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1 Introduction 
  
  
  
1.1 Motivation  
One of the basic principles of economic thought is that firms seek to maximise 
expected profits. The pioneering work by Cournot, Bertrand and Edgeworth in the 
19th century focuses on the questions how non-cooperative profit maximising firms 
compete and how prices are formed when there are only a few competitors in the 
market. These questions form the foundation of oligopoly theory, which literally 
means ‘few to sell’ (oligoi polein). In the course of the 20th century, oligopoly theory 
has become one of the backbones of industrial organisation which currently may be 
considered as one of the main fields in economics.  
In his seminal article, Hotelling (1929) underlines the importance of product 
differentiation in oligopoly theory. He shows that price competition is softened 
when products are differentiated and consumers have heterogeneous tastes. 
Subsequent studies extend the idea of product differentiation in various directions. 
For example, Chamberlin (1933) and Kaldor (1935) discuss whether all product 
variants are symmetric substitutes or not; Lancaster (1966 and 1979) adds the 
distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation; McFadden (1974) 
introduces discrete choice modelling to model consumers’ heterogeneous tastes; 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) study monopolistic competition using a representative 
consumer model including a taste for variety; and Berry (1994) and Berry et al. 
(1995) focus on measuring product differentiation.  
This dissertation adds to the current literature the study of competition with 
endogenous product differentiation for multi-product firms, accounting for both 
observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity. Hotelling’s article implies that 
product differentiation may be a key strategy for profit maximisation. In addition, 
in modern industries most firms produce multiple product variants. Surprisingly, 
however, both endogenous differentiation and multi-product firms are largely 
ignored in the literature. The few exceptions, amongst others Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), do not account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity. Furthermore, this 
dissertation combines demand uncertainty and product differentiation in capacity-
then-price competition and analyses the impact of differentiation on capacities, 
welfare and price dispersion. Although capacity-then-price games are well 
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documented and analysed, the effect of demand uncertainty (Reynolds and Wilson, 
2000) and differentiation (Benassy, 1989) are only studied separately. Apart from 
these theoretical contributions, two empirical studies analysing consumer and 
supplier behaviour in differentiated markets are included in this dissertation. The 
first study focuses on the analysis of consumer demand for vertically differentiated 
product variants and the long term impact of loyalty programs. The second study 
analyses consumer behaviour in a transport market with imperfect substitutes.  
The focus of this dissertation is on the interaction of consumer heterogeneity, 
product differentiation and (oligopolistic) competition between scheduled service 
suppliers in transport markets. Throughout this dissertation, the aviation industry 
serves as the prime example of such a market. The aviation industry, like many 
other contemporary industries, can be characterised by a high degree of product 
differentiation. For instance, a quick search on the internet to buy a ticket to your 
next holiday destination results in an extensive list of available airline tickets to 
choose from. The alternatives generally differ in a range of attributes like price, 
departure and arrival time, luggage allowances, and in-flight quality. Although the 
product is essentially the same – travelling to your destination – the available 
alternatives may differ between competing carriers, but even more between the fare 
types available from a single carrier. Furthermore, the ticket you choose to buy 
depends on your tastes and other individual factors, such as trip purpose and socio-
economic characteristics. It is not hard to imagine that the elderly couple buying a 
ticket to their holiday destination will have other preferences than the regular 
business man who needs to attend a meeting in another city the next day. 
A thorough understanding of the impact of observed and unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity on (multi-product) firm behaviour lies at the heart of normative 
(welfare and policy) analysis. Because airline networks form important links 
between regions and the world economy, policy makers need insight into airline 
behaviour to understand possible opportunities and threats for the local economy’s 
international position. 
The next section provides a short background on the combination of product 
differentiation and discrete choice theory. Section 1.3 discusses current 
developments in the aviation industry. Section 1.4 formulates the research 
objectives and discusses the outline of this dissertation.  
 
 
1.2 Product differentiation and discrete choice theory 
In a series of articles published in the late 80’s and early 90’s of the last century 
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse explore the linkage between discrete choice theory, 
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product differentiation, and competition between firms for different market 
structures.1 They argue that the random utility framework, and in particular the 
discrete choice model, is utmost suitable to study consumer behaviour in markets 
with differentiated goods.  
1.2.1 Product differentiation  
The essence of product differentiation is that the purchase decision of consumers is 
not only based on the price, but also on non-price characteristics of the product 
(Anderson et al., 1992). Products, or industries, may be horizontally differentiated, 
vertically differentiated or both (Lancaster 1966 and 1979). The distinction between 
horizontal and vertical product differentiation has large implications for market 
outcomes, as will become apparent in Chapter 5. When there is no consensus on 
the ranking of the products amongst consumers, the products are horizontally 
differentiated. As a consequence, each product variant always obtains a positive 
demand in the event that all variants are priced at their marginal production costs. 
In contrast, products are vertically differentiated if consensus about such a ranking 
of product variants amongst consumers exists. Differentiation based on 
geographical location or based on taste are classic examples of horizontal 
differentiation, whereas differentiation based on quality refers to vertical 
differentiation.  
Anderson et al. (1992) convincingly show that the two mainstream approaches to 
determine the aggregated demand in case of differentiated products – the 
representative consumer model and the address model – are consistent with the 
random utility framework.2 For oligopolistic price competition with differentiated 
products, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) prove the existence of a price equilibrium for 
a whole range of random utility models. Supported by this result, the random 
utility model is used as a starting point to study product differentiation for multi-
product firms and endogenous quality setting in Chapters 2 and 3. Besides 
analytically tractable results, at least in the standard models, and the guaranteed 
existence of an equilibrium, the random utility framework is preferred due to its 
frequent use in empirical transport (demand) analysis and applicability in 
analysing the impact of the strategic decision variables of firms, such as, price, 
quality and location. 
                                                          
1 Many of the articles, amongst others Anderson et al. (1989) and Anderson and de Palma (1992a 
and 1992b), are published in Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, a textbook by the 
same authors (Anderson et al., 1992). 
2  The representative consumer model is put forward by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to study 
monopolistic competition, whereas the address (or characteristics) model is developed halfway the 
last century by several authors, amongst others Lancaster (1966) and Baumol (1967), based on the 
seminal contribution by Hotelling (1929). 
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1.2.2 The discrete choice model and (air) transport demand analysis 
One of the major implications of Hotelling’s work is the notion that although 
demand for (differentiated) products may be discontinuous at the individual level, 
aggregation of demand over a heterogeneous population may yield continuous 
demand at the market level. Often purchase decisions can be regarded as mutually 
exclusive choice situations resulting in discontinuous demand. Particularly in the 
field of transport economics, purchase decisions are mutually exclusive: the elderly 
couple only needs one ticket of a single supplier to travel to their holiday 
destination. The random utility model, as first proposed by McFadden (1974), is 
another approach to allow for continuous demand at the individual level.   
The main assumption of random utility models is that each consumer chooses the 
alternative that maximises his or her utility. However, the firm cannot observe the 
idiosyncratic preferences that may affect the utility of the individual consumer. As a 
result, the individual purchase decision as observed by firms is a random process. 
By assuming a specific distribution for the random variable, reflecting the 
unobserved (idiosyncratic) preferences, one can express individual demand as a 
continuous probability function. The probability that a consumer chooses a specific 
alternative in the market is the ratio of the utility the passenger gets from that 
alternative and the summation of the expected utility of all alternatives in the 
market.3 As a result, the firm can predict aggregate demand without observing the 
idiosyncratic preferences of the individual consumer.  
The contribution by McFadden (1974) has spurred a wave of research in 
disaggregate demand analysis using discrete choice models in the field of 
marketing, spatial, and transport economics. Improvements in computational 
capacities and availability of large revealed and stated preference data sets allowed 
researchers to develop and apply extensions to the standard multinomial logit 
model in the last two decades.  
Discrete choice models are frequently used in empirical studies analysing 
competition in the aviation industry. Skinner (1976), Harvey (1987), and Ashford 
and Bencheman (1987) provide the first applications of the multinomial logit 
model analysing airline- and airport competition in the Baltimore-Washington 
Biregion, San Francisco Bay Area and Central England respectively. The large 
influence of (public) availability of disaggregate data sets becomes apparent when 
                                                          
3 A word of caution regarding the term random is necessary. Following McFadden (1974) and 
Manski (1977), the term random reflects that consumer behaviour as observed by the researcher or 
firm is random, while the behaviour of the consumer is perfectly rational and deterministic given 
the unobserved individual preferences. Another interpretation found in the literature is that 
consumers themselves are not rational and may show randomness in their behaviour. Throughout 
this dissertation, the term random refers to the restriction that the researcher or firm cannot 
observe individual preferences completely.     
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realising that a large share of these studies focuses on the same multi-airport area. 
Harvey (1987), Pels et al. (2003), Basar and Bhat (2004), Hess and Polak (2005), 
Hess and Polak (2006), and Ishii et al. (2009) all study competition in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, and use, except for Harvey (1987), all the same data set. These 
studies, however, differ in the focus on competition. For example, Harvey (1987), 
Basar and Bhat (2004) and Hess and Polak (2005) focus exclusively on airport 
choice, whereas Pels et al. (2003) analyse airport and access mode choice and Ishii 
et al. (2009) study airport and airline choice. Hess and Polak (2006) study three 
choice dimensions: airports, airlines and access modes. Except for Harvey (1987), 
all studies provide extensions of the standard multinomial logit model. Pels et al. 
(2003) specify a nested logit model, whereas mixed multinomial logit models are 
presented by Hess and Polak (2005) and Ishii et al. (2009). 
Product differentiation and discrete choice theory are essential elements in 
developing an analytical framework to understand the challenges that scheduled 
service suppliers and policy makers in the aviation industry face. The next section 
illustrates these challenges by discussing the current developments in this industry.  
 
 
1.3 Developments in the aviation industry 
Airlines worldwide shipped 46 million tonnes of freight and 2 800 million 
passengers in 2011. Forecasts indicate that carriers will ship 400 million tonnes of 
freight and 16 000 million passengers annually by 2050 (IATA, 2011). The 
forecasts and impressive growth figures in passengers, freight, revenues and 
number of airlines worldwide over the last four decades seem to contradict the 
profitability performance of carriers. In a recent article, Borenstein (2011) reports a 
total loss for the US domestic airline industry of $54 billion over the period 2000 to 
2009.4 One of the reasons for this paradox is that legacy carriers cannot maintain 
their price premiums while they also struggle to close the cost gap with low-cost 
carriers.  
In an extensive report for the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
Porter and Pearce apply the five forces framework5 to analyse the economic forces 
behind this paradox (IATA, 2011). A first important force is the threat of new 
entrants. Over 1 300 carriers entered the industry in the last four decades resulting 
in more intensive price competition. The availability of substitutes is mentioned as 
a second force. Besides extended possibilities of telecommunication, the 
                                                          
4 Other discussions about the profitability of global carriers can be found in Morrell (2011) and 
Pearce (2012). 
5 See Porter (1979).  
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development of high-speed rail in Europe and Japan turns out to be a viable 
competitor on short and medium haul point-to-point markets. Furthermore, rivalry 
among existing competitors, the third force, is at an extremely high level for two 
reasons. First, due to the sequential choice of capacity and prices individual airlines 
may set capacities too high. Second, although airlines apply sophisticated yield 
management systems, the product differentiation between firms, in particular 
within the same segments, is limited. Chapter 5 discusses this third force in more 
detail and shows that capacity may not be too high taking into account demand 
uncertainty and product differentiation. 
According to Porter and Pearce, the use of yield management systems without true 
inter-firm product differentiation leads industry wide to more intensive price 
competition. The effects are strong in the aviation industry because both loyalty of 
consumers towards carriers and consumer switching costs are low. They indicate 
that loyalty programs, so-called frequent flier programs (FFPs), may have a positive 
effect on carriers’ profits. Prior research has found some evidence that FFPs may 
indeed lead to entry-deterrence (Borenstein, 1989), switching costs (Klemperer 
1987a and 1987b) flight consolidation at hub airports (Lederman 2007 and 2008), 
and a higher willingness to pay for air fares (Morrison et al., 1989 and Morrison 
and Winston, 1995). Chapter 4 studies FFPs in detail.  
Besides profitability, the deregulation in the aviation industry, predominantly in 
the US and Europe, and its impact on competition also attracts attention. The US 
domestic airline industry is deregulated since 1978, whereas the deregulation in 
Europe has been realised in three consecutive phases, in 1988, 1990 and 1993. Full 
deregulation in Europe was established in 1997 (Goetz and Vowles, 2009). The so-
called US-EU Open Skies agreement that became effective in 2008 deregulates the 
aviation industry between the two continents. Although the industry is deregulated 
for the transatlantic market, other international aviation markets are still 
dominated by bilateral trade agreements between national governments. 6 
Furthermore, national governments around the world, including the US and 
Europe, increase barriers by bailing out (flag) carriers, limit ownership by other 
nationalities, and limit the incentives for buying rivals via antitrust rules (IATA, 
2011).7  
 
                                                          
6 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) continuously reviews the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services in air transport (WTO, 2007). Traffic rights granted and exercised can be compared via: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/transport_air_e.htm 
7 The position of the European Commission regarding the recent hostile takeover bids by Ryanair 
for Aer Lingus underlines these limitations, based on antitrust arguments, for buying rivals 
(European Commission, 2012).  
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1.3.1 Low-cost carriers  
In recent years, low-cost carriers have been by far the most profitable carriers. Over 
the period 2000-2009, Ryanair is the only carrier to achieve an average earnings 
before interest and tax margin over 20 per cent. The industry average over the 
same period equals just 0.7 per cent (IATA, 2011). Several other low-cost carriers 
are amongst the best performing carriers in terms of profitability. Although casual 
observation may reveal distinctive variation between the low-cost carriers on the 
one hand, and legacy carriers on the other, there is no standard definition 
separating them. The strategy of low-cost airlines is sometimes referred to as 
‘cherry picking’: only profitable markets are served. Due to the more complex 
network structure of legacy carriers, i.e. hub-and-spoke network, these type of 
carriers are less flexible in withdrawing from specific routes. Hence, even when a 
legacy carrier faces strong competition from low-cost carriers or high-speed rail, 
ceasing operations on this route will have repercussions for the whole network: all 
the markets in which this route is used, and tickets are offered, will be lost. 
The emergence of hub-and-spoke networks in the aviation industry, as well as 
competition between carriers operating these networks is well documented and 
analysed in the literature. A general finding is that consolidation of the own hub-
and-spoke network takes away the incentive to invade the competitor’s hub 
markets.8 Much less attention has been paid to the effect of competition between 
carriers operating a hub-and-spoke network and typical point-to-point carriers. 
Recently, Alderighi et al. (2012) study the impact of low-cost carriers in Europe on 
competition. They conclude that legacy carriers decrease fares in all segments with 
an emphasis on the mid-segment fares as a result of low-cost carriers entering the 
market. 
1.3.2 Intermodal transport 
The expansion of high-speed rail infrastructure, predominantly in Asia and Europe, 
changes the competitive environment for the aviation industry in point-to-point 
markets.9 Looking, for example, at China, 6 299 km of high-speed track is in 
operation, another 4 339 km is under construction and 2 901 km is planned (UIC, 
2011). Other countries in Asia, like India, Iran, Japan, Saudi Arabia and South 
Korea, also have high-speed rail in operation, under construction or planned. This 
high-speed rail network offers connections between megacities, such as between 
Beijing-Shanghai, Mumbai-Ahmedabad, Tokyo-Shin Osaka, and Seoul-Daegu.  
                                                          
8 See, for example, Zhang (1996), Hendricks et al. (1999), and Pels and Verhoef (2004). 
9 As is the case for low-cost carriers, a standard definition of high-speed rail is not available. In 
Europe, rail is defined as high-speed if new infrastructure is designed for speeds above 250 km/h or 
existing infrastructure is upgraded for speeds above 200 km/h.  
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Figure 1.1 Total annual revenue passenger km (in billion) for air transport (primary vertical axis) and high-
speed rail in Europe (secondary vertical axis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AEA (2012), UIC (2012). 
 
In Europe, a total of 6 637 km of high-speed rail track is in operation, while another 
2 427 km is under construction and an extensive expansion, that is 8 705 km, is 
planned. Nowadays, high-speed rail offers connections between main urban areas, 
for example between London-Paris, Madrid-Barcelona, Frankfurt-Cologne, and 
Amsterdam-Paris. Chapter 6 provides an empirical study of intermodal 
competition in the London-Paris passenger market. Figure 1.1 shows the total 
annual revenue passenger km (in billion) for air transport (primary vertical axis) 
and high-speed rail in Europe (secondary vertical axis). High-speed rail in Europe 
experienced a continuous growth over the last decade, whereas the aviation 
industry experienced a decline in 2008. The large growth for high-speed rail in the 
years 2007, 2008 and 2009 may be caused by the opening of significant lines in 
Europe, like the high-speed rail connecting London with Brussels and Paris. 
Despite the large growth and the extensive expansion plans, air transport is still 
almost ten times as large as the size of high-speed rail in Europe.   
In the United States there are ongoing projects to develop high-speed rail. The 
California High-speed Rail Authority proposes to connect Los Angeles with San 
Francisco and its international airports via high-speed rail, while the Midwest 
High-speed Rail Association is studying the possibility of connecting Chicago 
O’Hare airport with downtown Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit and Indianapolis.10 
                                                          
10  For more detailed information about the projects, see www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov and 
www.midwesthsr.org. 
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1.4 Research objectives and outline 
The discussion about the role and impact of low-cost carriers and high-speed rail 
illustrates that the aviation industry is a strong example of a market with 
oligopolistic competition between imperfect substitutes. A coherent analytical 
framework can provide the tools to analyse oligopolistic markets with imperfect 
substitutes, in particular non-cooperative firm behaviour and the effect on welfare. 
The aim of this dissertation is to provide such a framework and thereby to 
contribute to the understanding of the interaction between consumer 
heterogeneity, product differentiation and oligopolistic competition between 
scheduled service suppliers.  
To this end, Chapters 2 and 3 study the question at what levels of observed and 
unobserved demand heterogeneity a multi-product strategy with endogenous 
price- and quality setting is a profit maximising strategy for a monopoly and/or a 
(asymmetric) duopoly. Besides endogenous quality differentiation as part of yield 
management, Dana (1999) argues that aggregate demand uncertainty may result 
into price dispersion. Chapter 5 studies how capacity-then-price games affect the 
functioning of markets given demand uncertainty and imperfect substitutes. 
Chapters 4 and 6 study two related empirical questions. The first empirical study, 
Chapter 4, analyses whether there is a long term impact of consumer loyalty 
programs on consumer behaviour in the aviation industry, as suggested by 
Lederman (2007 and 2008) and Borenstein (2011). The second empirical study, 
Chapter 6, discusses to what degree and under which conditions imperfect 
substitutes are feasible competitors in transport markets focussing on the 
competition between high-speed rail, legacy carriers and low-cost carriers. 
The outline of this dissertation is summarised in Figure 1.2. The five chapters are 
categorised based on theoretical or empirical focus and addressing single- or multi-
product firms. Except for Chapter 5, all chapters apply the random utility 
framework. Chapter 5 includes demand uncertainty as source of stochasticity. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are linked via focussing on endogenous product differentiation by 
firms choosing quality and prices in two stages. In Chapter 5 endogenous product 
differentiation is excluded. Therefore, we can compare the impact of yield 
management, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, with the impact of demand 
uncertainty, as discussed in Chapter 5, on the functioning of oligopolistic markets 
in general and price dispersion in particular. The empirical analyses also take the 
degree of product differentiation as given and analyse the consumer behaviour in 
markets with imperfect substitutes. In Chapter 4 these imperfect substitutes are 
offered by a single, multi-product firm. Chapter 6 studies multiple firms and does 
not focus on multi-product strategies. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 focus at the firm level by 
addressing yield management, whereas Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the market level. 
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Figure 1.2 Outline of the dissertation (excluding introduction and discussion). 
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Chapter 2 starts with reformulating the classic model by Mussa and Rosen (1978) 
of profit maximising behaviour of a multi-product monopoly into the more general 
random utility framework. The study provides the conditions regarding unobserved 
heterogeneity under which a multi-product monopoly supplies a non-symmetric 
product line.  
Chapter 3 extends the model, as developed in Chapter 2, to study quality-then-
price setting in a duopolistic market. Although this extension may seem 
straightforward at first sight, including strategic interaction amongst firms in both 
stages of the game does not only make the analysis more complex, it alters the 
qualitative results of the viability of multi-product strategies as well. This chapter 
analyses whether interlaced equilibria can be the outcome of profit maximising 
strategies, as hinted at by Cheng et al. (2011), using the random utility framework.  
Chapter 4 analyses the purchase behaviour of consumers of an airline with a 
differentiated fare structure, hence a multi-product firm. The main contribution of 
this chapter is the analysis of the impact of non-linear token accrual in loyalty 
programs, particularly FFPs, on consumer behaviour. As discussed in Section 1.3, 
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FFPs are generally believed to have a positive impact on consumer’s loyalty. Prior 
studies have based their findings on the use of aggregate data, whereas this chapter 
employs a disaggregate data set with repeated observations over a three-year 
period.  
Chapter 5 models capacity and price setting in a duopolistic market as a two-stage 
game and includes both demand uncertainty and (exogenous) product 
differentiation. This chapter contributes to the literature by integrating capacity 
setting under uncertainty with product differentiation. The chapter analyses in 
detail how the capacity-then-price equilibrium is affected by uncertainty and the 
level of differentiation in terms of capacity, efficiency and price dispersion. 
Chapter 6 presents an empirical analysis of intermodal competition, including 
high-speed rail, low-cost carriers and conventional carriers, in the London-Paris 
passenger market. Studies analysing competition between high-speed rail and 
carriers are limited and generally apply stated preferences techniques. The 
empirical specification in Chapter 6, based on revealed preferences, provides a 
framework to assess the impact of the presence of imperfect substitutes, and 
changes in the characteristics of the substitutes such as travel time, on consumer 
and firm behaviour.  
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the findings, provides conclusions, and discusses 
implications for policy and future research.  
 

2 Vertical product differentiation in a 
multi-product monopoly using a 
random utility framework 
 
 
  
  
  
2.1 Introduction11 
This chapter studies the patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multi-
product monopoly using a random utility framework. The economic motives for a 
multi-product strategy are studied by, for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978), 
Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006), and 
Cheng et al. (2011).  
The seminal article by Mussa and Rosen (1978) assumes that the willingness to pay 
for quality differs across consumers and that at least the distribution of this 
willingness to pay is known. The random utility framework is more general and 
assumes that the firm cannot predict consumer preferences completely. If besides 
the distribution of the willingness to pay, also the distribution for the random 
variable reflecting the unobserved (idiosyncratic) preferences is known, one can 
express individual demand as a continuous probability function. As a result, the 
firm can predict the aggregate demand without observing the idiosyncratic 
preferences of the individual consumer. So, in the random utility model, demand 
heterogeneity is based on heterogeneity in observed attributes (quality) and 
unobserved attributes. The demand heterogeneity introduced by Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), however, is only based on heterogeneity in observed attributes. 12  The 
random utility framework is frequently used in empirical analyses regarding multi-
product industries.13   
A key question regarding vertical product differentiation is whether the predicted 
equilibrium patterns are symmetric. Symmetry here refers to the occurrence that 
prices and qualities of all product variants supplied by a single firm are equal in the 
equilibrium. Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Cheng et al. (2011) show that for 
                                                          
11 This chapter is based on the TI discussion paper by Behrens et al. (2012). 
12 Throughout Chapters 2 and 3, the latter is referred to as the deterministic model. 
13 See Crawford (2012) for a recent overview of this literature. 
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deterministic models, fully differentiated equilibrium patterns exist for a monopoly 
and duopoly. In contrast, Anderson et al. (1992) mention the so-called ‘constant 
mark-up property’ resulting from the random utility model. This property suggests 
symmetric patterns of vertical product differentiation. 14  To the best of our 
knowledge, no attempt to show the existence of non-symmetric equilibria of 
vertical product differentiation within a random utility framework exists. This 
chapter looks at whether, and under which conditions, the random utility 
framework is applicable in modelling the non-symmetric patterns of vertical 
product differentiation, as often observed in multi-product industries.  
Based on a model closely related to the model used by Mussa and Rosen (1978), 
this chapter studies the relationship between the level of observed indirect utility 
on the one hand, as determined by prices, qualities, and the dispersion in the 
willingness to pay for quality, and unobserved utility on the other. The non-linear 
nature of the random utility framework prevents insightful analytical results from 
being available. The results of the numerical analysis show that the monopolist 
supplies vertically differentiated product variants if the level of unobserved 
heterogeneity is relatively low compared with the observed dispersion in 
willingness to pay for quality across consumers.  
Section 2.2 introduces the basic model of vertical product differentiation. Section 
2.3 looks at the patterns of vertical product differentiation in case the monopolist 
faces deterministic heterogeneous demand. Section 2.4 relaxes the assumption of 
deterministic demand by introducing a random utility framework. This section 
discusses in detail the resulting equilibrium patterns of vertical product 
differentiation and the welfare implications. Section 2.5 provides a discussion and 
conclusion. 
 
 
2.2 Background 
Each consumer is assumed to purchase one variant out of all product variants, or 
not to buy at all. The indirect utility of consumer t is as follows: 
 
? ??? ??
,
.
i t i
t
z αp θ q if consumert purchasesoneof thevariantsi
V
z otherwise
 (2.1) 
                                                          
14 Anderson and de Palma (1992) are particularly interested in the number of product variants per 
firm and not in the implied patterns of product differentiation. They study quality choice, multi-
product firms, and observed demand heterogeneity separately. This chapter shows that the 
‘constant mark-up property’ is partly due to the nature of the discrete choice model and partly due 
to the specific set of assumptions – in particular the exclusion of observed demand heterogeneity – 
applied by Anderson and de Palma.  
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Product variant i is characterised by its price, pi, and quality, qi. The generic 
parameter z captures the base utility a consumer attains if he or she decides not to 
buy a variant at all. The generic coefficient α captures the marginal utility of 
income, and tθ  represents the consumer specific marginal utility derived from 
quality. Consumers are homogenous with respect to their marginal utility of 
income. However, the implied willingness to pay for a unit increase in quality,  
/ ,tθ α  differs across consumers following a uniform distribution over the interval 
? ?? ?, ,θ θ  with density normalised to 1.  
Consumers self-select in product variants according to their willingness to pay for 
quality. Consumers with a relatively high θ  are willing to pay more for quality and 
therefore self-select in product variants with relatively higher qualities and prices if 
prices and qualities vary over variants that are supplied in the equilibrium.  
The utility function as depicted in Eq. (2.1) has no random terms and is 
deterministic; the utility – and hence behaviour – of consumers is fully explained 
by prices and qualities of the supplied product variants, the consumer sensitivities 
regarding these variables, and the base utility derived from other goods, z. This 
model is applied throughout the literature by, for example, Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), Gabszewicz et al. (1986), Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006), and 
Cheng et al. (2011). 
Producing quality is costly. The costs of quality improvement per unit of output 
become increasingly costly when quality increases. The unit costs of quality are 
strictly convex: 
 ? ? ? ?2? ? .i i ic q aq bq  (2.2) 
By assuming 0?a  and 0?b  it follows that ? ? 0?' ic q  and ? ? 0?'' ic q  for all qi. The 
cost function and linear specification of utility guarantee an interior solution with 
respect to quality setting. The optimal quality level for a given tθ  is determined by 
setting marginal costs of quality improvement, 2? ,ia bq  equal to the willingness  to  
pay for quality, / .tθ α 15  
By adding a random error term, ε, we introduce unobserved heterogeneity:  
                                                          
15 From this one can directly derive the quality the monopolist would provide in case everyone 
would have the same willingness to pay for quality: ? ?? ? 2? ?* / / .iq θ α α b  Because the mark-up the 
monopoly can attain is maximised if setting the social optimum quality level, the profit- and welfare 
maximising quality level coincides.  
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? ? ??? ? ??
,
.
i t i it
t
t
z αp θ q ε if consumert purchasesoneof thevariantsi
V
z ε otherwise
 (2.3) 
Assuming that the random error term is i.i.d. Gumbel distributed, one may write 
the expected demand functions as usual logit probabilities. One of the properties of 
the Gumbel distribution is that the variance equals ? ?2 2 6/ .μ π  The importance of 
the unobserved error term compared with the observed prices and qualities 
increases with this variance. The term in brackets is just a constant. However, the 
parameter μ, the so-called scale parameter, needs to be (empirically) determined 
(see, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Section 2.4 shows that the value 
of this scale parameter plays an important role in the implied pattern of product 
differentiation. 
The model as described in Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2) has been used to study 
deterministic demand heterogeneity in single-product duopolistic markets. Using 
backward induction, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium in prices and qualities can 
be found. In the first stage firms set their quality level and in the second stage they 
set their prices accordingly. The standard textbook results show that equilibrium 
profits rise in quality differences between the two variants. Therefore, there is a 
clear incentive to get a maximum differentiation between the two variants of both 
firms.16 The principle of maximum differentiation holds, even if costs of quality are 
ignored and a symmetric duopoly is assumed. The observed heterogeneity in 
demand, however, needs to be large enough, i.e. 2? ,θ θ  otherwise the interior 
optimal price of the low-quality variant becomes negative, so that one firm will 
cease to be active (Anderson et al., 1992, page  309).  
Besides studying vertical product differentiation for single-product firms, the 
deterministic model has been extended to multi-product firms. Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) and Gabszewicz et al. (1986) show that the monopolist maximises its profits 
by supplying multiple product variants with vertically differentiated qualities.  
The various studies into multi-product duopolists produce different results. 
Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006) find 
that profits are maximised when both firms supply just a single product variant. 
Cheng et al. (2011) argue that the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand may 
explain the results found by Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Bonnisseau and 
Lahmandi-Ayed (2006). In our model, the demand for products conditional on 
                                                          
16  The principle of maximum differentiation also applies to the standard Hotelling model of 
horizontal product differentiation. Both in horizontal- and vertical product differentiation models, 
firms differentiate their products in order to segment the market and to increase their market 
power, mark-up, and profits. See Tirole (1988) for a detailed exposition on the models of horizontal- 
and vertical product differentiation. 
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buying a product is perfectly inelastic. However, the unconditional demand is 
elastic because consumers can choose not to buy and obtain their base utility,  z, as 
shown in the last line of both Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.3). 
Observed heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for quality across consumers 
results in asymmetric patterns of vertical product differentiation for monopolies 
(Mussa and Rosen, 1978). To the best of our knowledge, no attempt to reproduce 
the results of Mussa and Rosen (1978) using the more general random utility 
framework exists. Anderson et al. (1992) are the first to integrate the discrete 
choice model into traditional models of vertical product differentiation. Their 
results, however, only show symmetric equilibria. The next section provides more 
details of the deterministic model in order to compare this model with the random 
utility model in section 2.4.  
 
 
2.3 Heterogeneous demand in observed attributes 
Following the model by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Cheng et al. (2011), the 
monopolist supplies n product variants.17 The variants are ranked in quality from 
q1,...,qn, with q1 representing the highest quality variant and qn the lowest quality 
variant.18 The marginal consumer t is defined to be the one with that iθ  for which 
he or she is indifferent between choosing two successive product variants or 
choosing between the lowest quality variant and not buying at all. Solving for iθ  
yields for every pair of variants i and i+1: 
 
    
 
1 1 1 1/ ,..., ,
max / , .
i i i i
i
i i
α p p q q for i n
θ
αp q θ for i n
     
 

 (2.4) 
Because every consumer buys the product variant which maximises his or her 
utility or no variant at all, the demand for each product variant equals:  
                                                          
17 Without loss of generality, the quality is measured linearly in the utility function and strictly 
convex in the cost function. It is also possible to have costs linear in quality and utility strictly 
concave in quality (Anderson et al., 1992). Furthermore, one could also adopt a negative index for 
quality and interpret this index as the number of restrictions of the product, for example the 
number of restrictions on a ticket. This measure has the benefit of practical applicability in studies 
regarding the aviation industry.  
18 The number of product variants n may be assumed to be exogenously given or endogenously 
determined. 
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   
   1
1
2
   
 
  
/ ,
/ , , .
i
i
i i
θ θ θ θ for i
x
θ θ θ θ for i n
 (2.5) 
In line with Eq. (2.5), the demand for the outside alternative, ,outx equals 
    / .nθ θ θ θ  Figure 2.1 illustrates the above results for a pair of prices and 
qualities of two product variants, assuming 1 2 ,p p 1 2 ,q q 1 ,α  and an arbitrarily 
level of z. The figure shows the willingness to pay for quality for two marginal 
consumers and the resulting demand for the two product variants. The monopolist 
does not cover the whole market, because consumers with a willingness to pay 
between θ  and 2θ  can attain a higher level of utility by not buying the product at 
all.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to model the pattern of product differentiation, the equilibrium prices, and 
qualities as used in Figure 2.1, one needs to include firm behaviour in the model. 
The monopolist maximises profits by setting prices and qualities for each product 
variant i. Total profits are equal to the summation over all variants of the price 
minus the costs for quality times the demand for the particular variant. Like Cheng 
                                                          
19 Throughout this chapter and Chapter 3, we assume that θ  is sufficiently low to guarantee that the 
market is not fully covered: /n nαp q θ  i.e. 2 3 .θ θ   
Figure 2.1 Utility, marginal consumers, and resulting demand for two product variants. 
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et al. (2011), here it is assumed that 0?a  and 1 2? / .b 20  The profit function, 
therefore, yields:  
 
2
1 2?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? .
n
i
m i i
i
q
π p x  (2.6) 
The maximisation problem is solved by formulating a quality-then-price 
equilibrium and applying backward induction. Taking the first order conditions 
with respect to prices and solving for the equilibrium prices, yields:  
 ? ? ? ?24? ?* .ii i iqp q αq θα  (2.7) 
Eq. (2.7) shows that the equilibrium price for each variant has an equal expression 
for all the product variants. Furthermore, the equilibrium price is an increasing 
function of the quality of that variant. After substituting the equilibrium prices into 
the profit function, taking the first order conditions with respect to quality, and 
solving for qualities, the equilibrium qualities yield:  
 ? ? ? ?
2 1
1 2
? ? ??
* .i
θq n i
α n
 (2.8) 
The combination of equilibrium prices and qualities as shown in Eq. (2.7) and Eq. 
(2.8) results in a unique equilibrium in which all n variants are active and have a 
different quality. So, every product variant has a positive demand, price, and 
quality. The quality difference between sequential ordered product variants, 
1? ?* * ,i iq q  is constant and equals ? ?2 1 2?/ .θ α n  This interval of quality-
differentiated product variants is also reported by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and 
Cheng et al. (2011). Furthermore, it is easy to check that the highest quality variant, 
i=1, has a quality equal to ? ?2 1 2?/ .θn α n   
By substituting the equilibrium qualities, Eq. (2.8), into the expression for 
equilibrium prices, Eq. (2.7), one can check the price difference between sequential 
product variants. The price difference, ? ? ? ?? ?22 21 2 2 2 1 2? ? ? ? ? ?* * / ,i ip p θ n i n α  is, 
in contrast to the quality difference, not a constant. In fact, the price difference is 
increasing in i. The price differential between neighbouring higher quality products 
is larger compared with neighbouring lower quality products. This has 
straightforward implications for the mark-up, 2? / ,i ip q  per product variant. 
                                                          
20 So, without loss of generality, the marginal costs of quality are set equal to the quality level itself. 
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Because the quality interval is constant, the marginal costs interval is also constant; 
however, the price interval is increasing. So, the mark-up needs to be higher for 
higher quality product variants. 
Intuitively, and clearly shown in Eq. (2.7), the equilibrium prices increase in the 
equilibrium qualities. Prices as well as qualities for all variants are increasing in the 
highest prevailing willingness to pay for quality, .θ  In contrast, equilibrium prices 
and qualities are not affected by the lowest prevailing willingness to pay for quality, 
.θ  The relevant willingness to pay in determining the market share of the monopoly 
is the willingness to pay of the consumer who is indifferent between buying a 
variant or not, i.e. / .n nαp q  Provided that ?/ ,n nαp q θ  the profit maximisation 
problem does not depend on ,θ  whereas total demand and profit is affected by .θ  In 
addition, prices are also decreasing in the generic price coefficient. Finally, an 
increase in the number of supplied product variants, n, has a positive effect on the 
quality of each product variant, and therefore on prices, which is consistent with 
the idea that the quality range is divided over more variants.21 Naturally, and in the 
absence of any fixed costs related to producing variants, the equilibrium profits are 
increasing in n. So, the monopolist obtains the highest profits if n goes to infinity. 
In that case, the profits equal:  
 
2
2
1
12??
? ? .mn
θ θ
π
α θ θ
 (2.9) 
Assuming the market is not fully covered, i.e. 2 3? ,θ θ  the profit of the monopolist 
increases in both the lowest and highest prevailing willingness to pay for quality. 
The profit is decreasing in the generic price coefficient. To analyse how vertical 
product differentiation in a monopoly affects welfare surplus is calculated. Surplus 
equals consumer surplus plus the profits of the monopolist: ? ? .mW CS π  The 
consumer surplus is the integral over the utility function for all types of consumers 
multiplied by the inverse of the marginal utility of income (Train, 2003, page 55): 
? ?1? ? , .θ
θ
CS V θ q dθ
α
 Due to the assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for quality, the consumer surplus can be conveniently calculated 
as: 
 1 11 1 1
2
1
2 2
?
?
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
* * * * .
n
i i
i i i out
i
θ θ θ θCS z αp q x z αp q x zx
α
 (2.10) 
                                                          
21 So, for example, the highest quality product, i=1, has a higher quality for a larger n as a result of 
being closer to perfect price discrimination. 
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The first complete term in the RHS of Eq. (2.10) deals exclusively with the highest 
quality product variant, whereas the second RHS term in Eq. (2.10) addresses all 
remaining n-1 product variants. The average of θ  equals ? ?1 2? ? /i iθ θ  over the 
applicable range. So, the two complete terms within brackets quantify the average 
utility of all consumers buying a certain product variant i with its equilibrium 
prices and qualities. By multiplying this average utility with the number of people 
buying this product variant, and adding over all variants, one arrives at the total 
consumer surplus. So, total surplus equals: 
  1 11 1 1
2
1
2 2
?
?
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
* * * * .
n
i i
i i i out m
i
θ θ θ θW z αp q x z αp q x zx π
α
 (2.11) 
Without loss of generality, the utility from other goods, z, can now be normalised to 
zero. This simplifies the consumer surplus calculation. Assuming that n goes to 
infinity, evaluating consumer surplus and profits shows that total surplus yields: 
 
2
2
1
8
? ? ? ? .m m
θ θW CS π
α θ θ
 (2.12) 
The fact that the monopolist supplies vertically differentiated products increases 
welfare. In case the monopolist offers a single product variant profits equal 
2
2
2
27 ? ,
θ θ
α θ θ
 while the consumer surplus equals 
2
2
1
27 ? .
θ θ
α θ θ
22 So, both profits and 
consumer surplus increase due to vertical product differentiation under a 
monopoly. However, the increase in surplus is limited; the surplus in case of a 
single-product monopoly equals 8/9 of the surplus in case of a multi-product 
monopoly.  
Now, assume that a social planner sets prices and qualities in such a way that the 
surplus as depicted in Eq. (2.11) is optimised. Evaluating consumer surplus – 
profits of the firm are equal to zero in the social optimum – assuming n goes to 
infinity yields:  
                                                          
22  For n=i=1, the demand for this single variety, by applying Eq. (2.4) and Eq. (2.5), yields 
? ?? ? ? ?1 1 1? ? ?/ / .x θ αp q θ θ  The quality equals ? ? ? ?2 3/ / /θ α  and the price equals ? ?? ?2 24 9/ / .θ α  
Plugging the quality, price, and demand in the profit function yields: ? ? ? ?? ?2 22 27? ?/ / .mπ θ θ α θ θ  
Substituting the equilibrium quality, price, and demand in Eq. (2.10) yields the consumer surplus:
? ? ? ?? ?2 21 27 ?/ / .θ θ α θ θ  
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2
1
6
? ? .o
θ θW
α θ θ
 (2.13) 
The social optimum can be characterised by the same quality variants but lower 
prices for each variant compared with the monopoly outcome. The monopoly sets 
the quality of its product variants at the social optimum, i.e. equalising willingness 
to pay and marginal costs of quality improvement, in order to maximise the mark-
up. Social surplus in the social optimum in Eq. (2.13), for equal n, always exceeds 
social surplus for the monopoly outcome in Eq. (2.12). In fact, assuming n as given, 
the social surplus in the monopoly is always, by dividing Eq. (2.12) by Eq. (2.13), 75 
per cent of the welfare in the social optimum.  
The above findings are illustrated in Figure 2.2 below. The area between the solid 
line and the utility from other goods, z, represents the total surplus in case the 
social planner sets the prices and qualities. In the social optimum, profits of the 
monopolist are zero and surplus coincides with the consumer surplus. The area 
between the long-dashed line and the utility from other goods, z, represent the 
surplus in the monopoly case. This is a summation of the profits and the consumer 
surplus, also shown in Figure 2.2.23 The triangular area enclosed by ,oW  ,mW  and 
z, indicated by A, represents the loss in surplus of the monopoly compared with the 
social optimum in the absence of any fixed costs for supplying a product variant. 
Figure 2.2 Welfare comparison between monopoly and social optimal outcome for ??.n   
 
                                                          
23 For example, an individual with a willingness to pay for quality of 0.5 chooses in the monopoly 
situation not to buy a product at all, whereas in the social optimum he or she buys a product and has 
a corresponding utility of approximately 0.14.  
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2.4 Heterogeneous demand in observed and unobserved 
attributes 
2.4.1 Nested logit model 
Anderson et al. (1989 and 1992) study and use the random utility framework for 
numerous issues in product differentiation theory. Our model set-up can be looked 
at as a combination of the models studied by Anderson and de Palma (1992a and 
1992b and 2001), on the logit model and quality choice, the multi-product 
oligopoly, and product selection and price competition. 
The structure of the nested logit model enables us to capture the differences in 
unobserved product heterogeneity between the products of the monopolist at one 
hand, and the unobserved heterogeneity between the products of the monopolist 
and the outside alternative at the other.24 Using this model enables us to compare 
the profit maximising patterns of product differentiation between the deterministic 
and random-utility demand models.  
The two-level nested logit model is depicted in Figure 2.3. The different product 
variants are the elemental alternatives nested per firm. The outside alternative, z, 
forms a single elemental alternative in a separate nest. Therefore, the two nests 
may be interpreted as buying versus not buying at all. The nested structure does 
not indicate a behavioural decision sequence of the consumers. It indicates that the 
product variants within a nest are more similar in unobserved attributes as 
perceived by the consumers compared with product variants in other nests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 By specifying a nested logit model, the error term included in Eq. (2.3) has two parts. The first 
part, say ,ytε  only captures the unobserved components varying over the product variants (lower 
level in Figure 2.3). The second part, say ,ρtε  only captures the unobserved components varying 
over the nests in the upper level in Figure 2.3.   
Figure 2.3 Nested demand structure for a multi-product monopolist. 
buy ? ?,m tP  not buy ? ?1 ,? m tP  
z ? ?1 ,? m tP  variant 1 ? ?1| ,m tP  variant i ? ?| ,i m tP  variant n ? ?| ,nm tP  
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Using the standard nested logit expressions, the demand for each product variant i 
of monopolist m is as follows: 
 
1
1
?
? ?? ,Ρ , , , ,i im t
t
x i n  (2.14) 
with ?, | , ,Ρ Ρ Ρ .im t i m t m t  So, each consumer t has a demand equal to the conditional 
probability of choosing product variant i given that they buy the product, 
multiplied by the probability that they actually buy the product. The total demand 
for product variant i is the summation over all consumers. Each consumer differs 
in their willingness to pay for quality / .θ α  The conditional probability is defined 
as: 
 
? ?? ?
? ?? ?
2
2
1?
? ??
? ??| ,
exp /
Ρ ,
exp /
i t i
i m t n
i t i
i
z αp θ q μ
z αp θ q μ
 (2.15) 
and the probability of actually buying a product from monopolist m as: 
 
? ?
? ? ? ?
1
1 1
? ?
,
,
,
exp /
Ρ ,
exp / exp /
m t
m t
m t
S μ
S μ z μ
 (2.16) 
with the so-called logsum, , ,m tS  defined as: 
 ? ?? ?2 2
1?
? ?? ? ?? ?? ??, ln exp / .
n
m t i t i
i
S μ z αp θ q μ  (2.17) 
The two scale parameters, 1μ  and 2 ,μ  determine the variance of the unobserved 
components in the utility function. The variance in unobserved components 
associated with the elemental alternative, the lower level in Figure 2.3, is 
represented by 2 ,μ  whereas 1μ  represents the variance associated with each nest, 
the upper level in Figure 2.3. The model as described in Eq. (2.14) to Eq. (2.17) 
offers a direct expression for consumer surplus. The consumer surplus is the 
summation of the expected indirect utility over all consumers (Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985):  
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The monopolist aims to maximise profits and behaves accordingly. The same profit 
function for the monopolist as in the deterministic case applies. The demand, xi, is 
now specified as in Eq. (2.14). Taking the first order conditions with respect to 
prices and qualities and solve them for the prices and qualities reveals the profit 
maximising strategy.  
Unfortunately, the non-linear nature of the nested logit model, and in fact any logit 
model, prevents any interpretable explicit analytical solutions in prices and/or 
qualities from being available. In addition, due to taking into account differences 
across consumers the implicit analytical solutions do not offer any tractable 
insights either.25 Appendix 2A states the first order conditions and discusses briefly 
the second order conditions. The appendix shows furthermore that under the 
assumption of a single representative consumer, consumer t*,  the implicit solution 
for the profit maximising prices equals the one given by Anderson et al. (1992, page 
251). Given the complexity of the implicit solutions, we focus on numerical 
solutions in the remainder of this chapter.26  
2.4.2 Unobserved inter- and intra-product heterogeneity  
The scale parameters, 1μ  and 2 ,μ  set the variance of the unobserved components of 
the utility. These unobserved components are also referred to in the literature as 
unobserved inter- and intra-product (firm) heterogeneity (Anderson et al., 1992, 
page 250) and are represented by error terms, say ytε  for the elemental 
alternatives, and ptε  for the nests.  
Both error terms follow a double exponential distribution with a mean equal to zero 
and a variance equal to  2 22 6/μ π  and  2 21 6/μ π  respectively. The variance 
increases in the scale parameters. A higher value of the variance, whether through 
an increase in 1,μ  2 ,μ  or both, implies that the systematic part of the utility, 
  ,i t iz αp θ q  becomes a less important factor in determining whether and which 
variant a consumer buys. Or, stated alternatively, an increase in the variance via 2μ  
makes the demand for a particular variant less sensitive to its own price-quality 
setting, whereas an increase in the variance via 1μ  makes the demand for whether 
or not buying a product at all less sensitive to the maximum expected utility, the 
logsum, of buying the product. If, in the limit both scale parameters approach zero, 
                                                          
25 In fact, the integral over ,θ  based on a logit demand function, has no closed-form expression if 
more than two product variants are supplied.  
26 For all numerical results presented here and in the next chapter, we calculated the accompanying 
Hessian matrix and evaluated the appropriate determinants of this matrix in order to guarantee the 
existence of the equilibrium.   
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consumer behaviour can be fully explained by the deterministic part of the utility 
function. The nested logit model reproduces the outcomes as the deterministic 
model as discussed in the previous section.  
Consistency with random utility theory requires the unobserved heterogeneity at 
the upper level of the nested logit, see Figure 2.3, to be larger or equal compared 
with the unobserved heterogeneity at the lower level of the nested logit. This means 
that 1 2? ,μ μ  which has the straightforward interpretation that product variants are 
equal or more similar in unobserved characteristics amongst each other in 
comparison with the outside alternative. A final restriction on the parameterisation 
of the scale parameters is dictated by the inclusion of the outside, degenerated 
alternative. Having one elemental alternative in the nest requires that the scale 
parameters at both levels are equal.27    
The Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 show how the expected market shares (probabilities) 
for three product variants vary over the range of willingness to pay for quality for 
three different ‘extreme’ sets of values of the scale parameters. In contrast to Figure 
2.1, the expected market shares in the figures below are now based on the actual 
profit maximising price and quality for each product variant assuming 1?α  and 
2? .θ  The expected market shares in Figure 2.4 (upper panel) sharply react to the 
level of the systematic utility which varies per product variant for each consumer. 
For example, the probability of choosing product variant 1, 1 ,Ρ ,m t  directly 
approaches 1 at the moment the marginal consumer 1,θ  here around 1.72, prefers 
product variant 1 over 2 in observed utility components. In the lower panel of this 
figure, the observed utility per product variant for each consumer type is depicted 
reflecting the deterministic model. Due to the absence of any variation in the 
random components the nested logit model mimics the deterministic model. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the case in which the scale parameter associated with the 
elemental alternative approaches zero in the limit and the one associated with the 
nest is set to one. The expected market shares are still fully responsive to the 
differences in the systematic utility, but now only for the choice between the 
product variants and no longer for the choice between buying and not buying at all. 
Figure 2.6 shows the effect of a further increase in the value of the scale parameter 
of the elemental alternative to 0.5. In that case, the expected market shares are 
hardly responsive anymore to the differences in systematic utility between the 
product variants on the one hand and buying versus not buying at all on the other. 
So, the parameterisation of the nested logit model, or the empirical validation of its 
scale parameters, has a substantive influence on the appropriateness to analyse 
                                                          
27 In estimating nested logit models, only the ratio of the two scale parameters can be identified. 
This requires normalisation of the scale of one of the two levels, normally the upper level, at, for 
example, 1.  
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vertical product differentiation from a theoretical perspective using a logit demand 
model. In fact, as will become clear in the next section, the random utility 
framework is only useful if the relative importance of the observed utility compared 
with the unobserved utility is substantive. 
 
Figure 2.4 Market share as function of θ for random (upper panel) and deterministic (lower panel) utility and 
three product variants: 1,α ?  2? ,θ  1 0 001? . ,μ  and 2 0 001? . .μ  
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Figure 2.5 Market share as function of θ  for random utility and three product variants: 1,α ? 2,θ ?  1 1? ,μ  
and 2 0 001? . .μ  
 
Figure 2.6 Market share as function of θ  for random utility and three product variants: 1,α ? 2,θ ?  1 1? ,μ  
and 2 0 5? . .μ  
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2.4.3 Numerical results 
The full numerical results for product differentiation patterns in case of 
deterministic and random utility models are shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. 
Irrespective of the different parameter values or utility models, the monopolist 
maximises its profits by supplying an infinite number of product variants. 
However, for reasons of tractability, we limit the numerical analysis to supplying 
two product variants in Table 2.1 and five variants in Table 2.2. The numerical 
results are evaluated assuming 1? ,α  1 1? ,μ  and 0? .θ  The welfare implications, as 
shown in the last five lines of both tables, will be discussed in Section 2.4.4. 
As expected, the equilibrium prices, qualities, mark-ups, and profits increase, 
ceteris paribus, in .θ 28  In the deterministic model, the market shares do not 
depend on θ  because the monopolist offers fixed quality intervals, as shown in Eq. 
(2.8), and adjusts the prices and qualities accordingly. In the random utility model, 
an increase in θ  has an effect on the market shares of each product variant because 
a higher θ  implies a larger probability that people actually buy the product at all 
and buy higher quality variants. 
 
Table 2.1 Random utility model and deterministic model equilibria, n=2, μ1=1, α=1. 
 Deterministic Random Utility 
  2 0.1?μ  2 0.5?μ  2 0.9?μ  
 1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  
1p  0.56 2.24 14.00 1.47 2.81 13.45 1.54 2.26 13.32 1.62 2.32 12.91 
2p  0.24 0.96 6.00 1.47 1.65 14.94 1.54 2.26 15.12 1.62 2.32 17.97 
1q  0.80 1.60 4.00 0.52 1.56 13.87 0.52 1.12 13.84 0.52 1.09 13.71 
2q  0.40 0.80 2.00 0.52 0.59 11.62 0.52 1.12 11.66 0.52 1.09 12.45 
             
mark-up1 0.24 0.96 6.00 1.33 1.60 5.96 1.40 1.62 5.94 1.49 1.72 6.04 
mark-up2 0.16 0.64 4.00 1.33 1.47 3.62 1.40 1.62 3.75 1.49 1.72 4.97 
             
market share1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.19 
market share2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.18 
market sharem 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.24 0.30 0.41 0.28 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.37 0.38 
profitm 0.08 0.32 2.00 0.32 0.47 2.02 0.40 0.53 2.03 0.48 0.63 2.07 
             
CSm 0.04 0.16 1.00 0.28 0.38 1.15 0.34 0.42 1.16 0.39 0.48 1.16 
CSo 0.16 0.64 4.00 0.80 1.10 4.18 0.96 1.25 4.21 1.14 1.44 4.30 
Wm 0.12 0.48 3.00 0.61 0.85 3.18 0.73 0.96 3.20 0.88 1.12 3.24 
Wo 0.16 0.64 4.00 0.80 1.10 4.18 0.96 1.25 4.21 1.14 1.44 4.30 
Wm/Wo 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.75 
                                                          
28 This holds for 2 3? ,θ θ  hence for all situations in which the market is not fully covered. 
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Table 2.2 Random utility model and deterministic model equilibria, n=5, μ1=1, α=1. 
 Deterministic Random Utility 
  2 0.1?μ  2 0.5?μ  2 0.9?μ  
 1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  
1p  0.66 2.64 16.53 1.49 2.78 16.32 1.68 2.37 14.14 1.93 2.58 12.37 
2p  0.50 1.98 12.40 1.49 2.78 11.99 1.68 2.37 14.14 1.93 2.58 12.37 
3p  0.35 1.39 18.68 1.49 2.78 18.34 1.68 2.37 19.27 1.93 2.58 12.37 
4p  0.21 0.86 15.37 1.49 1.64 15.11 1.68 2.37 16.16 1.93 2.58 13.79 
5p  0.10 0.40 12.48 1.49 1.64 12.32 1.68 2.37 12.81 1.93 2.58 13.79 
1q  0.91 1.82 14.45 0.52 1.52 14.49 0.51 1.08 13.97 0.50 1.02 13.50 
2q  0.73 1.45 13.64 0.52 1.52 13.52 0.51 1.08 13.97 0.50 1.02 13.50 
3q  0.55 1.09 12.73 0.52 1.52 12.61 0.51 1.08 12.79 0.50 1.02 13.50 
4q  0.36 0.73 11.82 0.52 0.54 11.64 0.51 1.08 11.92 0.50 1.02 11.04 
5q  0.18 0.36 10.91 0.52 0.54 10.47 0.51 1.08 10.70 0.50 1.02 11.04 
             
mark-up1 0.25 0.99 6.20 1.35 1.63 6.25 1.55 1.79 6.26 1.80 2.06 6.26 
mark-up2 0.23 0.93 5.79 1.35 1.63 5.79 1.55 1.79 6.26 1.80 2.06 6.26 
mark-up3 0.20 0.79 4.96 1.35 1.63 4.95 1.55 1.79 5.38 1.80 2.06 6.26 
mark-up4 0.15 0.60 3.72 1.35 1.50 3.76 1.55 1.79 4.32 1.80 2.06 3.25 
mark-up5 0.08 0.33 2.07 1.35 1.50 2.21 1.55 1.79 2.56 1.80 2.06 3.25 
             
market share1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 
market share2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 
market share3 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 
market share4 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 
market share5 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 
market sharem 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.26 0.31 0.45 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.49 0.48 
profitm 0.08 0.33 2.06 0.35 0.49 2.12 0.54 0.70 2.24 0.80 0.98 2.43 
             
CSm 0.04 0.16 1.03 0.30 0.40 1.20 0.43 0.53 1.27 0.59 0.68 1.38 
CSo 0.16 0.66 4.13 0.85 1.16 4.35 1.27 1.58 4.60 1.77 2.11 4.99 
Wm 0.12 0.50 3.10 0.65 0.89 3.33 0.98 1.23 3.51 1.39 1.66 3.81 
Wo 0.16 0.66 4.13 0.85 1.16 4.35 1.27 1.58 4.60 1.77 2.11 4.99 
Wm/Wo 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.76 
 
Furthermore, the mark-up and market share of the highest quality variant is the 
largest for both models and all parameter values. The effect of unobserved inter-
product heterogeneity, 2 ,μ  on equilibrium prices, qualities, mark-ups, market 
shares, and profits is positive. So, if consumers become less sensitive regarding the 
observed part of the utility function, the monopoly can increase its mark-up freely 
by setting higher prices for the same quality. This will not affect the expected 
demand (market shares) for the variant. 
An equilibrium is symmetric if and only if prices and qualities of all product 
variants supplied by a single firm are equal. In contrast, the asymmetric 
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equilibrium can have overlapping, i.e. subsets of symmetric product variants, as 
long as at least two product variants supplied by a single firm differ in prices and 
qualities. In case prices and qualities of all product variants supplied by a single 
firm vary, like 1 2? ? np p p  and 1 2? ? ,nq q q  the equilibrium is fully differentiated. 
As expected based on Eq. (2.7) and Eq. (2.8), fully differentiated equilibria are 
found for all parameter values in the deterministic model. In the random utility 
model, however, only for a combination of low values of θ  and high values of 2μ  
symmetric equilibria are found. For example, with 2 0 9? .μ  the equilibrium is 
symmetric for 2 product variants in case θ  equals 1 or 2, whereas for 5 product 
variants not even a partially differentiated equilibrium exists for 1?θ  and 2? .θ  
The observed dispersion in willingness to pay for quality, ? ,θ θ  positively affects 
profits if the market is not fully covered. Intuitively, the monopolist differentiates 
more if this observed dispersion increases. The effect of 2μ  on the pattern of 
product differentiation is in line with the aforementioned observation that the 
importance of the systematic part of the utility – so, the realised prices, qualities, 
and associated sensitivities – diminishes when 2μ  increases. Hence, an increase in 
2μ  partly offsets the observed dispersion of willingness to pay for quality amongst 
consumers or makes this dispersion less important in the behaviour of the 
consumers.  
Figure 2.7 shows contour lines as a function of θ  and 2.μ  Below this line, a fully 
differentiated equilibrium exists and above the line the equilibrium is symmetric or 
asymmetric with overlapping product variants with at least two product variants 
not being equal in prices and qualities. The contour lines are drawn for two, three, 
four and five product variants respectively and with 7?θ  and 2 1?μ  as upper 
limits. In general, the nested logit model predicts fully differentiated patterns of 
product differentiation if the unobserved product heterogeneity, 2 ,μ  relative to the 
observed dispersion of willingness to pay for quality, ? ,θ θ  is small. Naturally, the 
more product variants are supplied, the more restrictive the parameters values to 
obtain fully differentiated equilibria become.  
These findings show that the random utility framework can be applied to study 
vertical product differentiation without the drawback of only analysing non-
realistic symmetric patterns of product differentiation and without relying on the 
assumption of completely deterministic demand. 
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Figure 2.7 Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria. 
 
2.4.4 Welfare comparison 
This section compares the surplus in two regimes. In the first regime, the 
monopolist maximises its profits, whereas in the second one a social planner 
maximises surplus. Surplus is the sum of our measure of consumer surplus, the 
logsum, and monopoly profits: 
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The last five lines of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 summarise the welfare measures of the 
two regimes, whereas in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 in Appendix 2B full results of the 
social optimal equilibria are shown. As can be readily verified by comparing the full 
results of Table 2.1 with Table 2.3, and Table 2.2 with Table 2.4 respectively, in 
both regimes the same product variants, in terms of quality, are supplied but for a 
higher price. The multi-product monopolist supplies the social optimal quality but 
adds a mark-up, resulting in higher than social optimal prices for all product 
variants.29 So, the differences in surplus are mainly a result of the difference in 
price setting. Due to this overpricing, consumers with a larger willingness to pay for 
                                                          
29 The social optimal price equals the marginal costs of supplying the particular product variant: 
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the product compared with the social costs of supplying this product may choose 
not to buy the product. This results in a loss in surplus. The market share of buying 
the product in case of the social optimal equilibrium is roughly twice the market 
share in case the monopolist optimises profits.30  
The last five lines in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 suggest that efficiency, which equals 
approximately 75 per cent, is independent on both observed and unobserved 
demand heterogeneity.31 The reason that the observed dispersion in willingness to 
pay for quality does not alter relative efficiency is that the monopolist supplies the 
social optimal qualities given the heterogeneity across consumers. The way the 
monopolist sets its prices is not affected by the level of observed heterogeneity, only 
the outcome is adjusted accordingly to the new optimal qualities. For the social 
planner, a change in observed heterogeneity across consumers also results into a 
change in optimal qualities and a change in prices. However, the rules for 
determining optimal or profit maximising pricing do not alter by a change in 
observed heterogeneity. Therefore, such a change would equally affect the 
monopolist and the social planner, resulting in a comparison between the two 
regimes in which efficiency is approximately constant. The same reasoning holds 
regarding unobserved heterogeneity. The scale parameters have the same effect on 
the profit function to be maximised by the monopoly and the welfare function to be 
maximised by the social planner. Therefore, efficiency does not depend on this 
scale parameter. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Product differentiation, whether horizontal, vertical, or a combination of both, is an 
important characteristic of many contemporary industries. This chapter shows that 
the patterns of vertical product differentiation for a multi-product monopoly can be 
explained and analysed using random utility models. 
This chapter confirms that the commonly used deterministic utility model is a 
special case of the more general random utility framework regarding predicted 
equilibrium patterns of vertical product differentiation. The use of the random 
utility framework offers two advantages over the deterministic approach. First, it 
relaxes the assumption that consumer preferences are completely observable by 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the random utility model is often 
                                                          
30 In the social optimum, all consumers with a positive willingness to pay for quality buy a product 
variant, whereas the pricing strategy of the profit maximising monopolist results in only half of the 
consumers, the fifty per cent with the highest willingness to pay for quality, buying a product.  
31 In contrast, the absolute loss in surplus depends on .θ  
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used in empirical work to study consumer behaviour in markets characterised by 
multi-product firms and vertical product differentiation. The study in this chapter 
shows that the random utility framework can also be used as a tool to study 
endogenous quality-price setting by multi-product in a monopoly market. One may 
therefore see theoretical and empirical analyses using the same framework 
benefitting from each other in the future. 
A concern, discussed throughout the literature on vertical product differentiation is 
the finding of symmetric equilibrium patterns in which a single firm offers multiple 
product variants with equal prices and qualities. For the deterministic framework, 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Cheng et al. (2011) show that fully differentiated 
patterns of product differentiation exist, whereas for the more general random 
utility framework this chapter is the first to show that such fully differentiated 
patterns exist. In contrast to the deterministic framework, the existence of fully 
differentiated patterns of vertical product differentiation in the random utility 
framework is conditional on the relative importance of the observed heterogeneity 
compared with the unobserved heterogeneity. The results show that unobserved 
inter- and intra-product heterogeneity should be small relative to the observed 
dispersion of willingness to pay for quality in order to find asymmetric equilibrium 
patterns.  
The relative loss in surplus due to monopoly power is constant for both the 
deterministic and random utility model keeping the number of variants fixed. The 
efficiency equals approximately 75 per cent. The efficiency is independent of 
observed heterogeneity in the sensitivity for quality. Furthermore, it does not 
depend on unobserved heterogeneity in the demand for the product or demand for 
product variants.  
Based the results, two different directions for further research are worth 
mentioning. First, and most importantly, the results of this study should be 
expanded to cover for other market structures, such as duopolistic and oligopolistic 
multi-product markets. Although based on the article by Cheng et al. (2011) one 
may conjecture that the results may hold for different market structures, the 
inclusion of strategic interaction between firms using a random utility framework is 
challenging. The next chapter extends the monopoly model presented in this 
chapter to a duopoly model. Second, although the literature tends to study 
horizontal and vertical product differentiation separately, an effort should be made 
to combine both sources of product differentiation, because it is also the 
combination of both playing a role in many industries.  
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Appendix 2A: First order conditions and implicit analytical 
solution 
This appendix shows the first order conditions with respect to prices and qualities 
for the random utility model. The complete set of first order conditions with 
respect to a decision variable contains n similar expressions. Taking the derivative 
with respect to prices of the profit function yields: 
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and with respect to qualities yields: 
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with 2 2? ? /i i iψ p q  for ? .i n  Solving 0? ? ?
!
/m iπ p  and 0? ? ?
!
/m iπ q  for ,iψ  the 
mark-up for product variant i, results into two expressions for this mark-up: 
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and  
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The optimal prices and qualities follow from equating the right hand sides of both 
Eq. (2A.3) and Eq. (2A.4) to each other. For the equilibrium to exist, the 
determinant of the Hessian matrix needs to alternate over the number of strategic 
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variables considered: for an uneven number of variables the determinants needs to 
be negative. Hence, if only one product variant is supplied, two strategic variables – 
the price and quality – play a role and the determinant of the (symmetric) Hessian 
matrix needs to be positive. Unfortunately, it is unwieldy to write down the 
appropriate second order conditions and resulting Hessian matrices for the model 
above. Therefore, the determinant of the Hessian matrix is calculated for every 
numerical result in order to be sure that the outcome represents a profit or welfare 
maximising equilibrium. 
By assuming a representative consumer, t*, we return to the original case as shown 
by Anderson et al. (1992, page 251):  
 
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
2 2
1 1
2 1
1 1
1 1
? ?
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? |
,
| |
Ρ Ρ
.
/ Ρ Ρ Ρ
n
m j j m
j j i
i
m i m i m
μ μ
ψ
α μ
ψ
μ μ
 (2A.5) 
Employing the same assumption for Eq. (2A.4), the second expression for iψ  
equals: 
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Equating Eq. (2A.5) and Eq. (2A.6) yields the optimal quality:  
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Now, one can multiply both sides with ? ?? ? ? ?2 1 1 1? ? ?| |/ Ρ Ρ Ρ ,m i m i mμ μ  subtract from 
both sides ? ?2
1 1
1 1
? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ? ? |,Ρ Ρ ,
n
m j j m
j j i
μ
ψ
μ
 and divide both sides by 2μ  to get: 
 1 ?/ / .i tα q θ  (2A.8) 
This expression implies that the optimal quality in case of a representative 
consumer, equals the willingness to pay for quality.  
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Appendix 2B: Patterns of product differentiation in the social 
optimum 
 
Table 2.3 Social optimal equilibria for the random utility and deterministic model: n=2, μ1=1, α=1. 
 Deterministic Random Utility 
  2 0.1?μ  2 0.5?μ  2 0.9?μ  
 1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  
1p  0.32 1.28 8.00 0.14 1.21 7.67 0.14 0.62 7.55 0.13 0.60 7.26 
2p  0.08 0.32 2.00 0.14 0.17 1.46 0.14 0.62 1.62 0.13 0.60 2.11 
1q  0.80 1.60 4.00 0.53 1.55 3.92 0.52 1.12 3.89 0.52 1.10 3.81 
2q  0.40 0.80 2.00 0.53 0.58 1.71 0.52 1.12 1.80 0.52 1.10 2.06 
             
market share1 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.31 0.34 0.43 0.34 0.37 0.41 
market share2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.38 
market sharem 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.55 0.64 0.81 0.62 0.68 0.80 0.68 0.74 0.79 
profitm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
             
CSm 0.04 0.16 1.00 0.28 0.38 1.15 0.34 0.42 1.16 0.39 0.48 1.16 
CSo 0.16 0.64 4.00 0.80 1.10 4.18 0.96 1.25 4.21 1.14 1.44 4.30 
Wm 0.12 0.48 3.00 0.61 0.85 3.18 0.73 0.96 3.20 0.88 1.11 3.24 
Wo 0.16 0.64 4.00 0.80 1.10 4.18 0.96 1.25 4.21 1.14 1.44 4.30 
Wm/Wo 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.75 
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Table 2.4 Social optimal equilibria for the random utility and deterministic model: n=5, μ1=1, α=1. 
 Deterministic Random Utility 
  2 0.1?μ  2 0.5?μ  2 0.9?μ  
 1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  1?θ  2?θ  5?θ  
1p  0.41 1.65 10.33 0.13 1.26 10.17 0.13 0.58 8.08 0.13 0.55 6.50 
2p  0.26 1.06 6.61 0.13 1.26 6.54 0.13 0.58 8.08 0.13 0.55 6.50 
3p  0.15 0.60 3.72 0.13 0.88 3.69 0.13 0.58 4.01 0.13 0.55 6.50 
4p  0.07 0.26 1.65 0.13 0.14 1.57 0.13 0.58 1.88 0.13 0.55 1.17 
5p  0.02 0.07 0.41 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.58 0.57 0.13 0.55 1.17 
1q  0.91 1.82 4.45 0.52 1.59 4.51 0.52 1.08 4.02 0.51 1.04 3.60 
2q  0.73 1.45 3.64 0.52 1.59 3.61 0.52 1.08 4.02 0.51 1.04 3.60 
3q  0.55 1.09 2.73 0.52 1.33 2.71 0.52 1.08 2.83 0.51 1.04 3.60 
4q  0.36 0.73 1.82 0.52 0.52 1.77 0.52 1.08 1.94 0.51 1.04 1.52 
5q  0.18 0.36 0.91 0.52 0.52 0.66 0.52 1.08 1.06 0.51 1.04 1.52 
             
market share1 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 
market share2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 
market share3 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 
market share4 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 
market share5 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 
market sharem 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.57 0.66 0.84 0.72 0.77 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.88 
profitm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
             
CSm 0.04 0.16 1.03 0.30 0.40 1.20 0.43 0.53 1.27 0.59 0.68 1.38 
CSo 0.16 0.66 4.13 0.85 1.16 4.35 1.27 1.58 4.60 1.77 2.11 4.99 
Wm 0.12 0.50 3.10 0.65 0.89 3.33 0.98 1.23 3.51 1.39 1.66 3.81 
Wo 0.16 0.66 4.13 0.85 1.16 4.35 1.27 1.58 4.60 1.77 2.11 4.99 
Wm/Wo 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.76 
 
 
3 Vertical product differentiation in 
multi-product duopolistic aviation 
markets 
 
 
  
  
  
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 looked at the pattern of product differentiation for a monopolist facing 
observed and unobserved demand heterogeneity. Chapter 2 concluded that fully 
differentiated patterns of product differentiation exist if the unobserved demand 
heterogeneity is small relative to observed demand heterogeneity. The current 
chapter extends the study in the previous chapter by including strategic interaction 
between firms in a duopolistic market.  
This chapter generalises the model of vertical product differentiation for multi-
product duopolistic competition, as discussed by Cheng et al. (2011), into a random 
utility framework accounting for both observed and unobserved random consumer 
heterogeneity. As in the previous chapter, the unobserved heterogeneity is 
introduced by a random term in the consumers’ utility function. Observed 
heterogeneity is caused by the dispersion in willingness to pay for quality. The 
duopolistic firms compete in number of variants, qualities, and prices. This chapter 
analyses under which conditions subgame perfect Nash equilibria exist with firms 
supplying a product line in which at least two variants supplied by a single firm 
differ in prices and qualities. 
Studies of vertical product differentiation in a random utility framework and 
endogenous price- and quality setting only report symmetric equilibria. In these 
equilibria, all the product variants supplied by a single firm have the same price- 
and quality setting (Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson and de Palma (1992)). 
Clearly, these symmetric equilibrium patterns are not anticipated to be found in 
reality. Therefore, the appropriateness of the random utility model in modelling 
endogenous product differentiation – see, for example, Anderson et al. (1989 and 
1992), Anderson and de Palma (2001), Berry (1994), and Berry et al. (1995) – may 
depend on whether the only type of equilibria obtainable within the random utility 
framework are these symmetric ones. 
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The aviation industry is a prime example of an industry with vertically 
differentiated multi-product duopolies. In Europe, multiple origin-destination 
pairs are served by two carriers only. For instance, a consumer flying from 
Manchester to Amsterdam, Copenhagen, or Dublin currently can choose between 
two carriers in each market. The same holds for consumers travelling from 
Edinburgh to Amsterdam or Dublin. In these markets a traditional legacy carrier, 
like Air France-KLM or Aer Lingus, competes with a low-cost carrier, like easyJet 
or Ryanair. The legacy carrier supplies different fare types characterised by 
different prices and qualities, whereas the competing low-cost carrier supplies one 
fare type with a single low price- and quality setting. The typical single-product 
strategy of low-cost carriers on the one hand, and the multi-product strategy of 
legacy carriers on the other, suggests a relation between number of variants 
supplied and the price- and quality setting. This chapter analyses profitability of 
multi-product strategies compared with single-product ones for both the low- and 
high-quality firm. The analysis takes into account the different relative levels of 
unobserved heterogeneity the firms may face.  
Although the literature on vertical product differentiation is well established, 
aviation specific literature on this topic is still rather limited. 32  Botimer and 
Belobaba (1999) are the first to explicitly mention the trade-offs that carriers 
supplying multiple product variants face. Their model, however, does not include 
quality, unobserved heterogeneity, or strategic interaction between firms. More 
recently, Lin and Sibdari (2009) use a random utility framework in a duopolistic 
market setting to conclude that a Nash equilibrium in prices exists. 
Compared with the study by Cheng et al. (2011), this chapter takes into account 
unobserved idiosyncratic consumer preferences and the possibility of entangled 
product variants implying interlaced equilibria. In comparison with Lin and 
Sibdari (2009), this chapter includes quality as a second strategic variable. The 
results show that in the random utility model of vertical product differentiation the 
nature of resulting equilibrium patterns – fully differentiated or not – crucially 
depends on the level of unobserved heterogeneity relative to the level of observed 
heterogeneity. Without unobserved demand heterogeneity, the incentive to supply 
an extra variant is only present if this extra variant serves the high-end of the 
market. This finding implies that interlaced equilibria are highly unlikely to exist in 
a deterministic setting. Taking into account unobserved heterogeneity, however, 
restores the existence of interlaced equilibria as observed in, for example, the 
aviation industry.  
                                                          
32 Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999), Algers and Beser (2001), and Balcombe et al. (2009) are 
the only empirical studies that address consumer behaviour regarding intrafirm product 
differentiation in the aviation industry.  
Vertical product differentiation in multi-product duopolistic aviation markets     41 
 
The next section introduces the model and shows how to define the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium in number of variants, qualities, and prices. Section 3.3 
discusses the random utility framework and specifies the nested logit demand 
model. Section 3.4 changes the focus to the numerical analysis with a discussion 
about possible market configurations. Section 3.5 presents the numerical results. 
The numerical analysis analyses the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in qualities 
and prices for a set of market configurations and thus number of variants. Section 
3.6 provides a discussion and conclusion.  
 
 
3.2 Model 
3.2.1 Background 
Throughout this chapter it is assumed that two firms, firms A and B, compete by 
supplying multiple product variants. Each variant may differ in the observed 
characteristics price and quality. As in the previous chapter, each individual 
consumer maximises his or her utility by choosing whether to buy the product and 
which particular variant. The indirect utility function of consumer t is defined as: 
 
? ? ? ??? ? ??
, ,
,
t ij t ij ij t
t t
V z αp θ q ε if consumer t purchases one of the variants ij
V z ε otherwise
 (3.1) 
with subscript i indicating the product variant and subscript j the firm. The indirect 
utility function consists of a systematic and stochastic part. The generic parameter 
z captures the utility derived from other goods and equals the utility obtained from 
not buying the product at all. The systematic utility is further determined by the 
generic marginal utility of income, ,α  the marginal utility of quality, ,tθ  the price, 
and the quality of the specific variant. The marginal utility of income and quality 
determine the willingness to pay for a unit increase in quality: / .tθ α  The 
willingness to pay differs across consumers following a uniform distribution over 
the interval ? ?? ?,θ θ  and density normalised to 1. This definition of observed 
heterogeneity across consumers is in line with the literature (see, for example, 
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz et al. (1986), and Cheng et al. (2011)). 
The stochastic part represents the unobserved heterogeneity across consumers. It 
is included in Eq. (3.1) via the individual and product variant specific error term tε . 
The specification in Eq. (3.1) is flexible and allows for specifying consumer 
behaviour to be consistent with a random utility framework. Furthermore, it also 
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offers the possibility to model the deterministic demand structure as used by 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Cheng et al. (2011). 
3.2.2 Market coverage 
The last line of Eq. (3.1) specifies that consumers may choose not to buy a product 
at all. Hence, firms do not have to cover the whole market. As in the previous 
chapter, to avoid full market coverage it is crucial to assume that the lowest 
prevailing willingness to pay across consumers is not too high with respect to both 
the outside alternative and the highest prevailing willingness to pay. The outside 
alternative is necessary for the existence of a differentiated multi-product 
equilibrium.  
Consider the case in which no outside alternative exists. This implies that each 
consumer buys a product variant no matter what. For a single-product vertically 
differentiated duopoly, it is obvious that both firms will maximise product 
differentiation under all circumstances to avoid Bertrand price competition. The 
incentive to maximise differentiation still holds if one of the two firms, let’s say 
firm B, supplies a second product variant. Assume that firm B supplies the lowest 
quality variants and starts increasing the quality of the second variant. Firm A 
already supplies the highest quality variant and will not change its quality setting. 
As a result, the second variant of firm B, located more close to the variant of firm A, 
increases price competition with firm A. This causes the mark-up of all variants in 
the market to decrease. Because of the full market coverage, the loss in mark-up 
cannot be offset by an increase in market share.33 Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed 
(2006) show this mechanism in detail. They illustrate that if firm B would set the 
quality of its second variant too close to firm A’s quality, firm A may locate its 
variant in between the two variants of firm B thereby earning a positive profit and 
reducing firm B’s profits even further.  
The example above is a general result of inelastic demand. In this case the inelastic 
demand is clearly dictated by the assumption that firms need to cover the whole 
market. The choice between buying and not-buying a product variant is inelastic 
with respect to the observable characteristics of the product variants. Regarding 
multi-product differentiation, two possible reasons for inelastic demand are 
mentioned in previous studies. First, ignoring the availability of the non-buying 
option – as done in Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-
Ayed (2006) – implies inelastic demand. 34  Second, if the lowest prevailing 
                                                          
33 If firm A would supply a second variant instead, the low-quality firm B would not change its 
quality either: by lowering its quality the firm cannot attract new consumers because the market is 
already fully covered. 
34 They assume that the demand for the lowest quality variant is determined via θ , instead of the 
firm deciding which consumers to serve. 
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willingness to pay across consumers is too high relative to the attractiveness of the 
outside alternative, no consumer considers not-buying. Demand, therefore, will be 
inelastic and the market fully covered (Cheng et al., 2011). By including unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity, a third possible reason emerges. If unobserved 
heterogeneity across consumers between buying and not-buying is large, the 
demand becomes inelastic for the price- and quality setting of each variant. 
Although the market is not fully covered, more precisely the market is divided in 
half, demand becomes inelastic and the incentives for product differentiation 
evaporate.  
3.2.3 Number of variants-then-quality-then-price game  
We define p as the vector of prices, and q as the vector of qualities of all product 
variants, so  1 1,..., , ,...,A BA n A B n Bp p p pp  and  1 1
,..., , ,..., ,
A BA n A B n Bq q q qq  where A 
and B are the j-subscripts referring to the two firms. Furthermore, let r  be the 
vector containing the number of product variants per firm:  r , .A Bn n  Hence, the 
profit function of firm j is as follows: 
       
 
1
  
r
rp q r; ; .
jn
j ij ij ij j
i
π p c q x n F  (3.2) 
The demand for each product variant xij is based on the indirect utility function in 
Eq. (3.1) and will be discussed in Section 3.3. 
The firm incurs two types of costs. First, a generic fixed cost for each variant, F, 
applies. Due to these fixed costs, nA or nB will not go to infinity.35 Second, the 
marginal cost of quality are equal to:     .ij ij ijc q a bq q   This specification assumes 
– like Mussa and Rosen (1978), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), and Cheng et al. 
(2011) – that marginal improvements in quality become increasingly costly. The 
combination of a utility function that is linear in the willingness to pay for quality 
and a cost function that is convex in quality ensures that none of the firms sets 
infinitely high qualities.36 
The duopolists play a three-stage game in which they optimise their profits by 
designing their product line. In the first stage the firms decide, simultaneously, 
how many variants they supply, whereas in the second stage the simultaneous 
quality setting of all product variants takes place. In the last stage, the firms 
determine prices given the afore chosen qualities and number of variants. In each 
                                                          
35 In contrast, Cheng et al. (2011) omit these costs and consequently only look at the case in which 
the number of supplied variants goes to infinity. 
36 As in the previous chapter, the parameters a and b are set equal to 0 and 1/2 respectively.  
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of the subgames, subgame perfect Nash equilibria can be established, taking into 
account the consequences in later subgames.  
The full game is solved by backward induction. Let’s define  1 ,..., AA A n Ap pp  and 
the other firm-specific vectors in the same manner. Given the vector of varieties r  
and the vectors of qualities qA  and qB  in the first and second stage respectively, 
the corresponding price-subgame is solved by    1* *; ,..., ; ,AA n Ap pq r q r  
   1* *; ,..., ;BB n Bp pq r q r  ensuring that: 
     p p q r p p q r* * *; ; ; ; ; ; .j j j j j jπ π  (3.3) 
 p q r* ;  is the resulting optimal price vector at which profits need to be evaluated in 
the quality stage. Denote this profit function for each firm as    q r p q r*; ; ; .π π  
The second stage quality-subgame equilibrium is then characterised by 
       1 1* * * *,..., , ,..., ,A BA n A B n Bq q q qr r r r  satisfying the following condition:  
     q q r q q r* * *; ; ; ; .j j j j j jπ π  (3.4) 
The resulting optimal quality vector,  q r* ,  is used to evaluate profits in the final 
stage. The profit function for each firm in the last stage is: 
      r q r p q r* * *ˆ ; ; ; .π π π  The third stage subgame equilibrium can then be 
characterised by * *, ,A Bn n  satisfying the following condition: 
     * * *ˆ ˆ, , .j j j j j jπ n n π n n  (3.5) 
Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is characterised by r* ,   q r*  and 
 p q r* ; .  If p*  is evaluated at  q r*  and q*  subsequently is evaluated at r* ,  we 
have found the corresponding equilibrium path. 
 
 
3.3 Consumer behaviour  
Following Anderson and de Palma (1992), a nested logit model is used to analyse 
consumer demand. Two possible specifications of such a nested logit model are 
depicted in Figure 3.1. The structure depicted on the left assumes that all product 
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variants, irrespective of the firm supplying them, are in one nest, whereas the other 
structure on the right depicts a nested model with firm specific nests. Product 
variants within the same nest are more similar in unobserved attributes compared 
with variants from other nests. The set-up on the left has therefore the 
straightforward interpretation that all variants, irrespective of the firm supplying 
them, are more similar in unobserved attributes compared with the outside 
alternative. In the structure depicted on the right, this distinction is made at the 
firm level. The question how the actual nesting structure looks like is eventually an 
empirical question. Chapter 6, for example, tests whether all aviation alternatives 
are more similar in unobserved effects compared with high-speed rail in a related 
mixed logit specification.37  
For the current analysis, it is important how the nested structure applies to both 
single and multi-product firms under varying levels of unobserved demand 
heterogeneity across consumers. A first analysis revealed that modelling the variant 
of the single-product firm in a separate nest, hence as a degenerated alternative, 
implies that for nearly all plausible levels of unobserved consumer heterogeneity 
the price- and quality setting of both firms hardly impact consumers’ choice 
between firms. As a result, the price- and quality setting of the single-product firm 
becomes irrelevant. In contrast, the multi-product firm still needs to take into 
account the impact of the price- and quality setting on all variants within the firm 
specific nest. The nesting structure depicted on the left in Figure 3.1 does not suffer 
from this drawback. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter applies the nested 
logit structure with all product variants in one nest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 One may also specify a three-level nested logit model: product vs. outside alternative, firm, 
product variant. For reasons of tractability, however, this analysis focuses on the two-level nested 
logit model. The standard multinomial logit model cannot be used because one cannot differentiate 
between the effect of stochasticity on the buying decision, i.e. the elasticity of the total demand, and 
on the product variant choice.      
Figure 3.1 Possible demand structures (nested logit) for multi-product duopoly. 
Buy 
1A 2A 1B 2B 
Outside alternative 
1A 2A 1B 2B 
Firm A Firm B Outside alternative 
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The model as depicted in Figure 3.1 requires to split the individual and product 
variant specific error term, as shown in Eq. (3.1), into two components: 
? ?, , , .ij t ijk t k tε ε ε  Here the subscript k indicates the nest and thus whether the 
consumer actually buys a product variant. The error component ,k tε  represents the 
individual unobserved random utility in whether buying any product variant, 
whereas ,ijk tε  represents the individual unobserved random utility for the 
combination of choosing product variant ij and buying the product.   
The two error terms are assumed not to be correlated. Furthermore, they are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed with scale parameters 1μ  
and 2μ  respectively. The variance of the corresponding density function equals 
? ?2 2 6/ .μ π  The scale parameters determine the variance of the error terms and 
thereby the importance of the unobserved component of utility. If, in the limit, both 
1μ  and 2μ  approach zero, the random utility model reduces to a deterministic 
model ignoring heterogeneity in unobserved attributes. 
The additional assumptions on the scale parameters are the same as in the previous 
chapter.38 First, the unobserved heterogeneity between alternatives within a nest 
may not be larger than the unobserved heterogeneity between alternatives from 
different nests, this requires 1 2? .μ μ  Second, the level of unobserved heterogeneity 
between the elemental alternative and the nest cannot differ for degenerated 
alternatives. So, for these alternatives one needs to impose 1 2? .μ μ  
 A higher value of the variance, whether through an increase in 1,μ  2 ,μ  or both, 
means that the systematic part of the utility, ? ? ,ij t ijz αp θ q  becomes a less 
important factor in determining whether and which variant a consumer buys. 
Stated alternatively, an increase in the variance via 2μ  makes the demand for a 
particular variant less sensitive to its own price-quality setting whereas an increase 
in the variance via 1μ  makes the demand for whether or not buying a product at all 
less sensitive to the maximum expected utility of buying the product.  
Based on the nesting structure on the left of Figure 3.1, total demand for product 
variant ij becomes: 
 
1?
?? ,Ρ ,ij ij t
t
x  (3.6) 
with ?, | , ,Ρ Ρ Ρij t ij k t k t  being the probabilities following a nested logit specification. So, 
each consumer t has an expected demand equal to the probability of choosing 
                                                          
38 See Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) for an in-depth discussion. 
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product variant ij conditional on choosing nest k (buying a product variant or not) 
multiplied by the probability of choosing nest k. The total demand for product 
variant ij is the summation over all consumers. The conditional probability is 
defined as:  
 
? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
2
2 2
1 1? ?
? ??
? ? ? ? ?? ?| ,
exp /
Ρ ,
exp / exp /
A B
ij t ij
ij k t n n
iA t iA iB t iB
i i
z αp θ q μ
z αp θ q μ z αp θ q μ
 (3.7) 
The probability of nest k equals: 
 
? ?
? ? ? ?
1
1 1
? ?
,
,
,
exp /
Ρ ,
exp / exp /
k t
k t
k t
S μ
S μ z μ
 (3.8) 
with the logsum, Sk,t, defined as: 
 ? ?? ? ? ?? ?2 2 2
1 1? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?, ln exp / exp / .
A Bn n
k t iA t iA iB t iB
i i
S μ z αp θ q μ z αp θ q μ  (3.9) 
The non-linear nature of the random utility framework prevents insightful 
analytical results from being available. In order to analyse the patterns of product 
differentiation in a multi-product duopoly and study the incentives to supply extra 
variants, the remainder of this chapter discusses an extensive numerical analysis. 
We solve the price setting stage, using sequential quadratic programming, for every 
set of possible qualities in a pre-defined grid of qualities given a pre-determined 
number of variants. Appendix 3A provides further details about the search 
algorithm. The pre-determined number of variants are based on actual observed 
market configurations that are described in the next section. 
 
 
3.4 Market configurations: Low-cost carrier versus legacy carrier 
Here, the possible market configurations are introduced. A particular market 
configuration is defined as the combination of the number of product variants 
supplied by each firm and the vertical order (price or quality based) of all variants. 
Table 3.1 gives an example of the current market configuration in the Manchester–
Amsterdam and Manchester–Dublin aviation markets based on price.  
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Table 3.1 Fares per fare type for a return flight, including a weekend stay, as published on the airlines’ 
websites for bookings 6 weeks in advance (in Euros). 
Manchester–Amsterdam  Manchester–Dublin 
Air France-KLM easyJet  Aer Lingus Ryanair 
195 (lowest fare) 175 (lowest fare)  180 (lowest fare) 35 (lowest fare) 
120 (economy) 210 (flexi fare)  120 (plus)  
355 (economy flexible)   670 (flex)  
545 (economy fully flexible)     
745 (business fully flexible)     
 
In the Manchester–Amsterdam market Air France-KLM competes with low-cost 
carrier easyJet, whereas in the Manchester–Dublin market Aer Lingus competes 
with Ryanair.39 With 180 scheduled flights in June 2012, Air France-KLM captures 
a market share – measured in number of flights – of 77 per cent. The market shares 
in the Manchester–Dublin market are more equal, in fact Aer Lingus and Ryanair 
split the market with 100 and 104 scheduled flights in June 2012.40  
Table 3.1 clearly shows a vertically differentiated product, with prices ranging from 
€75 to €745 in the Manchester–Amsterdam market and from €35 to €670 in the 
Manchester–Dublin market. The quality differences per fare type differ per carrier. 
For Air France-KLM, the differences in fare types represent the levels of flexibility 
the consumer has in cancelling and changing the flight and not the actual in-flight 
quality level. The business fully flexible fare type is an exception. The ‘flexi fare’ of 
easyJet provides both less restrictions on the ticket and a higher in-flight quality, 
like priority boarding and luggage handling.   
Table 3.1 reveals that the lowest available fares offered by the legacy carriers are 
more expensive compared with the ones offered by the low-cost carriers. 
Furthermore, low-cost carriers supply less number of variants than the legacy 
carriers. From this perspective, the launch and rollout of ‘flexi fares’ by easyJet in 
June 2011 – a high-quality variant – may be considered as a remarkable strategy. 
In the numerical analysis, we will address the possible incentives for a low-quality 
firm to supply an extra high-quality variant.  
The numerical analysis translates the actual market configurations, as shown 
above, into three distinctive scenarios. In the first scenario, both firms are single-
product firms. The high-quality firm, let’s say firm A, becomes a multi-product firm 
in the second scenario, whereas the low-quality firm remains a single-product firm. 
This second scenario resembles the duopolistic competition between Aer Lingus 
and Ryanair in the Manchester–Dublin market. In the third scenario, both the low- 
and high-quality firm supply multiple product variants with a maximum of two for 
                                                          
39 Due to the recent hostile takeover bids by Ryanair for Aer Lingus, competition between these two 
carriers in specific market attracts the attention from media and policy makers. 
40 Figures are taken from the UK Punctuality Statistics, accessible from www.caa.co.uk/punctuality.  
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the low-quality firm. This scenario reflects easyJet’s strategy. The first and second 
scenario show whether, and if so, under which circumstances, a multi-product 
strategy is more profitable for the high-quality firm. The second and third scenario 
repeat this analysis for the low-quality firm.  
Based on the second and third scenario, all the product variants in the market can 
be (vertically) ordered into two different ways. First, each firm produces only all 
low- or all high-quality product variants. As a result, firm A and B each supply one 
variant which is in direct competition with the variant of the competing firm, i.e. 
the so-called fighting variant (Cheng et al., 2011). Second, the firm’s specific 
product variants may be (perfectly) interlaced, resulting in multiple fighting 
variants in the product line of both firms. In contrast to Cheng et al. (2011), here 
the latter market configuration is not a priori excluded.  
For all three scenarios, i.e. number of product variants supplied, all possible 
patterns of vertical product differentiation are analysed. The resulting equilibrium 
may be symmetric or not. The equilibrium is symmetric if and only if prices and 
qualities of all product variants in the market are equal, otherwise the equilibrium 
is asymmetric. The asymmetric equilibrium may be fully differentiated or not. In 
case prices and qualities of all product variants supplied by a singly firm vary, the 
equilibrium is fully differentiated. The equilibrium is asymmetric but not fully 
differentiated otherwise. 
 
 
3.5 Numerical results 
3.5.1 Patterns of product differentiation  
In absence of unobserved heterogeneity, the equilibrium, if it exists, always has a 
fully differentiated pattern of product differentiation for multi-product duopolies. 
Differentiation between the two firms intensifies if the choice to buy any variant at 
all becomes less responsive to the price- and quality setting. An increase in 
unobserved heterogeneity between buying and not-buying, via 1,μ  results into less 
elastic total demand. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, in the extreme case that the 
decision to buy at all is unresponsive to the price- and quality setting, both firms 
maximise the quality difference like in a fully covered market. In this extreme case, 
each multi-product firm supplies symmetric variants at the low- or high-end of the 
market. At a critical level of heterogeneity in unobserved attributes between buying 
and not-buying, each duopolistic multi-product firm switches from supplying equal 
product variants to supplying differentiated variants. Whether or not the product 
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variants are differentiated between the two firms, depends on the level of 
heterogeneity in unobserved attributes regarding the elemental alternative: 2.μ  
The effect of increasing the unobserved heterogeneity regarding the elemental 
alternatives is shown in Figure 3.2.41 The figure shows the patterns of product 
differentiation, as function of 2μ  and ,θ  for a single-product duopoly (left panel) 
and a multi-product duopoly with one firm supplying a single variant and the other 
firm supplying two variants (right panel). The figure clearly shows that for 
relatively low levels of observed demand heterogeneity, ,θ  combined with 
relatively high levels of unobserved demand heterogeneity, 2 ,μ  the equilibrium 
becomes symmetric (area I in both panels). Differentiation becomes less attractive 
when consumers are more similar in observed behaviour and less predictable in 
general. Appendix 3B shows that if observed demand heterogeneity is low relative 
to unobserved demand heterogeneity (as in area I), profits are maximised by 
supplying symmetric variants. Additionally, each firm sets the quality of the 
product variant in such a way that the marginal costs of quality, ? ? ?' ,i ic q q  equal 
the willingness to pay for quality of the average consumer, 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?/ / / / .av i av i avV q V p θ α 42 
In case of a multi-product duopoly, the area for which a symmetric equilibrium is 
obtained is smaller than for a single-product duopoly. However, the area for which 
a fully differentiated asymmetric equilibrium (area III) exists also decreases with 
the number of product variants supplied in the market. This contradiction is 
caused by the existence of an intermediate area, area II. In this area, the high-
quality firm offers two equal product variants, but different from the variant of the 
low-quality firm: the so-called asymmetric but not fully differentiated equilibrium. 
In the remainder of this numerical analysis, most attention will be given to fully 
differentiated equilibria, as located in area III, because these are the type of 
equilibria observed in the aviation industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 We set both 1μ  and α  equal to 1 and θ  equal to 0. 
42 This finding is consistent with the results of the previous chapter. The firms attain the highest 
mark-up if the quality variants are optimally chosen.  
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3.5.2 Multi-product strategies and profitability 
Before analysing the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, first profitability of a 
multi-product strategy for the high-quality firm in the absence of unobserved 
heterogeneity needs to be analysed. Table 3.2 shows the effect of a multi-product 
strategy of the high-quality firm, firm A, on the profitability of both firms given a 
single-product strategy of firm B. The table shows, in different rows, the Nash 
equilibria for different orderings of product variants in terms of their quality in the 
absence of demand heterogeneity in unobserved attributes.43  
The results in Table 3.2 provide three main insights. First, the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium for a given number of product variants supplied per firm is not 
unique. This can be readily verified by looking at equilibria 3.I, 3.II, and 3.III in 
Table 3.2; given that in total three product variants are supplied, at least three 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria exist. More precisely, we observe unique subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria for each market configuration, i.e. for each number of 
variants and specific ordering of variants such as 3.I or 3.II. Because the quality 
stage does not have a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, one cannot solve 
for the number of variants in the first stage of the model.  
 
                                                          
43 The rows are labelled with the first number indicating the number of variants in the market and a 
roman numeral as index. 
Figure 3.2 Combinations of observed, ,θ  and unobserved, 2 ,μ  heterogeneity for single-product duopoly (left
panel) and multi-product duopoly (right panel) yielding different patterns of differentiation: I = symmetric 
equilibrium, II = asymmetric equilibrium, not fully differentiated, III = asymmetric equilibrium, fully
differentiated. 
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Table 3.2 Market configurations and profitability with deterministic demand: high-quality firm’s multi-
product strategy. Configurations with inactive variants are denoted in between brackets.  
Label Ordering (in quality) Profit 
 high low firm A firm B 
2.III q1A,  q1B 20.0328 ?θ F  20.0243 ?θ F  
     
3.III q1A,  q2A,  q1B 
20.0366 2?θ F  20.0213 ?θ F  
3.III ( q1A,  q1B,  q2A 20.0305 2?θ F   20.0224 ?θ F ) 
3.III q1B,  q1A,  q2A 20.0264 2?θ F  20.0293 ?θ F  
     
4.III q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B 20.0373 3?θ F  20.0208 ?θ F  
4.III ( q1A,  q2A,  q1B,  q3A 
20.0362 3?θ F   20.0212 ?θ F ) 
    
N.III  q1A,  q2A, ..., ,An Aq q1B 
20.0377 ? Aθ n F  20.0205 ?θ F  
 
Second, although the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is not unique in the 
number of variants, the number of potential candidate equilibria may be more 
restricted than suggested at first sight in Table 3.2. Starting from a single-product 
strategy of both firms, equilibrium 2.I, we observe that firm A only achieves higher 
profits following a multi-product strategy if the extra variant is positioned at the 
high-end of the market, i.e. equilibrium 3.I. Supplying a variant with lower quality 
compared to firm B’s variant, equilibrium 3.II, generates multiple ‘fighting brands’, 
intensifies competition with firm B’s variant, and causes the market share and 
mark-up of the own high-quality variant(s) to decrease. As a result, the high-quality 
firm maximises the differentiation in quality between the own low-quality variant 
and the variant of the low-quality firm. The high-quality firm achieves this by 
setting the lowest possible quality, i.e. zero, for this variant. Due to the outside 
alternative, the high-quality firm cannot capture any mark-up with the low-quality 
variant. Essentiality, this low-quality variant becomes inactive in equilibrium 3.11. 
Hence, it is highly unlikely that these equilibria arise. This limits the number of 
candidate equilibria.44 The unlikely equilibria are denoted in between brackets in 
Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. 
Finally, Table 3.2 shows that the marginal profitability of adding an extra variant 
diminishes quickly. The maximum profit, ignoring fixed costs, equals 20 0377. θ  and 
is achieved with approximately eight variants. This finding may explain the limited 
number of product variants one observes in, for example, the aviation industry. In 
particular if there are (constant) fixed costs related to introducing new variants, 
                                                          
44 Given the quality setting of the low-quality firm, profits for the high-quality firm are slightly 
higher (< 1 per cent) supplying the inactive variant compared to removing this variant from the 
product line. However, allowing for fixed costs per variant may easily alter this conclusion in favour 
of not supplying this low-quality variant at all.  
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decreasing marginal profitability limits the maximum number of variants.45 From 
Table 3.2, it becomes clear that the low-quality firm has lower profits due to the 
lower mark-ups that can be achieved from serving consumers with a lower 
willingness to pay.46 As a result, the marginal profitability of supplying an extra 
product variant is lower for the low-quality firm. This implies that with equal fixed 
costs, the low-quality firm would supply less product variants compared to the 
high-quality firm. Thus, fixed costs may explain both the limited number of 
product variants and the fact that low-cost carriers provide less variants compared 
with legacy carriers. 
Let’s now focus on the incentives of a multi-product strategy for the low-quality 
firm. The rollout of ‘flexi fare’ by easyJet, as discussed in Section 3.4, suggests that 
an incentive to provide a high-quality variant should be present. The model results 
as depicted in Table 3.3, however, tell another story. Table 3.3 shows that given a 
two-variant or three-variant strategy of the high-quality firm, the low-quality firm 
maximises profits by supplying a second low-quality variant, equilibrium 4.I and 
equilibrium 5.I. If the quality of the second variant is a high-quality variant, located 
in between variants of the high-quality firm, like in equilibrium 4.II, the profit 
maximising quality and price of the lowest-quality variant, q2B, become zero. In 
other words, under the assumption of deterministic demand, the low-quality firm 
will not supply a second product variant at the high-end of the market. The same 
intuition as before with the high-quality firm not supplying low-quality variants 
applies. The standard model for vertical product differentiation and multi-product 
firms, hence, produces results that are in sharp contrast to the actual strategic 
behaviour of easyJet.47 In the absence of unobserved demand heterogeneity, both 
the low- and high-quality firm have no incentive for supplying an extra product 
variant that faces direct competition with the competitor’s product variant(s). As a 
result, the high-quality firm does not undercut the quality of the low-quality firm, 
whereas the low-quality firm does not supply variants with higher qualities than 
the high-quality firm does. In other words, interlaced equilibria – in which all 
product variants have positive prices – do not exist given deterministic demand. 
                                                          
45 This is valid as long as the number of variants of the low-quality firm is fixed and in absence of 
fixed costs per variant. In this absence, the firms face the classic prisoner’s dilemma and will supply 
an infinite number of variants.    
46 This finding is in contrast to what is observed in the aviation industry where low-cost carriers 
attain higher earnings. However, as explained in Borenstein (2011), legacy carriers struggle in 
closing the cost gap with low-cost carriers and attaining a profitable margin. In the current analysis, 
generic cost functions for all firms are assumed. Including a more realistic cost setting would 
complicate the analysis, whereas the qualitative insights regarding differentiation keep unaltered.    
47 A possible reason for this contrast may lie in the fact that in reality the low-quality firm may 
believe only to affect competition in the high-end of the market, whereas in theory the whole 
product line of both firms is affected. For example, Botimer and Belobaba (1999) already indicated 
that airline yield management models tend to treat the demand for each fare product as completely 
separate.   
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Taking into account demand heterogeneity in unobserved attributes restores the 
existence of interlaced equilibria. In contrast to the deterministic case, the 
unaltered principle of maximum differentiation between the competing lowest 
quality product variants of both firms, now results in a quality of the lowest variant 
in the market approaching the minimum level, like in the deterministic model, but 
having a positive price and hence a positive mark-up. The effect of taking into 
account unobserved heterogeneity can be illustrated using the earlier mentioned 
rollout of ‘flexi fare’ by easyJet as an example. Table 3.4 shows the profits for both 
firms in case of stochastic demand – with 10? ,θ  1 1? ,μ  and 2 0 2? .μ  – and 
deterministic demand as shown earlier in Table 3.3. Table 3.5 shows the detailed 
price- and quality setting per product variant in each equilibrium. With unobserved 
heterogeneity, two subgame perfect Nash equilibria arise in case the low-quality 
firm decides to supply an extra variant. In both equilibria, the profits of the low-
quality firm are higher compared with supplying a single low-quality variant only, 
whereas the profits of the high-quality firm are lower.  
Table 3.3 Market configurations and profitability with deterministic demand: low-quality firm’s multi-
product strategies. Configurations with inactive variants are denoted in between brackets. 
Label Ordering (in quality) Profit 
 high low firm A firm B 
3.III q1A,  q2A,  q1B 
20.0366 2?θ F  20.0213 ?θ F  
    
4.III q1A,  q2A,  q1B,  q2B 
20.0326 2?θ F  20.0237 2?θ F  
4.III ( q1A,  q1B,  q2A,  q2B 
20.0289 2?θ F   20.0220 2?θ F ) 
     
4.III q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B 20.0373 3?θ F  20.0208 ?θ F  
    
5.III  q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B,  q2B 
20.0333 3?θ F  20.0232 2?θ F  
5.III ( q1A,  q2A,  q1B,  q3A,  q2B 
20.0362 3?θ F   20.0212 2?θ F ) 
5.III ( q1A,  q1B,  q2A,  q3A,  q2B 20.0296 3?θ F   20.0247 2?θ F ) 
 
Table 3.4 Profitability of multi-product strategy low-quality firm for stochastic – with 10,?θ  1 1,?μ  and 
2 0 2.?μ  – and deterministic demand. Configurations with inactive variants are denoted in between brackets. 
Label Ordering (in quality)  Profit stochastic demand  Profit deterministic demand 
 high low  firm A firm B  firm A firm B 
4.III q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B  3.77 3? F  2.08 2? F   3.73 3? F  2.08 2? F  
        
5.III q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B,  q2B  3.38 3? F  2.29 2? F   3.33 3? F  2.32 2? F  
5.III q1A,  q2A,  q1B,  q3A,  q2B  NA NA  ( 3.62 3? F  2.12 2? F ) 
5.III q1A,  q1B,  q2A,  q3A,  q2B  NA NA  ( 2.96 3? F  2.47 2? F ) 
5.IV q1A,  q2A,  q1B,  q2B,  q3A  3.33 3? F  2.30 2? F   ( 3.33 3? F  2.33 2? F ) 
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Table 3.5 Equilibrium price- and quality setting for selected market configurations for stochastic demand with 
10,?θ  1 1,?μ  and 2 0 2. .?μ  
Label Ordering (in quality)  Qualities  Prices 
 high low  firm A  firm B  firm A  firm B 
    q1A q2A q3A  q1B q2B  p1A p2A p3A  p1B p2B 
4.III q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B  9.4 8.5 7.3  3.6   57.6 49.1 38.3  12.7  
                
5.III q1A,  q2A,  q3A,  q1B,  q2B  9.4 8.8 7.6  4.0 1.7  56.5 50.8 39.8  14.5 5.4 
5.IV q1A,  q2A,  q1B,  q2B,  q3A  9.3 7.8 0  4.1 2.2  55.3 41.3 1.1  15.0 7.1 
 
Table 3.5 shows that the two equilibria, 5.I and 5.IV, are fully differentiated. The 
lowest quality variant in the market has the lowest quality possible, close or equal 
to zero, but with a positive price and therefore mark-up. In addition, equilibrium 
5.IV is an example of an interlaced equilibrium. For the chosen parameter setting, a 
perfect interlaced equilibrium in which all variants are entangled by the 
competitor’s variant, like q1A, q1B, q2A, q3A, q2B or q1A, q2A, q1B, q3A, q2B, does not exist. 
The reason is that in these configurations the low-quality firm can unilaterally 
increase its profits by placing its low-quality variant close to its high-quality 
variant.48 As a result, an equilibrium completely matching easyJet’s strategy is not 
found, even when accounting for unobserved demand heterogeneity across 
consumers. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter models the number of variants-then-quality-then-price competition 
for multi-product firms accounting for demand heterogeneity in observed and 
unobserved attributes. The random utility framework offers the flexibility to model 
demand for different relative levels of observed and unobserved demand 
heterogeneity across consumers. In contrast to the previous chapter, this chapter 
focuses on duopolistic markets. This focus introduces strategic interaction within 
the number of variants-then-quality-then-price game. 
In most industries, firms supply multiple product variants with different price- and 
quality settings. For example, in the aviation industry, low-cost carriers supply less 
                                                          
48 Due to the flexibility of the random utility formulation of the model, one does not have to impose 
the ordering of qualities beforehand. Therefore, one can invalidate equilibria defined prior as 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the deterministic model. This shows that imposing the ordering 
of qualities beforehand may result in incorrect statements about the existence of subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria.  
56     Chapter 3 
 
number of variants, often just one, with a low price- and quality setting, whereas 
legacy carriers have an extended table of fares to choose from.  
Although at first sight the positive relationship between product differentiation and 
profits may look straightforward, prior studies do not confirm the profitability of a 
multi-product strategy in duopolistic competition. The only exception, the article 
by Cheng et al. (2011), shows the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
under the restriction that each firm only supplies low- or high-quality product 
variants. Although Cheng et al. (2011) hint at the existence of interlaced equilibria, 
the results in this chapter show that both the low- and high-quality firm do not 
have the incentive to provide an extra product variant at the lower end of the 
market. This limits the likelihood for interlaced equilibria to exist. In point of fact, 
this chapter’s findings suggest that if there are sufficiently high fixed costs related 
to introducing new variants and demand heterogeneity is only based on 
heterogeneity in observable attributes, the interlaced equilibrium does not exist.  
If the interlaced equilibrium does not exist, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
is unique given the number of variants supplied by each firm. Including 
unobserved heterogeneity restores the existence of interlaced equilibria. Whereas 
with deterministic demand the price, and therefore the mark-up, for the lowest 
quality variant in interlaced equilibria is zero, unobserved heterogeneity provides 
the firms with the possibility to set a positive price and obtain a positive mark-up 
for this particular variant. As a result, including unobserved heterogeneity results 
in multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria per number of variants supplied. 
However, for every market configuration, i.e. number and ordering of variants, the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, if it exists for the particular configuration, is 
unique.  
The numerical simulation in this chapter shows the predicted equilibrium patterns 
of vertical product differentiation for different levels of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The strategy of easyJet to supply a high-quality, fully flexible fare in addition to its 
low-quality variant serves as an illustration. Without unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. 
the classic deterministic model, there is no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
describing the actual strategy of easyJet. Taking into account unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity results in multi-product equilibria that resemble the actual patterns 
of product differentiation observed in duopolistic aviation markets. The scope of 
market configurations that can be studied using the standard model of vertical 
product differentiation enlarges taking into account unobserved heterogeneity.   
As is the case for the monopoly market discussed in the previous chapter, the 
relative level of unobserved heterogeneity determines also the pattern of product 
differentiation in the duopolistic market. The results suggest that, compared with 
the monopoly market, the unobserved heterogeneity should be smaller in order to 
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obtain a fully differentiated equilibrium (compare Figure 2.7 and Figure 3.2). 
Finally, whereas product differentiation in case of a monopoly market is always 
profit maximising for the firm, competition may cause product differentiation not 
to be the profit maximizing strategy. Competition may lower the profitability of 
product differentiation in two distinct ways. First, adding an extra product variant 
may result into supplying multiple variants that are in direct competition with the 
variants of the competitor, thereby increasing competition, and lowering the mark-
up of the high-quality variants. Second, as discussed in detail by Cheng et al. 
(2011), choosing the number of variants to supply may suffer from the classic 
prisoners’ dilemma resulting in an oversupply of variants.   
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Appendix 3A: Numerical method 
In order to approximate the best response functions of the two firms in each 
market configuration, an algorithm is used in which the price setting stage in Eq. 
(3.3) is solved for every set of qualities of the product variants. The number of 
variants is assumed to be given, but the ordering of the qualities per firm is 
endogenous. Since potentially the number of sets is infinite, one needs to make the 
quality dimension discrete. The discrete set of qualities forms the grid for which the 
pricing stage is solved. We first define the coarse grid by letting the qualities range 
from θ  to θ with step size ? ? 10? /θ θ  and subsequently adapt the grid by adding 
evaluation points where the reaction functions intersect (i.e. the candidate 
equilibrium).49  
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in prices, for each set in the grid, is 
determined in an iterative manner. First, the profit maximisation problem of firm 
A given a fixed pricing strategy of firm B is solved. Second, the resulting optimal 
pricing strategy for firm A is introduced into the profit function of firm B. Third, 
firm B’s profits are maximised with respect to firm B’s prices.50 This iterative 
process continues until the change in both object values, i.e. the profits of firm A 
and B, is smaller than 0.1 per cent.51 We use sequential quadratic programming to 
maximise the non-linear profit functions in each iteration.  
After having solved the pricing stage for each quality setting in the grid, one can 
determine A’s best response in qualities for each quality setting of B, and vice versa, 
taking into account the price setting in the subsequent stage. To check whether the 
resulting outcome is indeed a profit maximising equilibrium, the determinant of 
the Hessian matrix – including the second order conditions – for both firms is 
calculated for every outcome.  
 
 
                                                          
49 Note that if the market is not fully covered and there is no consumer heterogeneity, i.e. there is a 
single representative consumer * ,t  the supplied quality of the highest quality variant will never 
exceed ** / .tq θ α?   Similarly, in case of consumer heterogeneity, the supplied quality of the highest 
quality variant will not exceed the highest willingness to pay. Therefore, the chosen range covers the 
relevant quality strategy space of both firms. 
50 The fixed pricing strategy of firm B in the first iteration is randomly assigned. After using multiple 
starting values, one may conclude that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is robust against 
different starting values.  
51 If after a reasonable number of iterations, in our case around 20, convergence is not reached, the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in prices does not exists for the particular market configuration.   
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Appendix 3B: High level of unobserved heterogeneity and 
symmetry 
Here it is shown that when, due to a high level of unobserved heterogeneity, the 
choice probability, i.e. the market share, is unresponsive to changes in the 
systematic part of the utility, the best strategy of each firm, given any number of 
product variants, is to supply product variants that are identical in quality. 
Furthermore, each firm sets the quality of the product variant in such a way that 
the marginal costs of quality, ? ? ?' ,i ic q q  equals the willingness to pay for quality of 
the average consumer, 
? ? ?? ?
/
.
/
av i av
av i
V q θ
V p α
 The mark-up per product variant increases 
in the number of own product variants supplied and therefore differs between 
firms if the firms supply an unequal number of variants. 
The quality-then-price equilibrium is determined based on the profit function 
depicted in Eq. (3.2), ignoring the fixed costs per product variant: 
 ? ? ? ?? ?
1?
? ??p q r; ; ,jnj ij ij ij
i
π p c q x  (3B.1) 
with demand xij as defined in Eq. (3.7) to Eq. (3.9). In the first stage, all first order 
conditions with respect to prices of all product variants need to be determined and 
solved simultaneously for the prices. In the second stage, all first order conditions 
with respect to qualities are determined and solved for the qualities evaluated at 
optimal prices. With a sufficient high level of unobserved heterogeneity, as a result 
from an increase in the scale parameters 1μ  and 2 ,μ the average probabilities of any 
particular variant or the probability of buying the product at all are equal for each 
product variant supplied by a single firm. Therefore, after taking the first order 
conditions with respect to prices and qualities, one can substitute ?? ?, ,Ρ Ρ Ρk t k t k  
and ?? ?| , | , |Ρ Ρ Ρ .ij k t ij k t ij k  Note that ??| |Ρ Ρij k ij k  for all product variants supplied by a 
single firm. Under these conditions, the first order condition with respect to prices 
becomes: 
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with 
2
2
ij
ij ij
q
ψ p? ? . Solving Eq. (3B.2) for ijψ yields the mark-up: 
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The denominator in Eq. (3B.3) is decreasing in nj, hence the mark-up is increasing 
in nj. The first order condition with respect to qualities equals: 
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with ? .t T  It is now possible to substitute Eq. (3B.3) into Eq. (3B.4) in order to 
evaluate the first order condition at optimal prices. Solving for *iq  yields:  
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 (3B.5) 
The numerator in Eq. (3B.5) equals the quality sensitivity of the average consumer. 
So, it follows that 
1
1 1
?
? ??* T avi t
t
θq θ
α T α
 if the unobserved heterogeneity is at the level 
that market shares are not responsive anymore to the systematic part of the utility 
function. 
 
 
 
4 Loyalty programs and consumer 
behaviour: The impact of FFPs on 
consumer surplus 
 
 
  
  
  
4.1 Introduction52 
With estimates that over half of U.S. adults are enrolled in at least one loyalty 
program and more than 120 million people are enrolled in one of the 200 airline 
loyalty programs globally, the significance of these programs seems to be 
undoubted (Kivetz and Simonson, 2003). After the deregulation of the domestic 
aviation industry in the U.S. in 1978 and the simultaneous advent of mass 
computerisation and data storage facilities, American Airlines launched the first, as 
such recognisable, contemporary loyalty program in 1981 named AAdvantage. 
Although initially derided as short-lived marketing gimmicks, frequent flier 
programs (FFPs) matured from a narrowly targeted marketing device into an 
essential part of most airlines’ product offering, copied by other firms in various 
industries including retail, finance and tourism.  
This chapter analyses the impact of redesigning a FFP on consumer behaviour and 
surplus by estimating a combined discrete choice and count data model using 
negotiated access to the FFP database of a particular airline. The proprietary data 
set is provided by airline X on a confidential basis, which restricts us from naming 
either the FFP or the airline partner. In contrast to the old FFP structure, the 
redesigned program differentiates between members based on the actual usage 
level by including membership status class and a non-linear scheme of token 
accrual. 
Consensus about the effectiveness and long term impact of loyalty programs does 
not exist amongst scholars. In a recent literature review, Dorotic et al. (2011) 
conclude that loyalty programs enhance  usage levels, but only for a minority of 
consumers. Banerjee and Summers (1987) show that FFPs negatively affect 
                                                          
52 This chapter is an extended version of the Monash University discussion paper by McCaughey 
and Behrens (2011). 
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competition in the airline industry, as they raise barriers to entry and switching 
costs. In contrast, Dowling and Uncles (1997) question the effectiveness of loyalty 
programs and argue that in case of homogenous products loyalty programs may 
increase competition and even may result in price wars. Basso et al. (2009) confirm 
this thought for the aviation industry in particular. The fact that loyalty programs 
are industry, company, and market specific, prevents scholars to generalise results 
to other programs (Liu, 2007). Nevertheless, by examining prior empirical studies, 
this chapter identifies a coherent set of major research challenges. The current 
study contributes to a better understanding of loyalty programs by explicitly 
addressing three of these challenges.  
First, both purchase frequency and transaction size determine actual usage levels 
(Liu, 2007). So far, most of the attention has been paid to frequency while ignoring 
transaction size.53 Sharp and Sharp (1997), Verhoef (2003), and Lewis (2004) focus 
on frequency only, whereas Liu (2007) is the only one addressing both frequency 
and size to study the impact of loyalty programs. Liu estimates two separate models 
and concludes that purchase frequency and transaction size is positively affected by 
the loyalty program for light and moderate buyers. She further points out that 
estimating separate models may result in inefficient and biased estimates. This 
chapter combines a discrete choice and count data model – introduced by 
Hausman et al. (1995) – to study purchase frequency (count data model) and 
transaction size (discrete choice model) together. This approach is consistent with 
two-stage budgeting and utility maximisation (Rouwendal and Boter, 2009). The 
model allows for calculating changes in consumer surplus after introducing 
membership status levels in the loyalty program. The combination of product 
differentiation and non-perfect price discrimination, as introduced in the 
redesigned FFP, may result in either a decrease or increase in consumer surplus.  
Second, this chapter addresses the issue of double causality between loyalty 
programs and consumer behaviour by focussing only at the impact of an exogenous 
change in the FFP on the consumer behaviour of active FFP members. Therefore, 
we avoid the membership self-selection bias in analysing the impact of loyalty 
programs on consumer behaviour (Leenheer et al., 2007). To alleviate this self-
selection bias, prior studies rely on longitudinal data (Liu, 2007) and/or dynamic 
modelling (Verhoef, 2003; Lewis, 2004). These approaches, however, may not 
completely address self-selection, because there are no controls for the program 
participation decision. As a consequence, the estimated impact of loyalty programs 
on consumer behaviour may still suffer from omitted variable bias. 
                                                          
53 Transaction size in aviation depends on both trip length and fare type choice. This chapter focuses 
on the latter aspect of transaction size and therefore assumes that destination choices are not 
affected by redesigning the FFP.  
Loyalty programs and consumer behaviour     63 
 
Third, this chapter also addresses one of the research directions mentioned by 
Dorotic et al. (2011): the effects of changes in reward structures. In particular, the 
results in this chapter support the findings by Taylor and Neslin (2005) and Kivetz 
et al. (2006) that moving towards a threshold value positively affects consumers’ 
usage levels. The empirical analysis shows that consumer surplus decreased after 
the introduction of differentiation in the FFP mainly due to the aforementioned 
increased usage levels near threshold values. In contrast, no clear evidence is found 
that introduction of differentiation leads to a change in consumers’ price 
sensitiveness.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a 
short discussion of the basic mechanism of loyalty programs in general and the FFP 
under study in particular. Section 4.3 introduces the empirical framework and 
Section 4.4 describes the data. Section 4.5 presents our empirical results. Section 
4.6 concludes with a general discussion of our findings. 
  
 
4.2 Frequent flier programs 
4.2.1 Basic mechanism 
The structure of FFPs has a seemingly unrelated precursor in the Sperry & 
Hutchinson (S&H) Green Stamps Company, a manufacturer of loyalty stamps and 
pasting booklets in the late 19th century. S&H Green stamps rapidly gained 
popularity as consumer retention strategies adopted by grocery stores (Schuman, 
1986). Shoppers collected the stamps in pasting booklets. Once a set number of 
stamps had been reached, the filled booklets could be exchanged against white 
goods. Shopping at non-affiliated stores meant forgoing stamp collection and hence 
pushing award collection into a more distant future. By the 1960’s, however, the 
S&H loyalty scheme had largely run its course and for the next two decades loyalty 
schemes were at fringes of consumer retention strategies.  
Physical stamps and pasting books became digital savings accounts and loyalty 
cards with the introduction of AAdvantage by American Airlines in 1981. The 
technology boom of the 1990’s allowed for an exponential expansion of loyalty 
programs across a wide range of consumer markets globally. At present, more than 
120 million people are enrolled in one or more of the 200 FFPs globally. The 
acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Delta in 2008 created what is currently the 
largest FFP in the world with 74 million members. 
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Figure 4.1 The process of moving across FFP membership tiers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The underlying mechanics and structures of all FFPs have remained unchanged 
over time. The airline traveller enters into a contractual membership agreement 
with the airline, in which the airline awards the member a pre-determined number 
of tokens (for example, miles, points, etc) per paid and taken flight. Once a pre-
determined threshold number is reached, these tokens can be redeemed against 
free flights or other goods and services. Up to this point, FFPs are very similar to 
bulk discounts and can be regarded as a form of second-degree price 
discrimination. What sets most FFPs apart from second-degree price 
discrimination, is that members are also often credited status points. These points 
entitle members to status levels within a program. Importantly, status levels give 
rise to both an accelerated token accrual and an increasing number of priority 
treatments. This non-linearity in points accrual leads to anti-competitive effects as 
it introduces airline switching costs to members at an increasing rate.  
The stylised process of moving from one status level to the next over a set period of 
time is shown in Figure 4.1. The figure clearly shows the functioning of threshold 
levels in time and tokens, 20 000 to reach Silver and 50 000 to reach Gold status.    
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4.2.2 Airline X’s FFP 
This study focuses on airline X’s FFP. Airline X is an established carrier with an 
extensive domestic and international network. It is engaged in alliances with a 
number of other large international carriers. Airline X’s FFP has from its inception 
been growing strongly in member numbers, currently approximately two million, 
and revenues. 
The data set includes all air and non-air related transactions by active FFP 
members over a three-year period, beginning on the 1st of January 2006 and 
ending on the 31st of December 2008. Developed as a simple loyalty program, the 
original FFP only included features of second-degree price discrimination, such as 
token accrual to redeem for free flights or other goods. Halfway the three-year 
period, in August 2007, airline X effectuated its redesigned and far more 
sophisticated FFP overnight. The major change compared with the original FFP 
program is the introduction of status levels. From August 2007 onwards, the FFP 
program includes three status levels. The accompanying threshold values, in time 
and tokens, for members to qualify for these status levels match the ones shown in 
Figure 4.1. Because the amount of tokens accrued per dollar spent increases with 
status level, the introduction of status levels also implied the introduction of a non-
linear scheme of token accrual. 
The initial status of each member is determined by airline X based on the program 
threshold values and the actual usage level of each member in the period prior to 
August 2007. The change in the program was not communicated beforehand to its 
members. Hence, both the change and the initial status level are exogenous.54 This 
allows us to assess the impact of loyalty programs, and in particular of introducing 
non-linear token accrual, on consumer behaviour of active members while avoiding 
the potential self-selection bias into membership.  
 
 
4.3 Modelling purchase frequency and transaction size  
The two-stage budgeting approach of Strotz (1957) and Gorman (1959) is the 
starting point in analysing both the number of flights taken and the amount of 
                                                          
54 The primary focus in this chapter is analysing the causal effect of the FFP structure on consumer 
behaviour. Hence, this study does not analyse the causal effect of a certain status level, for example 
Gold status, on consumer behaviour. This analysis would require – apart from attributes varying 
over the status levels – the use of discontinuous regression techniques (Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008). Since frequent travellers are more likely to be awarded the Gold status based on past 
behaviour and continue to spend money on flights at a higher level, comparing Silver and Gold 
status members would result in an upward bias of the estimate of the causal effect of status level. 
Section 4.4.2 argues in the models presented in this study this potential bias is negligible.   
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money spent per flight. They identify conditions for which the direct utility 
function is separable in different group commodities. Separability allows the 
researcher to solve the consumer’s utility optimisation problem in two stages. In 
the first stage, the consumer decides how much budget to spend on each group 
commodity. In the second stage, the consumer decides how to allocate the budget 
over the individual commodities within each group commodity. The linkage 
between the two stages is a price index, representing the price of a composite 
commodity, that is derived in the second stage and used as an explanatory variable 
in the first stage of the model (Hausman et al., 1995).  
This chapter applies the two-stage budgeting model to analyse the usage levels of 
active FFP members. In the first stage, consumers decide the number of flights to 
take with airline X. In the second stage, the consumer maximises utility by 
choosing a ticket type out of a menu of four ticket types ranging from the lowest 
available fare to a flexible business fare. The model is solved by backward 
induction. Hausman et al. (1995) and Rouwendal and Boter (2009) show that this 
approach is consistent with utility maximisation in that the model can be derived 
from a (indirect) utility function. In this chapter a count data model is applied for 
the first stage of the model, whereas for the second stage of the model a discrete 
choice model is specified.  
Rouwendal and Boter (2009) show that separability of the direct utility function is 
not compatible with specifying a discrete choice model in the second stage and use 
an indirect utility function instead.55 Let’s suppose that a consumer who derives 
utility from flying with airline X and other consumption goods has the following 
indirect utility function: 
   , , ,v v y π p  (4.1) 
where y  denotes income, π  is a vector of prices of the different fare types of flying 
with airline X, and p  is a vector of prices of other consumer goods. Separability 
implies that flying with airline X can be treated as a single commodity yielding the 
following indirect utility function: 
     ' , , , , ,v v y w p w w y π  (4.2) 
                                                          
55 They show that the resulting price index, specified as a logsum formula, does not satisfy the 
requirements of separability of the direct utility function. In particular, the price index is not 
homogeneous of degree 1 in the prices of each individual commodity.  
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where w  now denotes the aggregate price index of flying with airline X.56 We can 
now determine the demand for each of the fare types by applying Roy’s identity: 
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 (4.3) 
where subscript i denotes the fare type. Summing iq  for all fare types yields the 
total demand for flying with airline X: 
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 (4.4) 
Hence, the share of each individual fare type in the total number of flights with 
airline X equals: 
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 (4.5) 
The allocation of the budget over the different fare types, as shown in Eq. (4.5), 
only depends on the real prices of these fare types. In order to simplify Eq. (4.4) 
and Eq. (4.5), we follow Rouwendal and Boter (2009) and assume that income does 
not affect the aggregate price index ,w  i.e. 0? ? ?/ .w y 57 In addition, we assume 
that if all prices change by the same amount, the aggregate price index changes by 
the same amount, i.e. 1? ? ?? / .i
i
w π  Given these assumptions, one can rewrite Eq. 
(4.4) and Eq. (4.5) as ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?'/ / '/Q v w v y  and ? ? ?Pr /i iw π  respectively. 
To determine the total number of flights taken, as shown in the simplified Eq. (4.4), 
we only need information about the aggregate price index .w  The simplified Eq. 
(4.5) states that the output share of a specific fare type is equal to the partial 
derivative of this aggregate price index function. 58 A plausible and convenient 
functional form for the aggregated price index is the one that closely matches the 
discrete choice model. Applying this model, the aggregated price index function can 
be specified as the following logsum formula: 
                                                          
56 Expressing all prices and income relative to a numeraire good ensures that the indirect utility 
function is homogenous of degree 0 in ? ?, , .v v y π p?  There is no additional homogeneity 
requirement for the aggregate price index .w  
57 Rouwendal and Boter (2009) show that it is not essential an assumption to specify the two-stage 
budgeting model.    
58 The price index function w can now be specified as any homogenous of degree 1 function, see 
Rouwendal and Boter (2009) for details. 
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 ? ? 1 ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? 'ln ,i iαπ β xiw π eα  (4.6) 
where α  denotes the absolute value of the fare coefficient, ix  is a vector of 
alternative specific variables and β  is the vector including the related parameters of 
interest. The logsum is the maximum expected utility a consumer can derive from a 
choice set and is used as a measure of consumer surplus, see, for example, De Jong 
et al. (2007). The partial derivatives of Eq. (4.6) with respect to iπ  are identical to 
the logit choice probabilities and thus with the share model dictated by the 
simplified Eq. (4.5). Any random utility model can be specified to determine this 
logsum formula.  
The two-stage budgeting approach as discussed above allows us to first estimate a 
discrete choice model and determine the logsum in the second stage of the model. 
Using this logsum as a measure for the aggregate price index, one can then 
estimate the count data model to analyse the purchase frequency of active FFP 
members at airline X. Section 4.4.4 discusses in detail how combining both stages 
enables assessing the change in consumer surplus as a result of the introduction of 
status in the FFP. 
 
 
4.4 Data and empirical specification  
4.4.1 Data 
The data set includes a representative sample of airline X’s FFP members and 
contains all air and non-air related activities within this program of these members 
between 2006 and 2008. This analysis distinguishes between two periods. The first 
period runs from August 2006 up until July 2007 and the second period from 
September 2007 up until September 2008. In this latter period, the earlier 
mentioned restructured FFP is in place. We define the span of the sample as one 
year prior and one year after this change. This ensures that all FFP members are 
reviewed regarding their status exactly once after the new structure was 
implemented. 
For both periods a wide variety of attributes per transaction is recorded, such as, 
the actual choice of fare type and fare paid, days booked in advance, origin-
destination, date and the departure time of the flight. Apart from these trip 
attributes, socio-economic characteristics of the FFP members – such as, 
redemption behaviour, age, place of residence, gender, membership activation 
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date, job title, and membership status within a competing FFP – are included.59 
Furthermore, we construct an indicator of each FFP member’s income by matching 
public available income data per zip code area with the place of residence of FFP 
members.60  
A word of caution regarding token accrual per trip is necessary. Airline X’s FFP is 
designed such that  token accrual per trip is perfect linearly correlated with the 
fare: every member accrues a fixed number of tokens per dollar spent. Therefore, 
token accrual per trip and fare cannot be both included as explanatory variables. To 
identify the effect of non-linear token accrual two explanatory variables are 
constructed. The first variable measures token accrual per alternative relative to 
the threshold level (in tokens) of the attained status level in the next annual review 
period. The second variable measures the cumulative token accrual relative to the 
next threshold level (in tokens) at the time of booking. 61  The latter variable 
assumes myopic consumer behaviour, whereas the former assumes that consumers 
have rational expectations about their expenditure level throughout the whole 
review period. 
After removal of incomplete observations, a sample of 5 155 individuals and 62 826 
trips remains. In the first period, 31 515 trips are recorded from which 19 149 (61 
per cent) trips are characterised as business trips. In the second period, 31 311 trips 
are recorded and 18 796 (60 per cent) trips are characterised as business trips. On 
average each member made 7.4 trips in period 1 compared with 6.9 trips in period 
2.62  
Table 4.1 shows the number of trips per fare type, period and trip purpose, whereas 
Table 4.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of days booked in advance, 
distance between origin and destination and fare per fare type. From Table 4.1, one 
may conclude that fare type 2 is, by far, the most chosen fare type in both periods 
for business and leisure trips. As anticipated based on earlier empirical studies 
regarding aviation markets and trip purposes, the share of more expensive fare 
types, fare types 3 and 4, is higher for business trips. Table 4.1, however, does not 
show a clear pattern in actual fare type choice between the two periods.  
                                                          
59  In total 70 per cent of the FFP members did not redeem a single point in both periods. 
Furthermore, 58 per cent of the FFP members are also member of a competing FFP, of which 63, 
20, 11 and 6 per cent are entitled Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum status respectively.  
60 The wage and salary income as reported on the income tax return is used to construct this 
indicator. 
61 This specification ensures that the accrued tokens per trip and the fare are no longer perfect 
linearly correlated. The construction of both variables is, together with the construction of the fare 
and purpose variables, discussed in detail in Appendix 4A. 
62 The sample includes those members who at least took one flight in the first or second period. 
Therefore, we may observe that a member has no flights in a period. In this case, the aggregate price 
index function, Eq. (4.6), is calculated based on the average flight and member characteristics in the 
other period.  
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Table 4.1 Number of trips per fare type, percentage in brackets. 
 
Table 4.2 Mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of days booked in advance, distance in miles and fare in 2008 
dollar per fare type. 
 N Days booked 
in advance 
Distance Fare 
  mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare) 9 253 26.8 25.0 543.9 258.7 66.6 16.8 
Fare type 2 (...) 43 343 13.6 17.8 559.8 270.1 119.6 38.8 
Fare type 3 (...) 9 329 7.1 9.0 524.8 231.2 217.5 44.2 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare) 692 8.3 14.2 598.6 338.8 296.1 96.5 
Total 62 617       
 
The patterns shown in table 4.2 are also in line with expectations. More expensive 
fare types are bought less days in advance, which may reflect that cheaper fare 
types were not available anymore at the time of booking, or that business travellers 
do not book far in advance. Furthermore, Table 4.2 suggests that distance may 
have a positive impact on fare type choice. Naturally, the average fare paid 
increases with the flexibility, i.e. quality, of the fare type. 
4.4.2 Modelling transaction size 
To estimate the aggregate price index, i.e. the logsum formula in Eq. (4.6), a 
discrete choice model regarding the fare type choice of individuals is specified. 
Assuming that each individual maximises utility, we define the indirect utility of a 
specific fare type i of individual t for choice situation n is as follows: 
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 Business Leisure 
 period 1 period 2 period 1 period 2 
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare) 1 470 (07.7) 2 730 (14.5) 2 101 (17.0) 3 016 (24.1) 
Fare type 2 (...) 13 243 (69.2) 12 765 (67.9) 9 016 (72.9) 8 465 (67.7) 
Fare type 3 (...) 4 327 (22.6) 2 928 (15.6) 1 218 (09.8) 855 (06.8) 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare) 109 (00.6) 373 (02.0) 31 (00.3) 179 (01.4) 
Total 19 149  18 796  12 366  12 515  
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As in the previous two chapters, the indirect utility function captures both the 
systematic, 0 13?, ,iβ β  and the stochastic, ?, , , , , ,t i t n i t nω δ ε  part of consumers’ 
preferences. In the stochastic part, tω  denotes a vector of random terms with zero 
mean, , ,i t nδ  are individual specific error components, and , ,i t nε  is the usual error 
term. The specification of the stochasticity differs between discrete choice models. 
In the standard multinomial logit model, which is used as benchmark model in this 
chapter, stochastic unobserved heterogeneity affects the utility of all alternatives 
equally. Hence, , , ,t i t nω δ  is equal to zero. The highly flexible panel mixed logit 
specification, allows for unrestricted substitution patterns and correlation in 
unobserved factors over time (Train, 2003). For example, if one assumes that 
alternatives i and j are correlated in unobserved effects, we include in both utility 
functions the same , , ,t ij t nω δ  term.  
Focusing on the systematic part of Eq. (4.7), one can make the distinction between 
alternative specific, 0 10?, , ,i iβ β  and generic, 11 13?β β  parameters. The reference 
category for all alternative specific parameters is fare type 1. The alternative specific 
constants and the Sep07–Sep08 time period dummies, 0,iβ  and 1, ,iβ  capture the 
systematic unobserved heterogeneity over the four alternative fare types caused by, 
for example, differences in perceived in-flight quality and number of restrictions 
per fare type, in both periods. In addition, a trend variable, 2, ,iβ  is included to 
control for general business conditions and seasonal effects. Another dummy 
variable, 3, ,iβ  indicates the trip purpose, with leisure being the reference category. 
Based on Table 4.2, one may anticipate that both trip purpose and distance, 4, ,iβ  
have a positive impact on the choice for more expensive fare types, whereas days 
booked in advance, 5, ,iβ  may have a negative impact. The effect of membership in 
another FFP, 6, ,iβ  is difficult to determine a priori. For instance, multiple 
memberships may indicate that the individual is a frequent business traveller 
choosing more often the expensive fare types. On the other hand, being a member 
of another FFP decreases the incentive to spend more at airline X since the 
majority of the tokens might be earned and accumulated via travelling with the 
competing airline.  
All variables related to status are equal to zero in the period prior to the change in 
FFP, indicated by the dummy perδ  that equals 1 in the period Sep07–Sep08, and 0 
otherwise. The variables goal distance in days and points, 7,iβ  and 8, ,iβ  measure the 
hypothesised positive impact of threshold values in the FFP program on fare type 
choice assuming myopic consumer behaviour. In contrast, 12,iβ  and 13,iβ  measure 
the impact of accrued status points per alternative relative to the threshold level, 
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Silver and Gold, in points of the status attained in the next review period. These 
two variables are only positive if the individual indeed qualified for the particular 
status level: in that case the relevant dummy silverδ  or goldδ  equals 1, and 0 
otherwise. Because these two variables are in essence interaction variables, we 
include 9,iβ  and 10,iβ  as control variables. For both the rational and myopic related 
explanatory variables, we expect a positive effect on fare type choice.63  
4.4.3 Modelling purchase frequency 
The count data model analyses the impact of the change in the FFP on the purchase 
frequency, i.e. the number of trips, of each individual. The conditional expectation 
of the count variable is as follows:  
 ? ? ? ??Ε | exp ' ,λt λt λtQ X β X  (4.8) 
where λtQ  is the number of trips for individual t in period ,λ  period 1 or 2, λtX  is a 
vector of observable attributes affecting the number of trips, and 'β  denotes the 
vector of the related parameters of interest. Because all individuals are observed 
twice, we can control for unobserved individual heterogeneity that is constant over 
both periods. Including the unobserved individual effect, ,tμ  yields the following 
expectation of λtQ  conditional on λtX  and :tμ  
 ? ? ? ?? ?Ε | , exp ' .λt λt t λt tQ X μ β X μ  (4.9) 
Although Eq. (4.9) can be estimated by a conditional fixed effects negative 
binomial, unconditional fixed effects negative binomial, and conditional fixed 
effects Poisson models, we argue that the appropriate model for the purposes of 
this analysis is the latter one.64 The conditional fixed effects negative binomial 
model, introduced by Hausman et al. (1984), is criticised for not being a ‘true’ fixed 
effects model because the time invariant individual specific effects are not 
eliminated from the likelihood function (Allison and Waterman, 2002; Guimarães, 
2008). In addition, the large number of individuals, over 5 000, prevents us from 
                                                          
63 As aforementioned, one may argue that in the model as specified in Eq. (4.7), a potential 
treatment bias may still be present for the attributes related to earnings of status points. We 
performed a sensitivity analysis looking at the local treatment effect by selecting only these FFP 
members that were around the threshold levels of the Silver- and Gold status in August 2007. This 
analysis shows that the qualitative results of the impact of the change in the FFP are not altered by 
looking only at these members that were around these predetermined threshold levels. 
64 See Van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau (2011) for a recent discussion and comparison of 
these three models and Bell et al. (2011) for a recent application of the conditional fixed effects 
Poisson model. 
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estimating the unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model for the whole 
sample due to computational restrictions. Therefore, we estimate Eq. (4.9) with the 
conditional fixed effects Poisson including robust standard errors accounting for 
overdispersion.65 
The conditional expectation of the count variable, Eq. (4.9), is consistent with the 
specification of the indirect utility function as shown in Eq. (4.2). This indirect 
utility function is specified as follows:  
        1 1 21 1     , ,/ / exp ln ,θλt λt tλt λtv y θ η ηw β per β ask μ  (4.10) 
and applying Roy’s identity yields:  
     1 2    ,exp ln ln ,λt λt t λtλtQ ηw β per β ask μ θ y  (4.11) 
where ,λtw  is the aggregate price index, per  is a dummy variable equal to 1 after 
August 2007, λtask  is a proxy for the available seat kilometres and λty  is a proxy 
for income. Although the unobserved individual fixed effect, ,tμ  is not estimated 
directly, one can calculate an estimate for  exp tμ  and use this estimate in the 
consumer surplus analysis. This is estimate is calculated as follows: 
  
    1 2

  

 ,
exp .
exp ln ln
λt
λ
t
λt λtλt
λ
Q
μ
ηw β per β ask θ y
 (4.12) 
The above equation, Eq. (4.12), states that the difference between the observed 
total number of trips and the calculated number of trips based on the estimation 
equals the unobserved individual fixed effect. 66    
                                                          
65 To check the robustness of the Poisson fixed effects model, we define three subsamples and 
estimate the conditional fixed effects Poisson, the unconditional fixed effects negative binomial- and 
a combined fixed and random effects model for each of these samples. The latter model is discussed 
in detail by Allison (2005, Chapter 4). The first subsample includes airline X’s FFP members who 
are not a member in the competing FFP, the second subsample includes members who are in the 
entry level of the competing FFP, whereas the third subsample includes all other members having 
higher status levels in the competing FFP. See Section 4.5.3 and Appendix 4D and 4E. 
66 The average of the available seat kilometres over all relevant consumer specific origin-destination 
pairs can be seen as a measure of size of airline X and is therefore included in logarithmic form. 
Because the indirect utility function is based on the aggregation of alternatives, i.e. flights, a 
measure of size needs to be included from a theoretical perspective, see, for example, Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985, Chapter 9). However, from an empirical point of view, the issue of double causality 
between frequency and demand (i.e. number of trips) may lead to the exclusion of frequency. As a 
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4.4.4 Consumer surplus analysis 
In order to measure the change in consumer surplus resulting from the 
introduction of differentiation into the FFP in period 2, the compensating variation 
is calculated. The compensating variation is the amount of additional income each 
individual needs after the change in the FFP to attain the initial utility level as it 
would be if the change in the FFP had not been implemented. Stated otherwise, one 
compares the utility that, according to the model, could have been achieved in 
period 2 if the change in the FFP had not been implemented with the actual utility 
achieved in period 2. Following Hausman et al. (1995), we refer to the latter as the 
‘actual’ scenario and to the former as the ‘but for’ scenario. The compensating 
variation, dropping subscript 2?λ  for convenience, is defined as follows: 
 ? ? ? ?? ?, , , ,, , ,t t BF t BF t BF t Acv c v w c v w  (4.13) 
where ? ?c  is the applicable cost function following the utility function, as specified 
in Eq. (4.2), evaluated for the initial utility level and the price index in the ‘but for’ 
(BF) and the ‘actual’ (A) scenario respectively. Appendix 4B shows that the 
individual compensating variation in period 2 equals:67  
 ? ? ? ?? ?
1
1
1 1 ??? ??? ? ? ?? ?? ?exp exp ,
θ
θ
t t t BF A
θcv y y Z Z
η
 (4.14) 
With ? ?1 2? ? ? ?, lnBF t BF t tZ ηw β per β ask μ and ? ?1 2? ? ? ?, ln .A t A t tZ ηw β per β ask μ  
 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Transaction size model 
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for the multinomial logit and panel mixed 
logit specification of Eq. (4.7). The models are estimated using Biogeme 1.9 
(Bierlaire, 2003). The panel mixed logit model includes error components to test 
the hypothesis that the error terms of adjacent fare types are correlated due to the 
implicit ordering of the fare types from low to high quality. So, correlation between 
unobserved utility of fare type 1 and 2 is accounted for, likewise fare type 2 is 
related to fare type 3, and so on. Furthermore, the panel mixed logit specification 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
sensitivity analysis, Eq. (4.11) is also tested without this measure of size. The results do not differ 
between the two specifications.  
67 If the number of trips is fixed, the compensating variation simply equals Δ .Q w?   
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accounts for correlation between the individual-specific error terms over the 
subsequent choices by FFP members. Expanding the model with other random 
parameters, in particular the fare parameter, requires a number of Halton draws 
that is beyond the current computational maximum number of Halton draws, 
around 4000 draws for this data set, to obtain robust estimates.   
The parameters of all trip and/or individual specific variables are estimated relative 
to the fare type 1 alternative. For example, the utility of buying fare type 2 is 0.0289 
(model 1) lower for every day booked in advance compared to the utility of fare type 
1. This finding suggests that the probability of choosing a more expensive fare type 
(2, 3, or 4) increases if there are less days between booking and the flight date. For 
identification purposes, the alternative specific constants as well as the period 
dummies for fare type 3 and 4 are restricted to be equal for the panel mixed logit 
specification.  
Overall, the multinomial and panel mixed logit model give similar results in terms 
of significance and sign of estimated parameters. The standard deviations of the 
variance error components are highly significant in the panel mixed logit 
specification. Hence, we may conclude that the implicit ordering of fare types 
entails to correct for unobserved heterogeneity amongst the adjacent fare types. 
The log-likelihood ratio-test statistic – following a Chi-squared distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of extra estimated parameters – is used to 
test overall model significance (Hensher et al., 2005). We reject the hypothesis that 
the panel mixed logit model is not better than the multinomial logit model.68 
Therefore, and in combination with the earlier mentioned theoretical arguments, 
the panel mixed logit model is the preferred model specification.69 
Regarding the effect of status, a positive but insignificant effect on the number of 
tokens per fare type is found in case the member reaches Silver status in the next 
review period. This effect, however, becomes significant if the member reaches 
Gold status. Furthermore, the dummy variables measuring the impact of reaching 
Silver are not significant, whereas the ones measuring the impact of reaching Gold 
are. This may indicate that the benefits of becoming a Gold member are larger.  
The goal distance parameters measured in points, however, indicate that 
approaching the threshold value increases the probability of buying more expensive 
fare types. Hence, there is evidence for myopic behaviour and thus for the goal 
gradient hypothesis mentioned by Kivetz et al. (2006) even when accounting for 
rational behaviour. 
 
                                                          
68  This test statistic, -2(LLmultinomial logit model – LLpanel mixed model), equals 7 984. Hence, the null 
hypothesis is rejected using the critical value of 3.84 (one extra parameter).   
69 The results for the multinomial logit model specification are reported to serve as a benchmark.  
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Table 4.3 Estimation results for the transaction size model. *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10 per cent. 
 1 (MNL)  2 (Panel mixed logit) 
 Parameter robust s.e.  parameter robust s.e. 
ASC Fare type 2 2.1981*** 0.0653  2.3849*** 0.1004 
ASC Fare type 3 1.3843*** 0.1059  0.1850*** 0.2142 
ASC Fare type 4 -3.5080*** 0.2313  0.1850*** 0.2142 
Sep07_Sep08 * Fare type 2 -0.2840*** 0.0632  -0.2567*** 0.0761 
Sep07_Sep08 * Fare type 3 -0.4758*** 0.0850  -0.2402*** 0.1122 
Sep07_Sep08 * Fare type 3 0.0960*** 0.1811  -0.2402*** 0.1122 
Fare -0.0034*** 0.0006  -0.0034*** 0.0013 
Status points / Threshold Silver 0.0069*** 0.0053  0.0126*** 0.0089 
Status points / Threshold Gold 0.0214*** 0.0076  0.0596*** 0.0164 
Active tier member other airline * Fare type 2 0.2720*** 0.0308  0.4207*** 0.0853 
Active tier member other airline * Fare type 3 0.6815*** 0.0368  1.4906*** 0.3506 
Active tier member other airline * Fare type 4 1.2453*** 0.0903  1.3141*** 0.2929 
Business purpose * Fare type 2 0.1937*** 0.0295  0.1415*** 0.0426 
Business purpose * Fare type 3 0.5524*** 0.0405  0.5589*** 0.0757 
Business purpose * Fare type 4 0.2426*** 0.1101  -0.8634*** 0.1319 
Days booked in advance * Fare type 2 -0.0289*** 0.0011  -0.0281*** 0.0018 
Days booked in advance * Fare type 3  -0.0680*** 0.0019  -0.0573*** 0.0033 
Days booked in advance * Fare type 4 -0.0667*** 0.0072  -0.1021*** 0.0153 
Distance * Fare type 2 /1 000 0.9468*** 0.0704  0.9601*** 0.1091 
Distance * Fare type 3 /1 000 1.0643*** 0.1233  1.2538*** 0.2327 
Distance * Fare type 4 /1 000 2.1285*** 0.2152  -0.9181*** 0.6451 
Goal distance in days * Fare type 2 -0.1288*** 0.0738  0.1226*** 0.0992 
Goal distance in days * Fare type 3 -0.6395*** 0.1055  0.0164*** 0.1734 
Goal distance in days * Fare type 4 -1.4455*** 0.2372  -0.6688*** 0.4135 
Goal distance in points * Fare type 2 0.9112*** 0.0831  0.4290*** 0.1414 
Goal distance in points * Fare type 3 1.9589*** 0.1048  0.5288*** 0.2375 
Goal distance in points * Fare type 4 2.1633*** 0.2028  1.8747*** 0.3711 
Time trend * Fare type 2 /1 000 -1.2762*** 0.1248  -1.4679*** 0.1476 
Time trend * Fare type 3 /1 000 -2.2426*** 0.1603  -2.7264*** 0.2364 
Time trend * Fare type 4 /1 000 1.5964*** 0.3875  -1.6007*** 0.5174 
Towards Silver status * Fare type 2 -0.1472*** 0.1110  -0.1890*** 0.1673 
Towards Silver status * Fare type 3 -0.4445*** 0.2879  -0.5038*** 0.4905 
Towards Silver status * Fare type 4 -0.7682*** 0.4781  -0.2384*** 0.6907 
Towards Gold status * Fare type 2 -0.1773*** 0.0754  -0.4684*** 0.1363 
Towards Gold status * Fare type 3 -0.4080*** 0.1811  -1.3362*** 0.3739 
Towards Gold status * Fare type 4 -0.7106*** 0.2824  -1.4080*** 0.5287 
Variance error components      
Fare type 1 & 2 NA NA  0.5441*** 0.1031 
Fare type 2 & 3 NA NA  0.6869*** 0.0801 
Fare type 3 & 4 NA NA  1.8654*** 0.1070 
Number of observations -54 095   -54 095  
Number of individuals        NA   -52 947  
Halton draws        NA   -54 000  
Null log-likelihood -74 992   -74 992  
Final log-likelihood -43 248   -39 256  
Implied change in CS in total (in 2008 US$) -208.32   -77.38  
Implied change in CS per trip (in 2008 US$)   -34.76   -12.81  
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The unexpected sign and insignificant estimate of the goal distance parameters 
measured in days may be attributed to correlation with the goal distance measured 
in points. The larger magnitude of the latter effect suggests an overall positive 
effect of goal distance. The results in Table 4.3 further indicate that being involved 
in a competing FFP increases the probability of buying more expensive tickets. This 
implies that being a member of the competing FFP not necessarily decreases the 
incentive to spend more at airline X. 
Finally, the last two lines of Table 4.3 show the total and per trip compensating 
variation for the average trip and individual if the number of trips is fixed. The 
implied compensating variation is remarkably lower in the panel mixed logit 
model. This suggests that not accounting for the correlation between the individual 
specific-error terms and the implicit ordering of the alternatives results in an 
upward bias of the impact of differentiation in the FFP on consumer surplus. The 
compensating variation indicates that the average consumer should have an 
additional amount of money of $77 in order to be compensated for the introduction 
of differentiation into the FFP. Here we do not take into account the substitution 
effect of a change in the aggregate price index of flying with airline X, therefore the 
$77 is per definition an overestimation of the true compensating variation.  
4.5.2 Effect of fare and goal distance in points on transaction size  
Based on the estimation results presented in Table 4.3, one can assess whether 
price sensitivity changed after introduction of non-linear token accrual into the 
FFP by calculating the elasticity of market share with respect to fare. This direct 
elasticity,   , , , , , , , ,Pr / /Pr ,i t n i t n i t n i t nfare fare   is an individual point elasticity of market 
share and needs to be evaluated by aggregating the individual elasticities using the 
individual choice probabilities as weights (Hensher et al., 2005).70 The elasticity of 
market share based on the panel mixed logit specification has no closed form. 
Therefore, one needs to simulate these elasticities by calculating for each Halton 
draw the elasticity and subsequently taking the average over all draws (Train, 
2003). The resulting direct- and cross elasticities for all trip purposes are shown in 
Table 4.4.71 
 
 
                                                          
70 The cross elasticity of market share is defined in a similar way. The elasticity, however, is not 
based on a change in the own alternative attribute but on a change in the attribute of another 
alternative instead.   
71 Tables 4.8 and 4.9 in Appendix 4C show these elasticities for business- and leisure trips. 
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Table 4.4 Direct- and cross elasticity of market share with respect to fare. 
  1 (MNL)  2 (Panel mixed logit) 
  period 1 period 2  period 1 period 2 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of fare type 1       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.23 -0.21  -0.22 -0.20 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.03 -0.05  -0.03 -0.05 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.02 -0.03  -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 -0.03 
       
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of fare type 2       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.33 -0.32  -0.34 -0.31 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.15 -0.16  -0.11 -0.13 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.35 -0.35  -0.24 -0.25 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.37 -0.37  -0.22 -0.22 
       
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of fare type 3       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.12 -0.08  -0.08 -0.06 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.17 -0.12  -0.10 -0.08 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.71 -0.76  -0.52 -0.60 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.21 -0.17  -0.35 -0.28 
       
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of fare type 4       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.01 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.01 -0.03  -0.04 -0.07 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -1.22 -1.21  -1.04 -1.00 
 
Looking, for example, at the panel mixed logit model, a 1 per cent increase in the 
fare of fare type 1 results in a decrease in the market share of fare type 1 with 0.22 
per cent in period 1. The same 1 per cent increase in fare leads to an increase of 
market share by 0.03 per cent for fare type 2, and 0.01 for fare type 3, and so on.72 
The results provide no clear evidence that after the introduction of differentiation 
in the FFP consumers are less responsive to fares. In period 2, consumers are 
slightly less responsive to fare changes in fare types 1 and 4, whereas for fare types 
2 and 3 consumers seem to be slightly more responsive to fares. The finding of 
consumers being less responsive to fare changes in the most expensive fare type 
suggests a positive relationship between introduction of differentiation in the FFP 
and the transaction size. At the same time, however, consumers are also less 
responsive to fare changes in the cheapest fare type, suggesting that consumers are 
more likely to buy the cheapest fare type and therefore decrease their transaction 
size. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 in Appendix 4C show the same pattern for business and 
leisure trips separately. Although the total effect of the change in the FFP on price 
sensitivity cannot be determined, due to the opposite effects, we conclude that the 
total effect, irrespective of the sign, is small. 
                                                          
72 The multinomial logit model has equal substitution patterns, therefore the differences in cross-
elasticities are a result of the weighting procedure only (Hensher et al., 2005).  
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Likewise, the impact of moving towards a threshold value on consumers’ behaviour 
can be assessed. This requires calculating the elasticity of market share with respect 
to goal distance in points in the same way as above regarding the fare. Table 4.5 
presents these elasticities for total, business and leisure trips. The results imply 
that if a consumer gets 1 per cent closer to the threshold value of 20 000 or 50 000 
points, the probability of choosing (i.e. the expected market share) fare type 1 in 
case of a business trip decreases with 0.13 per cent in the panel mixed logit 
specification. The results in Table 4.5 show that a move towards the point 
threshold value positively affects the transaction size. In the mixed logit 
specification, this effect is evident for the lowest and highest quality fare type in 
particular, whereas the impact on fare types 2 and 3 seems to be negligible. Overall, 
our results support the goal distance effect as reported by Taylor and Neslin (2005) 
and Kivetz et al. (2006).  
 
Table 4.5 Elasticity of market share with respect to goal distance in points in period 2, for total, business and 
leisure trips. 
  1 (MNL)  2 (Panel mixed logit) 
  total business leisure  total business leisure 
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.23 -0.31 -0.14  -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.04 -0.06 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.41 -0.43 -0.35  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.48 -0.51 -0.40  -0.57 -0.66 -0.43 
4.5.3 Purchase frequency model 
The aggregate price index as shown in Eq. (4.6) is calculated based on the 
estimation results of the transaction size model reported in the previous section. 
The aggregate price index is individual and period specific. For the panel mixed 
logit specification of the transaction size model, the aggregate price index is 
simulated in a similar way as the elasticities of market share as discussed in Section 
4.5.2. Table 4.6 shows the results of estimating Eq. (4.11) applying the conditional 
fixed effects Poisson model. The standard errors are robust, i.e. they are adjusted 
upwards to take into account overdispersion.73 The estimated parameters as shown 
in Table 4.6 are similar across the multinomial logit and the panel mixed logit 
specification, except for the wage parameter.  
                                                          
73 Table 4.10 in Appendix 4D shows the results of estimating the purchase frequency model with the 
combined fixed and random effects model. Tables 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 in Appendix 4E compare the 
results of estimating the purchase frequency model applying the conditional fixed effects Poisson 
model with applying the unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model for the three defined 
subsamples. The estimation results of both the combined fixed and random effects model and the 
unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model confirm the presence of overdispersion with 
highly significant estimates of the overdispersion parameters.   
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Table 4.6 Conditional fixed effects Poisson model. *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10  per cent. 
 1 (MNL) 2 (Panel mixed logit) 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1376*** 0.0154 -0.1410*** 0.0146 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000)  -0.0018*** 0.0330 -0.0019*** 0.0328 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.3253*** 0.1738 -0.0072*** 0.1629 
Period -0.1811*** 0.0285 -0.1787*** 0.0276 
     
Number of individuals -4 611  -4 611  
Null log-likelihood      -11 047        -11 132  
Final log-likelihood      -10 848        -10 922  
 
The highly insignificant parameter estimate of the wage parameter in the panel 
mixed logit specification is remarkable. One possible explanation may be that by 
specifying a panel mixed logit model in the second stage, correlation in the 
individual-specific error components is already captured whereas with the 
multinomial logit specification this cannot be captured. As a result, the wage 
parameter in the first stage of the model may capture the individual-specific errors 
in case of a multinomial logit specification that are otherwise already accounted for 
by a panel mixed logit specification in the second stage.74 The sign of the parameter 
estimates of the aggregate price index, available seat kilometres and the period 
dummy are as expected. Table 4.6 shows that the price index has a negative effect 
on the number of trips, whereas the logarithm of the available seat kilometres has a 
small but positive effect.75 The results suggest that the period dummy has a strong 
positive effect on the number of trips, indicating that after the change in the FFP, 
ceteris paribus, consumers increased their purchase frequency. 
The robustness analyses in Appendix 4D and 4E – estimating Eq. (4.11) applying a 
combined fixed and random effects model and the unconditional fixed effects 
negative binomial model for subsamples – show that the parameter estimates are 
in line for the three different fixed effects methods. Applying the combined fixed 
and random effects model, Table 4.10 in Appendix 4D, results in slightly lower 
estimates for the aggregate price index and the period dummy. Tables 4.12, 4.13 
and 4.14 in Appendix 4E compare the conditional fixed effects Poisson with the 
unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model. From these tables, we 
conclude that the estimated parameters have the same order of magnitude 
                                                          
74 This ambiguity between the multinomial and panel mixed logit specification regarding the wage 
parameter in the first stage of the model is also found in the unconditional fixed effects negative 
binomial model (see Appendix 4E), but not for the combined fixed and random effects model (see 
Appendix 4D). 
75 The aggregate price index is in essence the logsum per trip, and needs to have a positive effect on 
the number of trips. However, in the Tables 4.6, 4.10, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 we included a minus sign 
to emphasise its use a proxy for the aggregate price.  
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irrespective of the model specification in the second stage – multinomial logit 
versus panel mixed logit model – and the fixed effects estimator used.76  
4.5.4 Effects on consumer surplus  
Using the estimation results of both the transaction size model as discussed in 
Section 4.5.2 as well as the purchase frequency models as discussed in Section 
4.5.3, this section calculates the compensating variation as specified in Eq. (4.14). 
As a first step in this calculation, we need to define the aggregate price index in the 
‘but for’ scenario assuming that the change in the FFP has not been implemented. 
This requires setting all estimated parameters related to status in the transaction 
size model equal to zero and recalculate the aggregate price index.     
Table 4.7 presents the point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals of 
the compensating variation for the conditional fixed effects Poisson model 
parameter estimates as shown in Table 4.6 for both the multinomial and panel 
mixed logit specification of the transaction size model. The compensating variation 
as shown in Table 4.7 is based on the average trip and member in our data set. 
Looking at the panel mixed logit specification, the results indicate that the average 
consumer needs an additional income of $47 – with a 95 per cent confidence 
interval between $21 and $73 – in order to be compensated for the change in the 
FFP and attain the utility that could have been achieved if the change had not been 
implemented. This is equivalent to an additional reimbursement of approximately 
$8 per trip, which is around 7 per cent of the average fare paid in period 2. The 
compensating variation resulting from the multinomial logit model is considerably 
higher, with an average compensation of $122 in total and $20 per trip, i.e. 16 per 
cent of the average fare paid in period 2. This finding is in line with the earlier 
discussed differences in compensating variation in case the number of trips is fixed 
between the multinomial and panel mixed logit model shown in Table 4.3 in 
Section 4.5.1. Comparing Tables 4.3 and 4.7, we conclude that taking into account 
substitutability between flying with airline X and buying other goods lowers the 
compensating variation by approximately $30 in total and $5 per trip compared 
with the figures shown in Table 4.3.  
 
 
                                                          
76 The earlier discussed wage parameter is an exception and shows even the opposite sign between 
the two fixed effects estimations. In addition, the period dummy for the subsample of members 
attaining the lowest tier level of the competing FFP shows an opposite sign between the two fixed 
effects estimators for the multinomial logit specification of the second stage.  
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Table 4.7 Change in consumer surplus in total and per trip for conditional fixed effects Poisson model (in 
2008 US$). 
   Mean s.e. [95% CI] 
 
1 (MNL) Change in CS, total -122.09 35.85 -192.35 -51.84 Change in CS, per trip 1-20.37 15.98 -32.09   -8.64 
      
2 (Panel mixed logit) Change in CS, total 1-47.00 13.24 -72.95 -21.04 Change in CS, per trip 11-7.78 12.19 -12.08   -3.48 
 
The point estimates of the compensating variation based on applying the combined 
fixed and random effects model, Table 4.11 in Appendix 4D, are considerably 
higher compared to the results shown in Table 4.7. This is in line with the earlier 
mentioned lower parameter estimates for the aggregate price index and period 
dummy in this particular model. Table 4.15 in Appendix 4E compares the point 
estimates of the compensating variation between the conditional fixed effects 
Poisson and the unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model for the three 
subsamples. This table shows that these point estimates are rather consistent over 
these two fixed effects estimators. The differences between compensating variation 
over the three subsamples is noteworthy: for individuals having a higher status in 
the competing FFP this compensating is much smaller compared with those 
members who do not have a high status in the competing FFP. This suggests that 
individuals holding multiple FFP memberships are less affected by a change in one 
of these programs. A possible explanation is that these individuals may switch 
easier between the sponsoring carriers. Although, we concluded in Section 4.5.1 
that being FFP member of the competing program increases the probability to buy 
more expensive fare types, here we show that these same individuals switch earlier 
between the airlines. The results in Table 4.15 suggest that this latter effect 
dominates the former.   
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Although initially derided as a marketing gimmick, FFPs matured from a narrowly 
targeted marketing device into an essential part of most airlines’ product offering. 
Loyalty programs are present in various industries including retail, financial and 
tourism, but there is no consensus amongst scholars about the effectiveness and 
long term impact of such programs. This chapter contributes to a better 
understanding of loyalty programs, in particular FFPs, by analysing how a 
redesigned FFP program affects usage levels of existing FFP members.  
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Three key concerns mentioned in prior literature are addressed in this chapter. 
First, the issue of double causality due to the endogenous participation decision is 
addressed by focussing only at the impact of an exogenous change in the FFP on 
the consumer behaviour of already active FFP members. The inclusion of non-
linear token accrual, i.e. a system with status levels, is the major change in the FFP. 
Second, this chapter analyses both dimensions of consumer usage levels – 
purchase frequency and transaction size – instead of focussing only at purchase 
frequency. Third, the change in the FFP allows studying the impact of changes in 
reward structures within loyalty programs on consumer behaviour.  
This chapter employs a two-stage budgeting model and shows that the combined 
model for analysing purchase frequency and transaction size is consistent with 
utility maximisation. Longitudinal data covering a representative sample of active 
FFP members of airline X is used to estimate a multinomial and panel mixed logit 
model analysing the transaction size in the second stage of the model. After 
calculating the resulting aggregate price index, the first stage – the purchase 
frequency model – is estimated with a conditional fixed effects Poisson model. This 
approach allows one to calculate the additional income needed, the compensating 
variation, to attain the utility that could have been achieved in case the change in 
the FFP had not been implemented.   
The results show that, based on the panel mixed logit and conditional fixed effects 
Poisson model, the point estimates of the individual compensating variation equals 
$47 in total and $8 per trip (in 2008 US$), which is equivalent to 7 per cent of the 
average fare paid in the period after introducing membership status in the FFP. 
Comparing the multinomial logit model and the panel mixed logit model, this 
chapter shows that not controlling for the correlation between individual specific-
error terms results in an upward bias of the point estimate of the compensating 
variation. The model in this chapter does not explicitly measure the benefits of 
status. Therefore, further research needs to address whether the reported 
compensating variation of around $47 is already offset by the benefits individual 
members receive from status as such.  
Finally, this chapter finds that the effect on transaction size is mainly due to the 
goal distance effect and not due to a decreased price sensitivity. This suggests that 
consumers’ attitude towards fares may not be affected by a loyalty program. Hence, 
the mechanism of non-linear token accrual, and accompanying status levels, seems 
to be a crucial element in the effectiveness of airline X’s FFP. The results reinforce 
the existing empirical evidence that FFPs do influence consumers’ usage levels. 
However, in contrast to most studies, this analysis shows that this effect is 
predominantly caused by transaction size and not by purchase frequency.  
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Appendix 4A: Definition and construction of variables 
Fare An average one-way trip fare (in 2008 US$) per fare type is calculated and 
used as a proxy for the airfare at the time of booking. This average fare is specific in 
origin-destination, days booked in advance and departure time. We distinguish 
between booking 0–7, 8–20, 21–60 and >60 days in advance and departing within 
the following time slots: 05:00–09:59, 10:00–13:59, 14:00–16:59, 17:00–20:59, 
and 21:00-04:59. Because the value of accrued redemption tokens may actually 
lower the real fare, the average fare is adjusted for individual redemption 
behaviour. The expected value of redemption is calculated as the redemption value 
per token (0.01 US$) times the number of accrued tokens per fare type multiplied 
by the expected probability that the member uses these accrued tokens for 
redemption. The latter one is approximated by dividing the total amount of 
redeemed tokens over the total amount of accrued tokens over the three-year 
period. 
Goal distance in days The goal distance in days is measured as the number of days 
passed in the annual review period divided by total number of days a year.  
Goal distance in points The goal distance in points is measured as the total amount 
of points already accrued within the annual review period divided by the total 
amount of points needed to qualify for the next status level: 20 000 for Silver and 
50 000 for Gold status.  
Status points divided by threshold value Silver or Gold status For each alternative, 
we calculate the number of status points. The number of accrued status points 
depends on the fare and the current status of the member. This number is divided 
by the threshold level of the status attained at the next annual review date. For 
example, if a member has Silver status in October 2007, but we observe that he 
attains Gold status in January 2008, we divide the status points of any booking in 
the period October 2007–January 2008 by the threshold level of Gold, i.e. 50 000 
points. We distinguish between members attaining Silver status (starting at Bronze 
or Silver status) and members attaining Gold status (starting at Bronze, Silver or 
Gold status). The reference category is based on members that get a downgrade in 
status or stay in the lowest status level, i.e. from Bronze to Bronze, Silver to Bronze 
or Gold to Silver.  
Towards Silver or Gold status The towards silver dummy equals 1 if members 
reach Silver status (starting at Bronze or Silver status) before the next annual 
review date, otherwise the dummy equals 0. The towards Gold status dummy 
equals 1 if members reach Gold status (starting at Bronze, Silver or Gold status) 
before the next annual review date, otherwise the dummy equals 0. 
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Purpose Trip purpose is not recorded in the data. Therefore, we applied a set of 
rules to determine the purpose of trip, distinguishing between business and leisure 
trips, based on the data available on the actual trip and the FFP member. Here, we 
briefly discuss this set of rules. First, people are excluded from having a business 
purpose based on their job status, like for example retirees, wait staff, nurses and 
hairdressers. Second, if the trip departs in the morning and/or arrives in the 
evening peak hours on weekdays and the total trip does not include Saturday or 
Sunday, it is defined as a business trip. Third, trips during and including bank 
holidays as well as short trips starting at Friday and Saturday are labelled as leisure 
trips. This set of rules classifies around 95 per cent of all trips. Although 
measurement error in this variable is difficult to avoid, our estimation results are 
robust applying different sets of rules. 
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Appendix 4B: Derivation of compensating variation 
To analyse the change in consumer surplus following the change in the FFP, this 
appendix defines the cost function associated with the indirect utility function 'v  
for the ‘actual’ scenario after the change in the FFP and the hypothetical ‘but for’ 
scenario. Since the compensating variation is based on one period, period 2, the 
subscript λ  is dropped from all equations in this appendix. The compensating 
variation is the difference between the two cost functions:  
 ? ? ? ?? ?, , , ,, , .t t BF t BF t BF t Acv c v w c v w  (4B.1) 
This compensating variation is the amount of additional income each individual t 
needs after the change in the FFP to attain the initial utility level as it would be in 
the hypothetical ‘but for’ scenario. The cost function ? ?, ,, ,,t BF t BFc v w  can easily be 
obtained by rewriting the indirect utility function of Eq. (4.10): 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?
1
1 11 11
1
? ?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
exp exp ,
θ θ
t
t BF t t BF
y θv Z y θ v Z
θ η η
 (4B.2) 
where ? ?1 2? ? ? ?, ln .BF t BF t tZ ηw β per β ask μ  The cost function ? ?, ,,t BF t Ac v w is 
obtained in the same way, but replacing BFZ with ,AZ  where 
? ?1 2? ? ? ?, ln .A t A t tZ ηw β per β ask μ  Substituting the above expressions into Eq. 
(4B.1) yields: 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1 1
1 11 11 1
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
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Substituting subsequently ? ?1 1
1
?
? ?? exp
θ
t
t BF
yv Z
θ η
 into Eq. (4B.3) and rewrite the 
equation yields: 
 ? ? ? ?? ?
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1
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η
 (4B.4) 
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Appendix 4C: Elasticities of market share with respect to fare 
Table 4.8 Direct- and cross elasticity of market share with respect to fare: business trips. 
  1 (MNL)  2 (Panel mixed logit) 
  period 1 period 2  period 1 period 2 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 1       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.25 -0.23  -0.24 -0.21 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.02 -0.04  -0.02 -0.04 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.02 -0.03  -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 -0.03 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 2       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.33 -0.33  -0.35 -0.33 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.15 -0.16  -0.11 -0.12 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.34 -0.34  -0.23 -0.24 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.35 -0.35  -0.22 -0.22 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 3       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.17 -0.11  -0.10 -0.07 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.20 -0.15  -0.12 -0.09 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.68 -0.73  -0.49 -0.56 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.23 -0.19  -0.39 -0.32 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 4       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.01 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.01 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.01 -0.03  -0.03 -0.06 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -1.16 -1.16  -1.05 -1.01 
 
Table 4.9 Direct- and cross elasticity of market share with respect to fare: leisure trips. 
  1 (MNL)  2 (Panel mixed logit) 
  period 1 period 2  period 1 period 2 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 1       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.21 -0.19  -0.20 -0.18 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.04 -0.06  -0.03 -0.06 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.03 -0.04  -0.02 -0.03 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.03 -0.04  -0.02 -0.04 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 2       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.33 -0.31  -0.33 -0.30 
Fare type 2 (…)  -0.13 -0.16  -0.11 -0.14 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.39 -0.38  -0.27 -0.28 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -0.42 -0.42  -0.23 -0.22 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 3       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)   -0.08 -0.05  -0.05 -0.04 
Fare type 2 (…)   -0.12 -0.08  -0.08 -0.06 
Fare type 3 (…)  -0.84 -0.91  -0.65 -0.73 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)   -0.16 -0.12  -0.30 -0.23 
Elasticity of market share wrt. fare of Fare type 4       
Fare type 1 (Lowest available fare)  -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 
Fare type 2 (…)   0.01 -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 
Fare type 3 (…)   0.01 -0.03  -0.08 -0.11 
Fare type 4 (Business flexible fare)  -1.36 -1.38  -1.02 -0.98 
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Appendix 4D: Combined fixed and random effects (hybrid) model 
 
Table 4.10 Combined fixed and random effects (hybrid) model. *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10 per cent. 
 1 (MNL) 2 (Panel mixed logit) 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
(deviation from mean) Price index / 100 -0.0883*** 0.0129 -0.0923*** 0.0123  
(deviation from mean) ln(Available seat km†)  --/0.0018*  0.0003 -0.0019*** 0.0003  
(deviation from mean) ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.5264*** 0.2281 -0.4018*** 0.2132 
(deviation from mean) Period --/0.1435* 0.0230 -0.1431*** 0.0218  
     
(mean) Price index / 100 0.3384*** 0.0098 -0.2672*** 0.0090 
(mean) ln(Available seat km†) 0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0013*** 0.0002 
(mean) ln(Wage / 10 000) 0.2358*** 0.0549 -0.2136*** 0.0564 
(mean) Period -1.1389*** 0.2182 -0.8109*** 0.2230  
     
Beta distribution parameter a  4.7703*** 0.1527 4.2716*** 0.1317 
Beta distribution parameter b  6.1260*** 0.2827 5.7111*** 0.2584 
Overdispersion parameter 1.3628***  1.4593***  
     
Number of individuals 4 611***     4 611  
Null log-likelihood -38 530***  -26 429  
Final log-likelihood -24 421***  -24 718  
 
† Available seat km / 10 000 
 
Table 4.11 Change in consumer surplus in total and per trip for combined fixed and random effects model (in 
2008 US$).  
   mean s.e. [95% CI] 
 
1 (MNL) Change in CS, total -238.86 27.55 -292.86 -184.85 Change in CS, per trip 1-39.85   4.60 -48.86   -30.84 
      
2 (Panel mixed logit) Change in CS, total 1-73.94   7.62 -88.88   -59.00 Change in CS, per trip 1-12.24   1.26 -14.72     -9.77 
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Appendix 4E: Unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model  
 
Table 4.12 Comparison between conditional fixed effects Poisson and unconditional fixed effects negative 
binomial model, subsample: no member of competing FFP. *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10 per cent.77  
 1 (MNL) 
 Poisson FE Unconditional NB 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1237*** 0.0263 -0.1459*** 0.0235 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000) -0.0017*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 0.0005 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.8206*** 0.3932 -0.7463*** 0.9102 
Period -0.2498*** 0.0542 -0.2401*** 0.0413 
Overdispersion parameter     NA      NA -0.0342*** 0.0068 
Number of individuals  1 933    1 933  
Null log-likelihood -4 312  -10 542  
Final log-likelihood -4 233    -7 782  
 2 (Mixed Logit) 
 Poisson FE Unconditional NB 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1331*** 0.0139 -0.1513*** 0.0230 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000) -0.0018*** 0.0003 -0.0014*** 0.0005 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.8353*** 0.3906 -0.7069*** 0.8942 
Period -0.2355*** 0.0240 -0.2200*** 0.0398 
Overdispersion parameter     NA      NA -0.0361*** 0.0080 
Number of individuals  1 933  /1 933  
Null log-likelihood -4 342  -9 026  
Final log-likelihood -4 261  -7 811  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 The reported standard errors in the unconditional negative binomial model are adjusted upwards 
as suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002, page 259). Hence, the robust standard errors are 
multiplied by the square root of the deviance to its degrees of freedom. 
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Table 4.13 Comparison between conditional fixed effects Poisson and unconditional fixed effects negative 
binomial model, subsample: lowest tier level in competing FFP. *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10 per cent. 
 1 (MNL) 
 Poisson FE Unconditional NB 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1208*** 0.0248 -0.1171*** 0.0291 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000) -0.0021*** 0.0005 -0.0022*** 0.0005 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.4569*** 0.2635    -0.3955* 0.3033 
Period -0.1446*** 0.0476 -0.1502*** 0.0594 
Overdispersion parameter     NA      NA -0.0453*** 0.0011 
Number of individuals 1 677  1 677  
Null log-likelihood -3 923  -8 084  
Final log-likelihood -3 856  -6 966  
 2 (Mixed Logit) 
 Poisson FE Unconditional NB 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1204*** 0.0147 -0.1191*** 0.0287 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000) -0.0020*** 0.0003 -0.0022*** 0.0005 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.5252*** 0.2733    -0.4514** 0.3031 
Period -0.1381*** 0.0472 -0.1414*** 0.0580 
Overdispersion parameter     NA      NA -0.0455*** 0.0111 
Number of individuals 1 677  1 677  
Null log-likelihood -3 944  -8 126  
Final log-likelihood -3 879  -6 996  
 
 
Table 4.14 Comparison between conditional fixed effects Poisson and unconditional fixed effects negative 
binomial model, subsample: highest tier levels in competing FFP. *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10 per cent.  
 1 (MNL) 
 Poisson FE Unconditional NB 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1316*** 0.0141 -0.1796* 0.0336 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000) -0.0007*** 0.0004 -0.0004* 0.0006 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.0753*** 0.0973 -0.0978* 0.3410 
Period -0.1152*** 0.0217 -0.1999* 0.0539 
Overdispersion parameter    NA      NA -0.0616* 0.0090 
Number of individuals           999         999  
Null log-likelihood       -2 939     -5 679  
Final log-likelihood       -2 881     -4 870  
 2 (Mixed Logit) 
 Poisson FE Unconditional NB 
 parameter robust s.e. parameter robust s.e. 
Price index / 100 -0.1423* 0.0297 -0.1830* 0.0311 
ln(Available seat km / 10 000) -0.0005* 0.0008 -0.0004* 0.0006 
ln(Wage / 10 000)  -0.1131* 0.2184 -0.0380* 0.2957 
Period -0.1499* 0.0526 -0.2208* 0.0536 
Overdispersion parameter       NA      NA -0.0620* 0.0090 
Number of individuals       999        999  
Null log-likelihood  -2 959    -5 700  
Final log-likelihood  -2 899    -4 884  
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Table 4.15 Change in consumer surplus in total and per trip for conditional fixed effects Poisson and 
unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model for all subsamples.  
   mean s.e. [95% CI] 
No tier member competing FFP     
1 (MNL)  
Poisson FE Change in CS, total -111.64 145.26 -396.36 173.07 Change in CS, per trip -21.06 127.40 -74.76 132.64 
      
Unconditional NB Change in CS, total -147.63 220.60 -580.00 284.74 Change in CS, per trip -27.84 141.61 -109.39 153.70 
       
2 (Mixed Logit)  
Poisson FE Change in CS, total -50.73 161.60 -171.47 170.00 Change in CS, per trip -9.53 111.57 -32.20 113.14 
      
Unconditional NB Change in CS, total -58.02 175.03 -205.07 189.04 Change in CS, per trip -10.89 114.09 -38.50 116.72 
      
Lowest tier level competing FFP     
1 (MNL)  
Poisson FE Change in CS, total -118.28 51.26 -218.74 -17.82 Change in CS, per trip -21.46 19.30 -39.70 1-3.23 
      
Unconditional NB Change in CS, total -110.46 32.19 -173.56 -47.36 Change in CS, per trip -20.04 15.84 -31.50 1-8.60 
       
2 (Mixed Logit)  
Poisson FE Change in CS, total -46.56 20.90 -87.53 1-5.59 Change in CS, per trip -8.31 13.73 -15.63 1-1.00 
      
Unconditional NB Change in CS, total -43.08 12.37 -67.33 -18.84 Change in CS, per trip -7.69 12.21 -12.02 1-3.36 
       
Highest tier levels competing FFP      
1 (MNL)  
Poisson FE Change in CS, total -127.67 63.88 -252.87 1-2.47 Change in CS, per trip -13.61 16.81 -26.95 1-0.26 
      
Unconditional NB Change in CS, total -133.06 82.48 -294.73 -28.60 Change in CS, per trip -14.18 18.79 -31.41 -13.05 
       
2 (Mixed Logit)  
Poisson FE Change in CS, total -6.32 12.80 -11.81 1-0.82 Change in CS, per trip -0.67 10.30 -1.24 1-0.09 
      
Unconditional NB Change in CS, total -6.35 13.27 -12.77 -10.05 Change in CS, per trip -0.67 10.35 -1.35 -10.01 

5 Capacity choice under uncertainty 
with product differentiation  
  
  
  
5.1 Introduction78 
This chapter analyses a two-stage duopoly game, where firms set capacities in the 
first stage and prices in the second. Demand is stochastic when capacities are 
chosen and becomes known before the pricing stage starts. Capacity-then-price 
games with uncertainty are relevant for a great number of industries where 
capacity is costly and outputs cannot be stored, such as, scheduled transport 
services, telecommunication services, electricity generation, hotels, and so on. This 
chapter focuses on markets with exogenous horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation. The combination of uncertainty and product differentiation in 
capacity-then-price games has not been studied before. Prior literature addresses 
these two topics only separately. 
The seminal article by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) has spurred a wave of 
research into capacity-then-price games. They establish that such a two-stage game 
yields profit maximising capacities equal to profit maximising quantities in a one-
stage Cournot game. Several authors study similar settings under demand 
uncertainty and find that equilibria in pure strategies either fail to exist or only 
exist for specific configurations of the demand function (see, for example, Hviid, 
1991; Gabszewicz and Poddar, 1997; Reynolds and Wilson, 2000). In contrast, De 
Frutos and Fabra (2011) do solve the capacity-then-price game and prove existence 
of the equilibrium by defining the capacity game submodular. Their findings are 
consistent with the more qualitative finding by Reynolds and Wilson (2000) that if 
an equilibrium exists, it is asymmetric in outcomes, despite a symmetric setting. 
Benassy (1989) provides the key contribution in understanding the impact of 
substitutability in Betrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin models. He finds that a pure 
strategy equilibrium in prices for given capacities does not exist for markets with 
close substitutes. Due to the assumed given capacities, his result may only affect 
the price subgame in models with endogenous capacities. 
                                                          
78 This chapter is based on the TI discussion paper by Behrens and Lijesen (2012). 
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The current study extends the literature by explicitly taking into account product 
differentiation. Although product differentiation may change the nature of 
capacity-then-price models, it has so far by-and-large been ignored in these 
models. For example, horizontal product differentiation can yield positive profits 
under Bertrand competition. To the best of our knowledge, Young (2010) provides 
the only attempt to include product differentiation in capacity-then-price models. 
He claims that symmetric pure strategy equilibria exist for goods that are imperfect 
substitutes. Unfortunately, this finding appears to be based on a mistake, as will be 
argued in Section 5.3. 
The model in this chapter allows for vertical and horizontal product differentiation 
to occur simultaneously in different degrees. The analysis shows that for a 
minimum degree of vertical differentiation, relative to horizontal differentiation, 
the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in pure strategies is 
guaranteed. This is the first study to find equilibria for capacity-then-price games 
under demand uncertainty without having to rely on mixed strategies and/or 
submodular games. The results are used to compare the capacity-then-price game 
with the standard Cournot model to analyse the effects of demand uncertainty and 
product differentiation on capacities and efficiency. This comparison shows that 
demand uncertainty results in higher (lower) market capacities and efficiency if 
capacity costs are relatively low (high).  
This study also relates to the literature on price dispersion over demand states. 
Dana (1999) finds that demand uncertainty and fixed costs may explain the 
existence of intrafirm price dispersion in competitive and oligopolistic markets. 
The results in this chapter show that Dana’s finding that intrafirm price dispersion 
increases with the intensity of competition does not necessarily hold in the case of 
vertical product differentiation. This finding provides an explanation for the mixed 
results in empirical studies, such as Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and 
Shapiro (2009).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the 
model, followed by a discussion of the existence of equilibria in pure strategies in 
Section 5.3. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 analyse and discuss the model for those degrees of 
vertical differentiation that guarantee the existence of SPNE in pure strategies. 
Section 5.6 provides a discussion and conclusion.  
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5.2 The model 
5.2.1 Basic set-up 
The model follows the framework used in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Two firms 
play a capacity-then-price game. Firms set capacities in the first stage and prices in 
the second stage. In both stages, the firms act simultaneously. We add exogenous 
product differentiation to the model. Similar to Vives (1999; pages 144-147), it is 
assumed that the representative consumer has the following quadratic utility 
function:  
 ? ? ? ? ? ?2 21 2 1 2 1 21 2 2?? ? ? ? ?/ ,U α z θz β z z z z  (5.1) 
where iz  represents the firm specific output, α  represents the reservation price, 
and β  the direct demand sensitivity. The demand sensitivity is assumed to be equal 
for both goods. The degree of horizontal product differentiation is captured by ?,  
which ranges from 0 for independent goods to 1 for perfect substitutes.79 Vertical 
product differentiation is represented by ,θ  where a unit value indicates that the 
goods are not differentiated. Without loss of generality, firm 1 represents the high-
quality firm by assuming 1? .θ 80  Additionally, we assume that ?/θ  is sufficiently 
large to ensure that firm 2 will install a positive capacity. For ease of exposition and 
interpretation, the parameters α  and β  are scaled in such a way that utility is 
measured in monetary terms.81  
By imposing restrictions on the parameters in the utility function two specific 
settings arise. First, setting 1? ?  and 1?θ  yields a model of horizontal product 
differentiation (with 0? ?  providing the special case of independent goods) while 
setting 1? ? and 1?θ  renders a model of vertical product differentiation. The 
limiting case of both models ( 1? ? ?θ ) renders the case of a symmetric duopoly.  
Utility is defined such that the marginal utility of output equals the marginal 
willingness to pay. Hence, the inverse demand is equal to: 
 ? ? ? ?1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ / , / / ,U z p α z z b U z p θα z z b  (5.2) 
                                                          
79 Formally, 0 1? ??  ensures that the two goods are substitutes and U is strictly concave. 
80 Quality may also refer to perceived quality or desirability. 
81 Alternatively, one may write Eq. (5.1) as a Lagrangian with a budget restriction and impose a unity 
value on the Lagrangian multiplier. 
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with 1? / .b β  Both the reservation price, ,α  and the inverse of the direct demand 
sensitivity, b, determine the level of demand. Throughout this chapter, the analysis 
focuses on demand uncertainty in the level of demand through stochasticity in b 
keeping the reservation price constant.   
Firm profits are equal to revenue, i.e. pi times zi, minus costs. Firms maximise their 
profits by setting capacities, xi, in the first stage and prices, pi, in the second stage 
of the model. Output is constrained such that ? .i iz x  Firms face a cost of ci per unit 
of capacity and are assumed to have no other costs. So, ? .i i iC c x  These costs may 
differ between firms. The only formal restriction on the cost parameter is that 
capacity costs are strictly positive for both firms. Apart from this formal restriction, 
one may argue that in practice the higher quality firm is likely to have higher costs 
per unit of capacity. Examples of firms with higher (perceived) quality or 
desirability in combination with higher capital costs include legacy carrier versus 
low-cost carriers, low-end- versus high-end hotels and renewable versus traditional 
electricity generation. 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) establish that capacity-then-price games lead to 
Cournot outcomes, motivating the use of the single stage Cournot outcome of our 
model as a benchmark for further analysis. If demand is deterministic, the Cournot 
outcome equals: 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?2 21 1 2 2 2 12 4 2 4* *, ,/ ; / ,C Cx b α c θα c x b θα c α c? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ??  (5.3) 
where b  is a positive parameter related to b that will be discussed in more detail 
below. Without demand uncertainty, the capacities are equal to the outputs for 
both firms in the equilibrium: ? .i iz x  The model is asymmetric for 1?θ  and equal 
capacity costs. In the Cournot benchmark, symmetry in profit maximising 
capacities is restored if the cost difference per unit of capacity equals the relative 
difference in reservation prices, ? ?1 2 1? ? ? .c c θ α  The level of demand and degree of 
horizontal product differentiation do not alter this condition. 
5.2.2 Demand uncertainty 
When setting capacities, firms know that different demand states will occur after 
capacities are chosen. Firms thus base their capacity decisions on a probability 
function of b, with support ? 10 ? ??,α  and mean .b 82 The expected profit for firm i 
equals: 
                                                          
82 Choosing the upper bound of 1α?  scales the model and ensures that ? ?0 1.D ?  
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 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?11 2 1 2 1 20 1 2
?
? ? ??, , , , , , , , .αi i i i iπ x x b p x x b z x x b f b db c x i  (5.4) 
Firms maximise expected profits by setting capacities in the first stage and prices in 
the second, with outputs following from capacities, prices and states of the world. 
The next section discusses how the states of the world, the level of demand and 
capacities are related. The model needs to be solved by backward induction.  
Apart from the profits of each firm, the model is used to look at the efficiency of the 
resulting equilibria over the different degrees of product differentiation, costs, and 
demand uncertainty. For the latter, one needs to compare the efficiency of the 
standard Cournot outcome as shown in Eq. (5.3) and the results based on 
maximisation of Eq. (5.4). In line with earlier work, see, for example, Acemoglu et 
al. (2009), efficiency is defined as the ratio of welfare in equilibrium relative to the 
first-best outcome, with welfare defined as:   
 ? ? ? ? ? ?11 2 1 2 1 1 2 20
?
? ? ??, , , , ,αW x x b U x x b f b db c x c x  (5.5) 
where ? ?1 2, ,U x x b  is the utility function as specified in Eq. (5.1) after substituting 
equilibrium prices into outputs. Note that prices are a function of capacities and b: 
? ?1 2, , ,ip x x b  hence ? ? ? ?1 2? , , .i i iz p z x x b  To attain the first-best outcome the above 
welfare is maximised with respect to x1 and x2 given optimal prices and outputs for 
every level of demand b (see the discussion in Section 5.4 and Appendix 5D). 
 
 
5.3 Existence of pure strategy equilibria 
The existence of equilibria in pure strategies is not generally guaranteed in 
capacity-then-price games with uncertain demand. At the core of the problem lies 
the incentive in Bertrand-Edgeworth models for one firm to increase its price if the 
other firm’s output is near capacity. As a result, the competitor’s capacity 
constraint becomes binding and the firm earns residual monopoly profits instead of 
Bertrand duopoly profits. Benassy (1989; page 227) establishes that for an 
equilibrium to exist, it should be impossible or irrational for any firm to saturate 
the capacity of its competitor(s) by raising its own price. In the case of 
deterministic demand, firms produce at full capacity by construction, and hence 
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is guaranteed.  
If demand is uncertain and capacity is costly, firms do not produce at full capacity 
for all levels of demand. Now, three situations may apply and hence three 
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parameter regions can be distinguished. The boundaries for each region depend on 
the level of demand, b, relative to installed capacities, x1 and x2. In the first region, 
demand is too low for any firm to produce at full capacity. As a result, a Bertrand 
game is played in the price stage of the game. In the third region, demand is 
sufficiently high to have both firms produce at full capacity and charge clearing 
prices corresponding to their capacities, which boils down to the results reported 
by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).  
Based on the first and third region only, Young (2010) claims to have found an 
equilibrium in pure strategies. This finding, however, is based on ignoring the 
intermediate region, in which pure strategy equilibria in prices fail to exist (see, for 
example, De Frutos and Fabra (2011)). The following example illustrates this point. 
Consider a Bertrand duopoly without product differentiation and both firms 
producing near capacity. Since neither firm is restricted, both firms make zero 
profit in the Bertrand equilibrium. Either firm can however obtain a positive profit 
by setting a price above marginal costs, as this will saturate the other firm’s 
capacity, implying that some consumers cannot switch to the other firm. For 
example, suppose firm 1 raises its price to saturate firm 2. This provides an 
incentive for firm 2, who is now capacity restricted, to raise its price as well. 
Actually, firm 2 may raise its price to just undercut firm 1’s price without losing 
consumers. In turn, this provides an incentive for firm 1 to just undercut firm 2’s 
price, and so on. We then have the non-existence problem as established by 
Benassy (1989). The same problem occurs assuming imperfect substitutes 
(Benassy, 1989; theorem 3).  
The existence of pure strategy equilibria is further explored by distinguishing 
between two settings. Appendix 5A proves that both firms will produce at any 
positive level of demand if and only if ? ?22? ?? ?/θ . We refer to this as ‘mainly 
horizontal product differentiation’, because the degree of vertical product 
differentiation is low (i.e. a high θ ) relative to the degree of horizontal product 
differentiation. Both firms producing at any positive level of demand, results in the 
non-existence problem as discussed in the above example.  
The non-existence of pure equilibria in case of ‘mainly horizontal product 
differentiation’ is in sharp contrast to the second setting, which we refer to as 
‘mainly vertical product differentiation’. If ? ?22? ?? ?/ ,θ  firm 2 does not want to 
produce as long as firm 1’s capacity is not binding (see Appendix 5A). This implies 
that firm 2 does not have the option to saturate firm 1’s capacity. Appendix 5B 
shows that for ? ?22? ?? ?/θ  firm 1 does not have the incentive to saturate firm 2’s 
capacity and attain residual monopoly profits over the residual demand instead of 
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attaining the contestable monopoly profits.  Therefore, one may conclude that the 
existence of SPNE in pure strategies is guaranteed for ? ?22? ?? ?/ .θ  
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the ‘mainly vertical product 
differentiation’ case. Such a setting would be relevant in real life for markets like air 
transport (low-cost carriers versus legacy carriers), hotels (low-end- versus high-
end hotels), and similar markets. Throughout the subsequent analysis, the degree 
of vertical product differentiation is bounded by a lower bound, ,θ  guaranteeing the 
capacity of the low-quality firm to be positive, and by an upper bound, 
? ?22? ?? ?/ ,θ  to guarantee the existence of an SPNE in pure strategies. 
 
 
5.4 Mainly vertical product differentiation 
As in the previous section, three parameter regions are distinguished. The 
boundaries for each region – contested monopoly, residual monopoly and 
Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly – depend on the level of demand, b, relative to 
capacities, x1 and x2.  
5.4.1 Contested monopoly region  
If demand is sufficiently low, firm 2 will not produce. This allows firm 1 to set its 
price above the Bertrand level. Firm 1, however, has to take into account the 
possibility that firm 2 may produce. Therefore, firm 1 offers output at the limit 
price: at this price firm 2 will just decide not produce. This price is found by setting 
firm 2’s best response in prices to zero and solve for p1:  
 ? ?1 ? ?? ?*, / .CMp α θ  (5.6) 
The price is positively related to the reservation price and to the level of vertical 
product differentiation. A smaller quality difference (i.e. a higher value for θ ) 
leaves less room for the monopolist to gain quality rents. Substituting 1*,CMp  and 
2 0?z  into firm 1’s demand function gives the equilibrium output: 
 ? ?1 1 ??* *, , / .CM CMz p αbθ  (5.7) 
Both the equilibrium price and output are increasing in the degree of horizontal 
differentiation, implying that firm 1’s profits are increasing in the degree of 
horizontally differentiation. The equilibrium price increases and the output 
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decreases in the degree of vertical product differentiation. For 1 2? / ,θ  firm 1’s 
equilibrium profit increases in the degree of vertical differentiation, i.e. decreases 
in .θ  The upper bound of the first region can be found by equating Eq. (5.7) to firm 
1’s capacity and solve for b:  
 1?? / .CMb x αθ  (5.8) 
Appendix 5C shows that if 2?? / ,θ  a special case arises. In this case, firm 2 cannot 
attain positive profits by setting a positive price for its output. As a result, the 
contested monopoly becomes a pure monopoly in this first region. Finding the 
equilibrium price and output for firm 1 and the accompanying boundary only 
requires substituting 2?? /θ  into Eq. (5.6), Eq. (5.7), and Eq. (5.8). Whether the 
first region is a contested or pure monopoly region does not affect the subsequent 
analysis for other two regions. 
5.4.2 Residual monopoly region  
If the level of demand exceeds the level as determined in Eq. (5.8), firm 1 produces 
at full capacity, whereas firm 2 serves residual demand as a monopolist. 
Substituting 1 1?z x  into the inverse demand function and rewriting for z2 yields the 
demand function for output 2: 
 ? ?2 2 1 2 1?? ? ?, , ,, .RM RM RMD p x αbθ bp x  (5.9) 
The profit for firm 2 simply equals price times demand minus capacity costs. The 
profit maximising price for firm 2 follows directly from the first order condition of 
the profit function and is equal to: 
 ? ?2 1 2?? ?*, / .RMp αbθ x b  (5.10) 
The equilibrium price of firm 2 is increasing in the firm’s own quality and 
decreasing in the capacity of firm 1. The latter clearly reflects the nature of firm 2 
having a monopoly over residual demand. Substituting 2*,RMp  into the demand 
function for output 2 yields the equilibrium output: 
 
? ?2 1 2?? ?*, / .RMz αbθ x  (5.11) 
Both the equilibrium price and output for firm 2 are increasing in the level of 
demand b, and decreasing in firm 1’s capacity. Vertical product differentiation 
decreases firm 2’s profits because it gives firm 1 more possibilities to exercise its 
contestable monopoly power in the first region. Since firm 1 is capacity restricted in 
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the second region, its optimal price is the clearing price taking firm 2’s optimal 
behaviour as given. Substituting 1 1?z x  and 2*,RMz  into the inverse demand function 
of output 1, see Eq. (5.2), gives this clearing price:  
 
? ? ? ?? ?21 12 2 2? ?? ? ? ?*, / .RMp αb θ x b  (5.12) 
The equilibrium price of firm 1 is positively related to the level of vertical product 
differentiation and negatively to its own capacity, which is a common finding in 
capacity restricted price games. The upper bound of the second region can be found 
by equating 2*,RMz  to firm 2’s capacity and solve for b:  
 ? ?1 22?? ? / .RMb x x αθ  (5.13) 
5.4.3 Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly region  
In the third region, both firms are capacity restricted. Hence, the outputs 
associated to their optimal prices exceed their capacities. Both firms therefore 
produce at full capacity and set clearing prices to maximise profits: 
 ? ? ? ?1 1 2 2 1 2? ?? ? ? ? ? ?* *, ,/ , / .BE BEp α x x b p αθ x x b  (5.14) 
Both prices are negatively related to the firms’ joint capacity, which is a common 
feature of Bertrand-Edgeworth models.  
5.4.4 Capacity stage 
Having expressed all equilibrium prices and outputs in terms of capacity and the 
level of demand, b, we may now proceed solving the capacity stage. We, therefore, 
substitute all equilibrium outcomes – i.e. prices and outputs – into the profit 
function as defined in Eq. (5.4). For firm 1, the profit function becomes: 
 
? ?
1
1 1 2 1 10
1 1 1 1 1 1
* *
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* *
, ,
, , ( )
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CM
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b
CM CM
b α
RM BE
b b
π x x b p z f b db
x p f b db x p f b db c x
?
?
? ? ?
?
? ?
 (5.15) 
and for firm 2: 
 ? ? 12 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2?? ? ?? ?* * *, , ,, , ( ) ( ) .RM
CM RM
b α
RM RM BE
b b
π x x b p z f b db p x f b db c x  (5.16) 
The three separate integrals in Eq. (5.15) reflect the relevant three regions – 
contested monopoly, residual monopoly and Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly – for 
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firm 1, whereas the two integrals in Eq. (5.16) reflect the regions relevant for firm 2. 
Note that the domain of integration for each region depends on these capacities 
and the equilibrium prices and outputs depend on b. Both firms maximise their 
expected profits by setting capacities simultaneously.  
Solving this maximisation problem requires information on the distribution of b. 
Here we assume that b has a uniform distribution over the interval ? 10 ? ??, ,α  where 
the upper bound scales the model such that ? ?0 1? .D  The first order conditions are 
as follows:  
 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
1 2 2
1 1 2
1
1
1 2 2 1
1 2
1 2 0
!
ln ln
ln ,
CM RM
π b x θ b x x
x
xx x x c
α θ
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
 (5.17) 
and 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?11 2 2
2
2 1 0? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
!
ln ln .RM
π x x b α θ c
x
 (5.18) 
Solving these conditions for capacities, results in analytical intractable expressions 
for the best response functions.83 We therefore present a numerical analysis.  
Before looking at the numerical results in Section 5.5, first the normative first-best 
solution is characterised. The first-best solution both includes optimal capacity 
levels per firm and optimal output levels given the optimal capacity levels. The 
same two-stage approach as applied above can be used to derive the first-best 
solution. To attain the social optimum in case of ‘mainly vertical product 
differentiation’, only the (perceived) qualitative superior output, i.e. firm 1’s output, 
should be produced until its capacity is restricted. Only if firm 1’s capacity is 
restricted, welfare increases by producing output 2. This optimal output scheme 
has, like the market scheme, three regions. In the first region, only firm 1 produces. 
In the second region, firm 1 produces at its capacity and firm 2 produces for 
residual demand. In the last region both firms produce at their capacity. Welfare is 
                                                          
83 Because the profit functions as defined in Eq. (5.15) and Eq. (5.16) might not be quasiconcave in 
capacity, solving the best response functions for the equilibrium capacities may yield a large set of 
solutions to the first order conditions, including the profit maximising solutions. In the numerical 
analysis, we apply an iterative procedure to find the equilibrium capacities. First, the profit 
maximisation problem of firm 1 is solved given a certain capacity set by firm 2. Then, the profit 
maximisation problem of firm 2 is solved given firm 1’s optimal capacity found in the first iteration. 
This iterative process continues until a stable equilibrium is detected and the process is repeated for 
different starting values of firm 2’s capacity.  
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always maximised by supplying only the qualitative superior output: if the capacity 
costs of firm 1 are not higher than firm 2’s costs, only firm produces.   
Appendix 5D shows that the resulting optimal welfare for ? ?22? ?? ?/θ  and 
1 2? ,c c  i.e. only firm 1 is active, equals: 
 ? ?? ?1 1 1 111 2 34? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?ln ,fbW x x x c  (5.19) 
and, if 1 2? :c c  
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 (5.20) 
with 1?* /b x α  and ? ?1 2?? ?** / .b x x αθ  Maximising these welfare functions with 
respect to capacities yields the first-best solution. Like the market outcome, the 
solution in first-best outputs is analytically intractable.  
 
 
5.5 Results 
Numerical analysis is required to solve the model as presented in the previous 
section. In discussing the results, the focus is first on resulting capacity levels, then 
on efficiency, and finally on price dispersion. In each discussion, we look at the 
effect of demand uncertainty, the degree of vertical product differentiation and 
asymmetry in costs per unit of capacity. 
The model allows us to present numerical results over the entire relevant domain 
without making arbitrary assumptions on parameter values other that on the cost 
parameters. Since the upper bound for b is 1? ,α  setting α  to unity scales all prices, 
outputs, and boundaries of regions as fractions of the reservation price and 
maximum demand respectively. Parameters ?  and θ  are bounded by the 
restrictions that guarantee existence of a SPNE in pure strategies as discussed in 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Since the degree of horizontal product differentiation, ?,  only 
has a minor effect on any of the outcomes presented here, only results for the 
limiting case of its value nearing unity are reported. The following analysis 
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distinguishes between the firms having equal costs and firm 1 facing higher costs 
per unit of capacity.  
5.5.1 Profit maximising capacities 
Figure 5.1 plots the profit maximising capacities of both firms for different values of 
θ  and equal cost levels ? ?1 2 0 1? ? .c c  for both firms. The left panel of Figure 5.1 
shows these outcomes for uncertain demand with b uniformly distributed over the 
interval ? ?0 1, .  The right panel shows deterministic demand, based on the Cournot 
benchmark as expressed in Eq. (5.3), with 1 2? / .b  
The patterns in capacity levels are very similar for both cases. These patterns 
remain similar when varying the cost level. Whether firms install higher capacities 
under uncertainty depends exclusively on the cost level relative to the reservation 
price. For 1 2 0 1? ? . ,c c  Figure 5.1 shows that stochastic demand, with the same 
expected level of demand, leads to higher capacities compared to deterministic 
demand for all degrees of product differentiation. This implies that given this cost 
level and the reservation price, it is rational for both firms to have spare capacity 
for low levels of demand b, rather than being capacity constrained for higher levels 
of demand. For higher cost levels the reverse holds. 
If firm 1 faces higher costs per unit of capacity, the pattern of resulting profit 
maximising capacities changes. In the Cournot benchmark, symmetry in profit 
maximising capacities is restored by imposing a cost difference, such that 
? ?1 2 1? ? ? .c c θ α  Figure 5.2 plots the profit maximising capacities of both firms for 
different values of θ  and different cost levels (c1=0.4; c2=0.1). In the Cournot 
benchmark (right panel), this would imply a symmetric outcome if 0 7? . .θ  
Figure 5.2 shows that symmetry in capacities under uncertain demand occurs at a 
higher degree of vertical product differentiation (i.e. a lower θ ) than in the Cournot 
benchmark. Stated alternatively, for those parameters that yield symmetric 
outcomes in the Cournot benchmark, our findings show that firm 2 provides more 
capacity than firm 1 if demand is stochastic. The finding of an asymmetric result for 
input values that would in the deterministic case yield symmetric outcomes is 
consistent with earlier results as reported by Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and De 
Frutos and Fabra (2011). Firm 1’s high capacity costs withhold it from serving 
occasional high levels of demand. Compared with the deterministic case, this leaves 
more room for firm 2 to serve the market.84 
                                                          
84 If the cost level for both firms increases equally, the difference between restoring symmetric 
outcomes for stochastic versus deterministic demand becomes smaller.  
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Figure 5.2 Profit maximising capacity as a function of θ  (c1=0.4,c2=0.1). 
Figure 5.1 Profit maximising capacity as a function of θ  (c1=c2=0.1). 
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5.5.2 Welfare maximising capacities 
Welfare maximisation requires that only firm 1 produces for any (perceived) quality 
difference and equal costs, and both for stochastic and deterministic demand. For 
1 2 0 1? ? . ,c c  the welfare maximising capacity is higher under uncertainty. The 
difference between welfare maximising capacities under stochastic and 
deterministic demand essentially depends on the trade-off between two factors. 
First, if demand exceeds capacity, welfare is lost due to demand not being served. 
Second, if demand is below capacity, costs of excess capacity are not met. If the 
overall cost level is low, the relative importance of the second effect is smaller, and 
hence the welfare maximising capacity is higher. If the cost level is higher, welfare 
maximising capacities are lower in the stochastic case than in the deterministic 
case. The welfare maximising capacities in case of different capacity costs are 
shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Welfare maximising capacity as a function of θ  (c1=0.4,c2=0.1). 
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For deterministic demand, the welfare maximising situation is that either the 
cheapest or the highest quality firm produces (Figure 5.3, right panel). If the lower 
cost firm produces, its optimal capacity is increasing in θ . This follows directly 
from the utility function in Eq. (5.1). For stochastic demand, the transition is more 
gradual, with a wide range of values for θ  where both firms have positive 
capacities. Again, the trade-off between foregone welfare due to excess demand and 
costs of excess capacity lie at the heart of the difference. If the difference in quality 
levels is high, high-quality capacity would be preferred in general, but it would be 
inefficient to build sufficient capacity to serve peak demand. It could however be 
efficient to have the high-quality firm serve ‘normal’ demand levels and build 
additional ‘cheap’ capacity to serve peak demand. Once the degree of θ  reaches the 
threshold where ? ?1 2 1? ? ? ,c c θ α  it is no longer efficient to have the high-quality 
firm producing, as its quality advantage does not outweigh its cost disadvantage. 
5.5.3 Efficiency 
By comparing the measure for efficiency, as discussed in Section 5.2, the impact of 
uncertainty and differentiation is analysed. Figure 5.4 graphs the efficiency for the 
stochastic (solid lines) and deterministic (dashed lines) cases for equal (left) and 
unequal (right) costs per unit of capacity.  
For 1 2 0 1? ? . ,c c  efficiency under demand uncertainty is higher compared with 
deterministic demand. As discussed in the previous section, firm 2 only produces if 
firm 1 is at its capacity. This results in a lower capacity share for firm 2 than in the 
deterministic case. Since for equal capacity costs it would be welfare optimising to 
have firm 1 produce all output, a smaller capacity share for firm 2 is more efficient. 
Hence, the stochastic case is more efficient than the deterministic one. The 
difference in efficiency decreases as the quality difference declines (i.e. θ  closer to 
unity). Moreover, as we have seen earlier, for low levels of capacity costs total 
capacity is higher under uncertainty. Uncertainty, therefore, partly offsets the 
welfare loss due to duopoly behaviour.85 Under deterministic demand, efficiency 
first decreases in the degree of vertical differentiation, but increases for high 
degrees of differentiation. The reason for this pattern is that, starting from high 
degrees of differentiation, a decrease in differentiation implies a larger, inefficient, 
capacity share for the low-quality firm 2. However, if the degree of differentiation 
decreases further, the efficiency increases because the quality of firm 2 increases 
and hence the efficiency loss caused by firm 2 producing instead of firm 1 
decreases. 
                                                          
85 The latter effect is smaller for higher (but still equal) cost levels, so that the difference in efficiency 
between the stochastic and deterministic case decreases. 
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The picture is somewhat different if costs per unit of capacity are unequal, i.e. if the 
(perceived) high-quality firm has higher costs, as shown in the right panel of Figure 
5.4. The efficiency results for different costs per firm follow from the profit 
maximising capacity shares of the firms (Figure 5.2) versus their welfare 
maximising capacity shares (Figure 5.3). Since both firms will always have positive 
capacities, the highest level of efficiency is reached at the degree of horizontal 
product differentiation where it would be optimal for welfare if firms had equal 
capacities. Both under deterministic and stochastic demand, profit maximising 
outcomes yield capacities for the least efficient firm (i.e. high cost relative to 
quality) that are too high from a welfare point of view. The stronger peak for the 
efficiency curve for deterministic demand in the right panel corresponds to the 
sharp switch in welfare optimizing capacities as shown in Figure 5.3. 
5.5.4 Price dispersion 
Our model provides some insights in the ongoing debate on the impact of the level 
of competition on price dispersion. Dana (1999) sets up a model using fixed 
capacity under demand uncertainty and finds that intrafirm price dispersion 
increases in the number of firms in the market, i.e. the more competitive a market 
is, the larger the dispersion in prices. Dana relates his theoretical finding to earlier 
Figure 5.4 Efficiency as a function of θ  (left panel: c1=0.1,c2=0.1, right panel: c1=0.4,c2=0.1). 
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empirical results in civil aviation (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Several other 
empirical studies on intrafirm price dispersion in civil aviation find mixed results 
however. Like Borenstein and Rose (1994), Hayes and Ross (1998) and Giaume and 
Guillou (2004) find a positive relationship between the level of competition and 
price dispersion, whereas Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find a negative relationship. 
Dai et al. (2012) find the relationship to be parabolic. Orlov (2011) finds an indirect 
positive relationship through lower search costs.86  
The numerical outcomes from our model provide an explanation for the ambiguity 
in empirical results. We compare levels of intrafirm price dispersion (over demand 
states) for different degrees of vertical product differentiation. Vertical product 
differentiation is negatively related to the competitiveness of the market, as more 
homogeneous goods lead to fiercer competition. 87  Our results show that price 
dispersion decreases in the level of vertical product differentiation, hence increases 
in competition, for the high-quality firm, whereas this relationship is parabolic for 
the low-quality firm.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter models capacity-then-price competition under demand uncertainty in 
a duopoly with product differentiation. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
(SPNE) in pure strategies is found, but only exists if the market is characterised by 
a sufficient degree of vertical relative to horizontal product differentiation. This 
sufficient degree allows solving the pricing game by defining three different regions 
– contested monopoly, residual monopoly and Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly – 
based on actual level of demand and installed capacities. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to find equilibria for capacity-then-price games 
addressing explicitly both demand uncertainty and product differentiation, without 
having to rely on mixed strategies and/or submodular games.  
Apart from establishing the existence of the SPNE in pure strategies, this chapter 
looks at the effects of per unit capacity costs, demand uncertainty and the degree of 
vertical and horizontal product differentiation on installed equilibrium capacities, 
                                                          
86 Mantin and Koo (2009) find no relationship between competition and price dispersion. They, 
however, analyse price dispersion on the route level, whereas the other studies analyse intrafirm 
price dispersion only. 
87 Moreover, more homogenous goods yield more symmetric outcomes, and are hence related to 
lower market concentration levels, which generally used as a (negative) proxy for competitiveness in 
empirical studies. It can be checked from Figure 5.2 that the negative relationship between market 
concentration and θ  no longer holds if cost differences are introduced. 
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welfare efficiency, and price dispersion. The results show that given the required 
degree of vertical product differentiation to guarantee the SPNE in pure strategies, 
horizontal product differentiation hardly has an effect on the outcome of the model 
in terms of prices, capacities and efficiency. 
In case of low capacity costs, both profit and welfare maximising capacities are 
higher under stochastic demand compared with deterministic demand. As these 
costs increase, having spare capacity for low levels of demand becomes too 
expensive compared with the forgone profit and welfare due to binding capacity 
constraints for high levels of demand. Consequently, for high capacity costs profit 
and welfare maximising capacities are lower under stochastic demand compared 
with deterministic demand. For asymmetric capacity costs, the results show that 
under stochastic demand the model yields asymmetric outcomes for parameter 
values – costs and product differentiation levels – that would result in symmetric 
outcomes for deterministic demand. This finding is consistent with the results by 
Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and De Frutos and Fabra (2011). The highest level of 
efficiency is reached at the degree of vertical product differentiation where it would 
be optimal for welfare if firms had equal capacities.  
The model is also applied to study price dispersion. The findings indicate that 
vertical product differentiation affects price dispersion of the high-quality firm 
negatively, whereas for the low-quality firm a positive relationship exists. This 
opposite direction between firms may explain the ambiguous results found in 
empirical studies.  
This chapter identifies three main directions for further research. The first 
direction can be found in generalising our model for larger numbers of 
competitors. Benassy (1989) establishes that the existence of the equilibrium is 
ensured for horizontal product differentiation if the number of competitors is 
sufficiently large. This implies that our condition on the degree of vertical product 
differentiation could probably be relaxed for larger numbers of competitors. 
Incorporating this into our model can provide a more explicit relationship between 
this condition and the number of players in the market. The second direction lies in 
testing the model empirically, which would shed light on the existence issue as well 
as on the results found here. Key in these kind of empirical analyses is to measure 
the degree of product differentiation adequately. Finally, this chapter assumes the 
degree of product differentiation to be given, whereas one could argue that firms in 
reality may choose, for example, their quality and location. The degree of product 
differentiation, therefore, should be modelled endogenously. 
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Appendix 5A: Degree of vertical product differentiation and the 
low-quality firm 
Using the minimum demand firm 2 faces, this appendix shows that firm 2 does not 
produce at all if the degree of vertical differentiation is too high, i.e. if θ  does not 
exceed ? ?22? ??/ .  The minimum level of demand occurs if both firms play the 
ordinary Bertrand pricing game. Rewriting inverse demand, as specified in Eq. 
(5.2), yields the relevant demand function for each output:  
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 (5A.1) 
The profit function simply equals demand multiplied by the corresponding price. 
Taking the first order conditions with respect to prices and solving for both prices 
gives the equilibrium price for both outputs:  
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Equilibrium outputs are determined by substituting these prices into the demand 
function Eq. (5A.1): 
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 (5A.3) 
It follows directly from Eq. (5A.2) and Eq. (5A.3) that a necessary condition for 
both 2*,Bp and 2*,Bz to be positive is ? ?22? ?? ?/ .θ  As a consequence, firm 2 is not 
active if ? ?22? ?? ?/ ,θ  i.e. if the quality difference between the two goods as 
perceived by the consumers is too large. 
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Appendix 5B: Contested or residual monopoly 
This appendix determines the degree of vertical product differentiation needed for 
which firm 1 has the incentive to saturate firm 2’s capacity. Firm 1’s contestable 
monopolist profits are easily determined by multiplying the equilibrium price, Eq. 
(5.6), and output, Eq. (5.7): ? ?2 21 ? ?? ?*, / .CMπ α bθ θ  
To calculate the profits if firm 1 chooses to act as a residual monopolist, we first 
consider firm 2’s best response function in prices: ? ?? ?1 12 1 2? ?? ? ?, , / .RM RMp α θ p  
Rewriting this function for 11,RMp  and substituting the clearing price 12*,RMp for 
which ? ?12 2 2?*, ,RMD p x  yields the equilibrium price for firm 1: 
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 1 21 2 22 2 1? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?* *, , / / .RM RMp α θ p αb θ x b  Substituting this price 
into the demand function yields equilibrium output: ? ?? ?1 21 2 2 ? ?? ? ?*, / .RMz αbθ x  
Therefore the profit as a residual monopolist equals: 
 ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 2 2 21 2 22 2 1? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?*, / .RMπ αbθ x αb θ x b  (5B.1) 
Because we are interested for which degree of vertical product differentiation it is 
more profitable for firm 1 to act as residual monopolist, we solve 
11 1?* *, ,CM RMπ π  for 
:θ   
 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?2 2 222 2 1 4 3? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?/ .θ αb x αb  (5B.2) 
Hence, if θ  is smaller than the expression in Eq. (5B.2), firm 1 does not have the 
incentive to act as residual monopolist. This condition is always satisfied for 
? ?22? ?? ?/ :θ  
 ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
22 3 22 2
2
2 2 2 2
1 2 22 2 1
2 4 3 2 4 3
,
αbαb x
αb αb
?? ? ? ???? ?? ??? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ?  (5B.3) 
which is always negative since ? ?23 22 2? ?? ?αb  for any level of demand b and for 
0 1?? ? .   
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Appendix 5C: Pure or contested monopoly 
Suppose firm 1 acts as a monopolist rather than a contested monopolist. Monopoly 
profits are equal to: ? ? 21 1 4?*, / ,Mπ α b  whereas contested monopoly profits equal: 
? ?? ?2 21 ? ?? ?*, / .CMπ α bθ θ  For 1 1?* *, ,CM Mπ π  it is required that ? ?1 2 ?? / .θ  It is only 
profitable for firm 1 to act as a monopolist if firm 2 cannot produce profitably at the 
monopoly price. Substituting this monopoly price, ? ?1 1 2?*, / ,Mp α  into the best 
response function of firm 2 yields firm 2’s equilibrium price: ? ?2 2 4?? ?*, / .Mp α θ  
Obviously, ? ?1 2 ?? /θ  yields a zero or negative equilibrium price for firm 2. 
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Appendix 5D: First-best solution 
This appendix defines the first-best output levels in each region if ? ?22? ?? ?/ .θ  
First, we assume equal capacity costs per firm. Hence, the output of firm 1 is 
superior. It is, therefore, efficient to have only firm 1 producing for all levels of 
demand. Substituting 2 0?z  into the utility function and subtracting the costs of 
capacity yields the welfare function: 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?
1
1 1 1 1
0
?
? ??, , .αfbW x b U x b f b db c x  (5D.1) 
Two regions apply: in both regions welfare is optimised by setting output but in the 
first region output is not constrained by installed capacity whereas in the second 
region it is. It can be readily verified that the optimal output in the first region 
equals: 1 ?*, .fbz αb  As a result, the capacity of firm 1 is restricted from 1? /b x α
onwards. The welfare function therefore yields: 
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 (5D.2) 
In the more realistic case that firm 1 has higher costs per unit of capacity, 
production of firm 2 increases welfare if firm 1 is at its capacity. For 1? ?* / ,b b x α  
it is optimal only to supply output 1: 1 ?*, .fbz αb  Only for higher levels of b, output 2 
is supplied: 2 1?? ?*, fbz αbθ x  with 1*, fbz obviously equal to x1. For 
? ?1 2?? ? ?** / ,b b x x αθ  both output capacity constraints are binding and the output 
supplied equals the capacity for each good: 1 1?*, fbz x  and 2 2?*, .fbz x  The welfare 
function therefore yields: 
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6 Intermodal competition in the 
London-Paris passenger market: 
High-speed rail and air transport 
 
 
  
  
  
6.1 Introduction88 
In medium-haul passenger markets, high-speed rail (HSR) and airlines are 
increasingly competing for passengers. This chapter looks at the degree to and 
conditions under which HSR is a viable or even a dominating substitute for airline 
travel using the London-Paris passenger market as illustration. The expansion of 
HSR around the world and its observed dominance, particularly in point-to-point 
markets, calls for an analysis of intermodal competition and the extent to which 
HSR is a viable substitute for air travel. 
 To the best of our knowledge, just a few studies have analysed intermodal 
competition and the role of HSR. Two studies for the European Commission – 
IATA (2003) and Steer Davies Gleave (2006) – explore HSR in Europe and briefly 
address the London-Paris market. IATA (2003) concludes that connectivity and 
access time are the most important determinants of the competition between HSR 
and aviation. Steer Davies Gleave (2006) discusses travel time improvements of the 
HSR and concludes that service frequency and fare levels will not be affected in this 
market by further improvements of the HSR.  
Adler et al. (2010) develop a network competition model including HSR, low-cost 
carriers and conventional carriers for Europe. They show that investment in HSR, 
despite the massive fixed costs, might be favourable from a social welfare 
perspective because of aggregate network- and environmental benefits. Bhat (1997) 
and Koppelman and Wen (2000) conclude that travel time is the most important 
mode choice determinant given variation in attribute levels in actual choice 
situations. Their conclusions are based on applying discrete choice models for the 
by car, train and airline served Toronto-Montreal passenger market. González-
                                                          
88 This chapter is based on the TI discussion paper by Behrens and Pels (2009) published as 
Behrens and Pels (2012) in the Journal of Urban Economics.  
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Savignat (2004) studies the viability of the (at that time) planned HSR between 
Madrid and Barcelona. She mentions fares, travel time, frequency, and trip purpose 
as the important determinants of mode choice. She discusses the possibility of a 
dominant position of HSR in this market. Park and Ha (2006) study the projected 
HSR in the Seoul-Daejon market. Their results suggest that individuals’ choices are 
mainly based on the actual fare. In addition, they predict a decline in aviation 
demand by approximately 85 per cent after the introduction of HSR. Finally, 
Ortúzar and Simonetti (2008) study the effect of a hypothetical HSR in the 
Santiago-Concepción market and conclude that travel time, fare, and service delay 
are the most important mode choice determinants.  
Prior empirical studies regarding HSR and intermodal competition are ex ante 
studies using stated preference data and discrete choice modelling. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by combining intermodal and airport-airline 
competition in a specific market using revealed preference data. Furthermore, this 
study is the first to examine intermodal competition over time using cross-sectional 
data over the years 2003-2009. Like Ishii et al. (2009), this study focuses on a 
specific market and non-price characteristics. In particular, this chapter studies 
how the introduction of a new alternative (HSR) affects passenger preferences and 
market shares of travel alternatives in the London-Paris market.  
The resulting elasticities of market share are used to define the degree of 
competition and the conditions, in particular travel time and geographical distance, 
under which HSR is a viable alternative for air travel. The results suggest that the 
analysis and results may be valid for medium to long-haul passenger markets in 
general. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the market, data, model, 
and primary estimation results. Section 6.3 analyses the change in behaviour over 
time in this market by discussing the elasticities of market share with respect to 
total travel time, weekly frequency, and fare. This section also discusses the 
withdrawal of airlines in this market and its consequences. Section 6.4 provides a 
discussion and conclusion.  
 
 
6.2 Empirical analysis 
6.2.1 Data  
The HSR between the United Kingdom and continental Europe serves the London-
Paris and the London-Brussels market. The HSR operator, i.e. Eurostar, started its 
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services in these markets in November 1994. Figure 6.1 shows the aviation and rail 
passenger numbers in the London-Paris and London-Brussels market.89 In these 
markets HSR experiences, contrary to the aviation business, an increase in market 
share and number of passengers. Total passenger numbers in these markets have 
increased from approximately 5 million in 1994 to 11.5 million in 2009. From 
Figure 6.1 one may hypothesise that the development of HSR has a considerable 
effect on the airline industry. More in-depth analysis, however, is needed to test 
this hypothesis. As indicated earlier, such empirical analyses of passenger 
behaviour in the London-Paris passenger market are not available. The lack of data 
regarding HSR may be considered as the primary reason for the dearth of empirical 
research relating to this specific market. To the best of our knowledge, this study is 
the first to explore a cross-sectional data set to analyse the impact of developments 
related to the HSR on travel behaviour.  
The data set used for the analysis is constructed from various sources. Our primary 
source is the International Passenger Survey (IPS). The IPS is a survey of a random 
sample of passengers entering or leaving the United Kingdom by air, sea, or the 
Channel Tunnel. The current analysis uses the IPS for the years 2003-2009 
provided by the Office for National Statistics. Only observations of passengers 
travelling via London airports or the HSR station to Paris, and vice versa, are 
selected. Hence, their actual travel behaviour in this market is recorded. The data 
contains departure and arrival airport or station (hereafter port), carrier, class of 
travel, fares paid, and trip purpose. Besides trip characteristics, the data also 
includes individual socio-economic characteristics, such as age, gender, and 
country of residence. This study uses three categories of passengers: UK residents 
leaving the UK; UK residents entering the UK; non-UK residents leaving the UK. 
For all UK residents, the main county of residence is available in the data. 
Furthermore, for all visitors leaving the UK the towns they visited during their stay 
in the UK are recorded. We determine the road distance between the main county 
of residence or the last town visited as a proxy for the travelling distance to the 
different ports in the Greater London area.90  
                                                          
89 The Eurostar figures are taken from the annual Revenue and Traffic press releases published by 
the Eurotunnel Group (2012). Only figures concerning the combined London-Paris and London-
Brussels market are available. Aviation statistics are compiled using annual UK airport statistics 
published by the Civil Aviation Authority, accessible from www.caa.co.uk/airportstatistics. 
90 The last identified category, Non-UK residents entering the UK, is excluded because a distance 
measure for this category cannot be calculated.  
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Figure 6.1 Number of passengers in the London-Paris/Brussels passenger market. 
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 Source: www.caa.co.uk/airportstatistics; Eurotunnel Group (2012). 
 
After the removal of incomplete observations, the sample contains 9 470 business 
and 18 356 leisure trips made during the period January 2003 until December 
2009. Table 6.1 shows the respondents per alternative, year, and trip purpose.91 
Note that only the year and the month of the interview are recorded in the primary 
data source. As a result, for those travelling with Eurostar in November 2007 one 
cannot know whether they use Waterloo International (before 14 November) or St. 
Pancras International (from 14 November onwards) as departure or arrival port. 
Therefore, all observations in November 2007 are excluded from the analysis. 
From 2007 onwards less respondents were surveyed in each period. 
 
                                                          
91 Sampled market shares reflect actual market shares, i.e. no intended or unintended oversampling 
is present.  
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Table 6.1 Respondents per alternative, year, and trip purpose, percentage in brackets.92 
 Business 
 LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
2003 479 (30) 95 (6) 115 (7) 601 (38) 238 (15) 69 (4) 
2004 418 (25) 50 (3) 118 (7) 761 (45) 242 (14) 103 (6) 
2005 492 (28)  108 (6) 832 (48) 253 (15) 56 (3) 
2006 461 (25)  70 (4) 1020 (55) 234 (12) 74 (4) 
2007 161 (15)   698 (66) 152 (15) 44 (4) 
2008 112 (13)   598 (71) 88 (11) 42 (5) 
2009 88 (12)   485 (71) 47 (7) 66 (10) 
 Leisure 
 LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
2003 332 (12) 117 (4) 117 (4) 1772 (63) 201 (7) 271 (10) 
2004 286 (10) 54 (2) 118 (4) 1954 (70) 155 (6) 206 (8) 
2005 297 (10)  106 (4) 2116 (74) 157 (6) 161 (6) 
2006 309 (11)  103 (4) 2035 (73) 188 (7) 150 (5) 
2007 240 (10)   1993 (80) 156 (6) 92 (4) 
2008 83 (4)   2142 (88) 95 (4) 104 (4) 
2009 110 (5)   1868 (83) 75 (3) 193 (9) 
 
The alternative specific characteristics or attributes are obtained from several 
sources. First of all, the average fare per alternative and ticket type is determined 
using the above-mentioned primary IPS source. Secondly, in-vehicle travel times 
and service frequency are calculated using OAG Market Analysis (OAG, 2011) and 
the European Rail Timetable (Thomas Cook, 2011). Thirdly, the on-time 
performance of the aviation alternatives are compiled using the UK Punctuality 
Statistics published by the Civil Aviation Authority, whereas the on-time 
performance of Eurostar is available via the Eurostar Press Office.93 Finally, the 
road distance between the arrival or departure port in the UK and the individual 
county of residence or visit is compiled using ViaMichelin travel services for road 
users.94  
Combining the aforementioned sources, one can define a choice set for each 
individual containing at least three and a maximum of six alternatives. Although it 
is assumed that each traveller in the same period faces the same choice set, 
variation of the attribute levels over time is present. The definition and 
construction of the variables is explained in Appendix 6A.  
                                                          
92 For all tables in this chapter the alternatives are abbreviated as follows: LHR = London Heathrow, 
LGW = London Gatwick, LTN = London Luton, AF = Air France, BA = British Airways, BD = BMI 
British Midland, U2 = easyJet, EUR = Eurostar. 
93  Accessible from the Eurostar’s website: www.eurostar.com/UK/uk/leisure/about_eurostar.jsp 
and from www.caa.co.uk/punctuality. 
94 Accessible from www.viamichelin.co.uk 
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Table 6.2 shows the average on time arrival, total travel time, and weekly frequency 
per alternative and year. A large variation in the on-time arrival, i.e. Public 
Performance Measure (PPM), between the aviation alternatives and Eurostar is 
observable. For no particular reason observed in the data set, the percentage of 
delayed (more than 15 minutes late) flights declined in 2009. Although both Air 
France and British Airways have services from London Heathrow, variation in the 
number of on-time arrivals is present between the two airlines. So, on-time 
performance is based on both airport and airline performance. The average total 
travel time – including in-vehicle travel time, check-in time and expected delay – is 
rather constant over the years for the aviation alternatives, whereas for Eurostar 
the improvements in the High Speed 1 track clearly result in a reduction of average 
total travel time. Finally, the weekly frequency figures partly reveal the 
development of HSR relative to aviation in this particular market. Two aviation 
alternatives exited the market and both Air France and British Airways reduced 
their frequency dramatically in 2008 and 2009, whereas the frequency of easyJet 
has remained stable over the whole period and Eurostar has increased its 
frequency.  
 
Table 6.2 Average on-time arrival, travel time, and weekly frequency per alternative and year. 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
n 
ti
m
e 
ar
ri
va
l  
   
in
 %
 (P
PM
) 
2003 75 75 61 78 65 72 
2004 69 69 59 89 67 71 
2005 63  70 86 70 71 
2006 63  70 92 64 55 
2007 65   92 67 65 
2008 67   92 63 69 
2009 84   95 77 77 
A
ve
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ge
 tr
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el
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e 
in
 
m
in
ut
es
 
2003 136 137 113 201 107 121 
2004 137 138 113 193 105 120 
2005 140  110 191 105 120 
2006 142  111 188 108 127 
2007 141   186 106 121 
2008 142   172 109 123 
2009 140   170 106 122 
A
ve
ra
ge
  
w
ee
kl
y 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
2003 73 36 40 99 92 30 
2004 73 33 35 98 88 30 
2005 71  32 98 82 21 
2006 71  32 104 80 26 
2007 71   109 80 26 
2008 68   119 59 26 
2009 59   119 56 25 
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Table 6.3 shows the average road distance in kilometres between the UK port and 
the main county of residence or visit per alternative, year, and trip purpose. As is 
shown in the table, a considerable variation over the years exists per alternative 
and trip purpose. Average road distances to the Eurostar station are shorter 
compared with those to the other ports.95 The average road distance for the chosen 
alternative is higher for leisure trip purposes compared with business trip 
purposes. This is in line with the general belief that the value of time of leisure 
passengers is lower compared with that of business passengers. So, catchment 
areas depend on the type of passengers the port serves. For example, both leisure 
and business passengers travelling with easyJet have a longer average road 
distance between the airport and county of residence or visit. This is in line with 
the general belief that passengers who choose for a low-cost carrier have lower 
monetary values for attributes like travel time and accessibility. 
 
Table 6.3 Average road distance (km) per alternative, year, and trip purpose. 
  Business 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
A
ve
ra
ge
 r
oa
d 
di
st
an
ce
 in
 k
m
 2003 72 95 106 49 68 106 
2004 76 109 96 45 67 100 
2005 82  111 49 71 88 
2006 83  68 41 68 85 
2007 92   38 63 101 
2008 56   44 63 117 
2009 105   53 36 88 
  Leisure 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
A
ve
ra
ge
 r
oa
d 
di
st
an
ce
 in
 k
m
 2003 94 136 166 62 77 123 
2004 97 175 148 62 65 158 
2005 89  155 62 72 102 
2006 88  99 58 68 126 
2007 95   46 74 87 
2008 85   56 59 85 
2009 124   70 61 96 
 
Table 6.4 shows the average fare paid per alternative (one-way), year, and fare 
category. Differences between the average fares of the aviation alternatives are 
considerably lower for second-class compared with first-class tickets. From 2007 
                                                          
95 One could argue that respondents travelling with HSR are more likely to access the Eurostar 
terminal by public transport. This is due, for example, to traffic conditions and, in particular, 
limited parking facilities in Inner London.   
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onwards, Eurostar has offered the cheapest fares in the second-class fare category. 
Before 2007, easyJet offered cheaper tickets. Figure 6.2 shows relative prices and 
ridership figures for HSR versus air transport over time. Clearly, the relative price 
of HSR versus air transport remains fairly constant over time, but the relative 
ridership shows a large increase after the opening of the HSR link. This implies that 
accounting for other travel characteristics than fare, such as travel time and 
convenience, is necessary in the empirical analysis. 
Table 6.4 Average fare paid per alternative, year and fare category. 
  First-class fare 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
A
ve
ra
ge
 fa
re
 2003 191 209 173 115 198 NA 
2004 210 230 176 125 171 NA 
2005 192  195 135 192 NA 
2006 171  184 144 200 NA 
2007 158   132 134 NA 
2008 185   121 127 NA 
2009 182   117 129 NA 
  Second-class fare 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
A
ve
ra
ge
 fa
re
 2003 83 58 59 53 74 41 
2004 72 56 52 57 72 43 
2005 73  62 59 62 42 
2006 66  68 59 61 47 
2007 58   55 56 56 
2008 75   54 53 63 
2009 69   51 62 57 
 
Figure 6.2 Relative first and second-class fares and degree of ridership for HSR versus air travel over time.  
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6.2.2 Model 
The model analyses the choice of carrier and UK port conditional on the chosen 
fare category. The choice set consists of three to six alternatives, depending on 
period and fare category. If an individual travelled first class, the alternative of 
travelling with easyJet is excluded, since easyJet does not offer first-class fare 
types.96 Assuming that each respondent maximises utility, the indirect utility of a 
specific alternative i of individual t is as follows:  
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 (6.1) 
The specification includes an alternative specific constant which captures the non-
stochastic unobserved heterogeneity between the different alternatives. This 
unobserved heterogeneity can be due, for example, to differences in quality and 
marketing. The aforementioned different locations of the ports in Paris is also part 
of this unobserved heterogeneity. The alternative specific constants are, via the 
specification of 1,iβ  to 4, ,iβ  period and fare type specific. London Heathrow–British 
Airways is the reference category for these alternative specific constants. 
Furthermore, the period Jan03–Oct04 and the second-class fare type serve as 
reference categories. In order to identify the model, these reference categories are 
normalised to zero. The aviation choice literature stresses that business and leisure 
passengers have different behaviour. This is the reason to estimate separate for 
both type of passengers. The choice of an alternative depends on the average fare, 
road distance to the port, average on-time arrival (PPM), total travel time, and the 
logarithm of the weekly frequency. Fare, road distance, and total travel time are 
expected to have a negative effect on utility and on the probability that a certain 
alternative will be chosen. Frequency and PPM are expected to be positive 
attributes of the alternatives.  
                                                          
96 Apart from the carrier-port choice model described in this section, we also specified a fare class-
carrier-port choice model. The latter model explicitly includes the fare class choice. The 
specification of this extended model is similar to the carrier-port model, but includes eleven 
alternative specific constants – for each fare class-carrier-port combination – and an extra normally 
distributed error component associated with fare class for the mixed logit specification. The 
qualitative results regarding road distance, on time arrival, travel time, and weekly frequency of this 
extended model are in line with the results presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 as well as with the 
reported elasticities of market share in the tables in Section 6.3. The fare coefficient in this extended 
model shows a positive sign for business trips. This suggests that the alternative specific constants 
do not capture all the benefits from first-class- compared with second-class travelling. Because we 
do not observe any attributes related to fare class, in sharp contrast with the model in Chapter 4, 
and from 2007 onwards fare class is not directly observable anymore in the data (see Appendix 6A), 
we assume that each consumer chooses an alternative within his or her observed fare class.  
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The potential and standard issue of possible endogeneity of the fare variable 
warrants attention. The for the researcher unobservable attributes of a product, 
like comfort, quality of service, and ease of booking may affect the fare. Ignoring 
the correlation between the observed and unobserved factors may result in a biased 
estimate of the fare parameter.97 In the current estimation, the impact of omitted 
unobservable attributes is limited by including multiple flight and traveller 
characteristics and making a distinction between first- and second class fares. Note 
that the fare data used here does not reflect individual trip fares, but only average 
fares. Hence, omitted product qualities that may be correlated with this fare 
variable are most likely also general quality differences. Like Ishii et al. (2009), 
alternative specific constants are included to account for the impact of any 
unobservable attribute of the trip that is invariant across the port-carrier 
combination.98 Although we conjecture that due to the specification of the model 
the endogeneity problem may be limited, one should be careful in interpreting the 
results regarding the fare variable.   
Apart from the basic multinomial logit model, which suffers from the IIA property 
(see, for example, Hensher et al., 2005), a mixed multinomial logit model is 
estimated. This specification accounts for the possibility of unobserved stochastic 
heterogeneity over the alternatives and heterogeneity amongst individuals in their 
attitude towards prices. The mixed logit model is specified with a lognormal 
distributed fare parameter and two normally distributed error components. The 
first error component relates to all aviation alternatives, while the second error 
component relates to all aviation alternatives departing from London Heathrow. 
So, the first error component takes into account the randomness amongst travellers 
for the unobserved stochastic heterogeneity between aviation and rail alternatives, 
such as the valuation of in-vehicle comfort levels and the use of electronic devices 
on board.  
Using the mixed logit specification described above, one can examine whether the 
development of HSR causes changes in travellers’ behaviour in this specific market. 
Four time periods are specified. In the first period, Jan03–Oct04, all aviation 
alternatives are in the market. In the second period, Nov04–Dec06, British 
Airways does not offer services anymore from London Gatwick. The alternative 
London Heathrow-British Midland is no longer available from the third period, 
Jan07–Oct07, onwards. The relocation of Eurostar services to St. Pancras 
International station marks the start of the last period, Dec07–Dec09.  
                                                          
97 For example, the fare parameter will be downward biased if higher fares imply higher but 
unobservable quality. 
98 A full analysis of the potential endogeneity problem requires more detailed fare information than 
that is currently available. Hence, well-known approaches to account for endogeneity, like the BPL 
or control function approach (Train, 2003, chapter 13), are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
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6.2.3 Results 
Table 6.5 shows the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors of the 
multinomial logit model, as specified in Eq. (6.1), for business and leisure 
passengers. The estimation results of the mixed logit model are depicted in Table 
6.6.99 The coefficients of fare, road distance, and weekly frequency are significant in 
all model specifications.100 In contrast, the estimated coefficient for on-time arrival 
for business trips is not significant in both the multinomial and mixed logit model. 
Remarkably, the effect of total travel time for leisure trips turns out to be not 
significant. The qualitative interpretation of the estimation results is the same for 
both models. Our findings in terms of the signs of fare, road distance, on time 
arrival, travel time, and frequency are both in line with intuition and results of 
previous mode choice studies. 
The alternative specific constants and the interactions with the period dummies 
show mixed results. In the period Nov04–Dec06, no alternative specific 
interactions term is found to be significant, whereas for the periods Jan07–Oct07 
and Dec07–Dec09 significant estimates are found.101 This indicates that the non-
observed characteristics of the alternatives as perceived by the consumers remain 
constant over the period Jan03–Dec06 but they change after this period. The 
significant estimates of the alternative specific constants for the Eurostar, including 
period interactions, are all positive. This suggests that the Eurostar alternative has 
valuable non-observed characteristics. Due to the non-linear nature of the applied 
models, one cannot directly compare the magnitude of each of the estimated 
parameters. The next section, therefore, discusses the elasticities of market share. 
Because the multinomial and mixed logit model produce similar qualitative results, 
the log-likelihood ratio-test statistic, following a Chi-squared distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of extra estimated parameters is used, to 
test overall model significance (see, for example, Hensher et al., 2005). We reject 
the hypothesis that the mixed logit model is not better than the multinomial logit 
model.102 
 
                                                          
99 The models are estimated using Biogeme 1.9 (Bierlaire, 2003) and the computational maximum 
number of Halton draws. The results are robust for different numbers of draws and starting values.  
100 The mean of the estimated fare parameter in the mixed logit model equals: exp(m + s/2), where 
m is the obtained point estimate and s the obtained standard deviation. So, the mean of the 
estimated fare parameter equals -0.0037 and -0.0151 for the business and leisure segments 
respectively.  
101  An exception is the London Heathrow-British Midland interaction effect for the business 
segment in the multinomial logit specification. 
102 This test statistic, -2(LLlogit model - LLmixed model), equals 10 for the business model. For the leisure 
model, the test statistic equals 98. Using the critical values of 7.81 (three extra parameters) and 
11.07 (five extra parameters) for the business- and leisure segments respectively, the null hypothesis 
that the mixed logit is not better than the multinomial logit model for both segments is rejected.   
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Table 6.5 Estimation results for multinomial logit model estimation. 
 Business  Leisure  
 parameter robust s.e.  parameter robust s.e.  
ASC LGW-BA -0.1266 0.2381  -0.1312 0.1870  
ASC LHR-BD -0.8880* 0.3564  -0.6087** 0.2741  
ASC EUROSTAR -0.1897 0.5503  -1.0999* 0.3935  
ASC LHR-AF -1.4050* 0.2479  -0.9500* 0.1933  
ASC LTN-U2 -0.3991 0.3359  -0.3206 0.2586  
Nov04-Dec06 * LHR-BD -0.2294*** 0.1321  -0.0025 0.1166  
Nov04-Dec06 * EUR -0.0404 0.0953  -0.0069 0.0752  
Nov04-Dec06 * LHR-AF -0.0276 0.0896  -0.0975 0.0940  
Nov04-Dec06 * LTN-U2 -0.0325 0.1487  -0 NA  
Jan07-Oct07 * EUR  -0.2733** 0.1381  -0.2239** 0.0950  
Jan07-Oct07 * LHR-AF -0.5002* 0.1417  -0.1807 0.1223  
Jan07-Oct07 * LTN-U2 -1.0696* 0.2344  -0 NA  
Dec07-Dec09 * EUR  -0.0967 0.2232  -0.6799* 0.1758  
Dec07-Dec09 * LHR-AF  -0.3763** 0.1587  -0.5779* 0.1407  
Dec07-Dec09 * LTN-U2 -1.5397* 0.1691  -0.9685* 0.1062  
First-class  * LGW-BA  -0.3871*** 0.2129  -0.2077 0.4716  
First-class  * LHR-BD -0.1764 0.1443  -0.0213 0.2463  
First-class  * EUR -0.8025* 0.0702  -0.4671* 0.1248  
First-class  * LHR-AF -0.3338* 0.0812  -0.1230 0.1840  
Fare -0.0035* 0.0010  -0.0132* 0.0015  
Road distance in km -0.0303* 0.0008  -0.0182* 0.0006  
On time arrival in % (PPM) -0.0058 0.0050  -0.0126* 0.0040  
Travel time in minutes -0.0138*** 0.0078  -0.0058 0.0057  
Ln (weekly frequency) -1.1958* 0.2834  -0.9847* 0.2004  
Observations -19 470   -18 356   
Null log-likelihood -14 310   -28 522   
Final log-likelihood -10 464   -15 108   
*, **, *** indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
 
The additional insights from the mixed logit model are related to the lognormal 
specified fare parameter and the two variance error components. The estimated 
standard deviation of the fare parameter is highly significant for the leisure trips, 
but insignificant for the business trips. This is an indication that leisure passengers 
are more heterogeneous as a group regarding the valuation of the average fare 
compared to business passengers. Differences between business and leisure 
passengers are also found in the unobserved stochastic utility of the alternatives. 
The mixed logit model detects that unobserved heterogeneity – for example, the 
use of electronic devices on board – between aviation alternatives and Eurostar 
plays a significant role for business trips. By including variance error components, 
one captures unobserved heterogeneity caused by not observing final destinations 
in Paris. 
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Table 6.6 Estimation results for mixed multinomial logit model estimation. 
 Business  Leisure 
 parameter robust s.e.  parameter robust s.e. 
ASC LGW-BA -0.0420 0.2540  -1.1200 0.7650 
ASC LHR-BD -0.9630* 0.3930  -0.7690*** 0.4100 
ASC EUROSTAR -0.2830 0.6250  -2.9300* 0.6660 
ASC LHR-AF -1.5700* 0.2910  -1.2500* 0.3940 
ASC LTN-U2 -0.4460 0.3650  -1.3200 0.9350 
Nov04-Dec06 * LHR-BD -0.2200 0.1390  -0.0403 0.1410 
Nov04-Dec06 * EUR -0.0945 0.1140  -0.0065 0.1340 
Nov04-Dec06 * LHR-AF -0.0335 0.0921  -0.1440 0.1070 
Nov04-Dec06 * LTN-U2 -0.0226 0.1590  -0.0271 0.1910 
Jan07-Oct07 * EUR  -0.3700** 0.1670  -0.4630* 0.1840 
Jan07-Oct07 * LHR-AF -0.4990* 0.1430  -0.0619 0.1360 
Jan07-Oct07 * LTN-U2 -1.1600* 0.2550  -0.0308 0.3950 
Dec07-Dec09 * EUR  -0.1740 0.2690  -1.4700* 0.3970 
Dec07-Dec09 * LHR-AF  -0.3750** 0.1650  -0.5520* 0.1630 
Dec07-Dec09 * LTN-U2 -1.6800* 0.1970  -1.9100* 0.4740 
First-class  * LGW-BA  -0.4320*** 0.2340  -0.0798 0.8490 
First-class  * LHR-BD -0.1700 0.1450  -0.0596 0.2500 
First-class  * EUR -1.0100* 0.1110  -1.3900* 0.3040 
First-class  * LHR-AF -0.3310* 0.0817  -0.0881 0.1900 
Mean of ln (Fare) -5.5900* 0.3030  -4.6700* 0.2570 
Std. dev. of ln (Fare) -0.0079 0.0078  -0.9490* 0.1970 
Road distance in km -0.0345* 0.0019  -0.0248* 0.0053 
On time arrival in % (PPM) -0.0043 0.0058  -0.0110** 0.0058 
Travel time in minutes -0.0182** 0.0091  -0.0156 0.0120 
Ln (weekly frequency) -1.2800* 0.3030  -1.1100* 0.3090 
Variance error component      
Mean of aviation alternative -0 NA  -0 NA 
Std. dev. of aviation alternative -0.9940* 0.2190  -1.2700 1.5100 
Mean of LHR alternative -0 NA  -0 NA 
Std. dev. of LHR alternative -0.5800 0.3720  -2.8300*** 0.8150 
Observations -19 470   -18 356  
Number of Halton Draws -20 000   -10 000  
Null log-likelihood -14 310   -28 522  
Final log-likelihood -10 459   -15 059  
*, **, *** indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
 
The results, and in particular the method of analysis, may be used to study other 
potential HSR markets. One prime example of such a market is the San Francisco–
Los Angeles passenger market in the US. Here we are interested under which set of 
travel times HSR in the San Francisco–Los Angeles market may be a viable 
alternative for air transport. For this purpose, the mixed logit estimation results of 
the London-Paris passenger market are used to plot the expected market shares 
against the set of travel times. Furthermore, we will assume that the fare level of 
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HSR is about 80 per cent of the airline fare and a total of 650 direct HSR 
connections a week and the current supply of 595 flights a week between the two 
cities.  
The current travel time by plane between the two cities is approximately 135 
minutes. The indirect utility based on fare, frequency, and travel time can now be 
approximated using the mixed logit estimation results. Based on these 
approximations, the market shares for travel times of HSR varying from 120 to 200 
minutes are derived. As depicted in Figure 6.3, the HSR is expected to capture a 
market share of 50 per cent if travel time equals around 145 minutes in the leisure 
segment, and the same market share if travel time equals around 160 minutes in 
the business segment. According to California High-speed Rail Authority, average 
travel time between the two cities will equal 180 minutes. These travel times will 
result in a market share of around 30 per cent in the business segment and 40 per 
cent in the leisure segment. Although we use strong simplifying assumptions, such 
as equal passenger behaviour in both markets, our market share forecasts are in 
line with the official forecasts published by the California High-speed Rail 
Authority.103 So, this suggests that the HSR will be a viable alternative, in terms of 
market shares and travel times, for air transport in the San Francisco–Los Angeles 
market, but it is not expected to become a dominant alternative. 
 
Figure 6.3 Projected market share for HSR in the San Francisco – Los Angeles passenger market. 
 
 
                                                          
103 Accessible from http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/Business_Plan_reports.aspx. 
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6.3 Elasticities of market share and market developments 
The model allows us to investigate whether and how passenger behaviour or 
preferences change over time. These changes over time can be related to changing 
market circumstances, in particular the ongoing improvement of the HSR 
alternative, or other unobserved factors.  
The measure of passenger behaviour applied here is the elasticity of market share 
with respect to a particular attribute. The direct elasticity of market share measures 
the effect of a 1 per cent change in the attribute of an alternative on the probability 
of choosing the specific alternative. Besides the direct elasticities of market share 
discussed in this section, Appendix 6B shows the cross-elasticities and discusses 
their meaning for intermodal competition. 
In the case of the mixed multinomial logit specification, the individual direct 
elasticity of market share is as follows: 
 ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?1? ? ?? ?, , , , ,, , ,
Ρ
,
Ρ Ρ
i t i t i t
i t i t
i t i t i t
X X
β L β L β f β dβ
X
 (6.2) 
where ? ?,i tL β is the logit probability, ,Ρ ,i t  evaluated at the parameter estimates in 
Eq. (6.1). The elasticity as defined in Eq. (6.2) is an individual point elasticity of 
market share and needs to be evaluated by aggregating the individual elasticities 
using the individual choice probabilities as weights (Hensher et al., 2005). The 
resulting elasticity, like the model itself, has no closed form. Therefore, Halton 
draws need to be used to calculate the elasticity. The final elasticity is the average 
over all draws. If the attribute ,i tX  is stated in logarithmic form, as is the case with 
weekly frequency, Eq. (6.2) is multiplied by 1 ,/ .i tX   
The above-defined elasticity of market share depends on preferences changing over 
time and the attribute levels of the alternatives. In case of total travel time and fare, 
the attribute levels appear directly in the definition of the elasticity of market share. 
Table 6.7 shows the aggregated direct elasticities of market share with respect to 
total travel time, weekly frequency, and fare on an annual basis. Suppose that total 
travel time of the Eurostar alternative decreases by 1 per cent in 2003. This 
decrease in total travel time would lead to an increase in market share of 1.09 and 
0.44 per cent in the business and leisure market, respectively.  
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Table 6.7 Direct elasticities of market share with respect to travel time, frequency, and fare per alternative, 
year, and trip purpose for the mixed multinomial logit model. 
  Business 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
Tr
av
el
 ti
m
e 
in
 
m
in
ut
es
 
2003 -1.59 -1.98 -2.24 -1.09 -2.04 -1.86 
2004 -1.62 -2.11 -2.29 -0.99 -2.04 -1.85 
2005 -1.65  -2.36 -0.91 -2.06 -2.06 
2006 -1.69  -2.41 -0.85 -2.14 -2.11 
2007 -1.95   -0.59 -1.99 -1.74 
2008 -1.97   -0.51 -2.18 -1.39 
2009 -1.94   -0.51 -2.14 -1.39 
W
ee
kl
y 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
2003 0.82 1.02 1.15 0.56 1.05 0.96 
2004 0.83 1.08 1.17 0.51 1.04 0.95 
2005 0.83  1.19 0.45 1.03 1.03 
2006 0.83  1.19 0.42 1.05 1.04 
2007 0.97   0.30 0.99 0.87 
2008 0.96   0.25 1.07 0.68 
2009 0.97   0.25 1.07 0.70 
Fa
re
 
2003 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.12 -0.32 -0.12 
2004 -0.24 -0.28 -0.24 -0.11 -0.30 -0.12 
2005 -0.23  -0.29 -0.11 -0.28 -0.13 
2006 -0.22  -0.30 -0.10 -0.29 -0.14 
2007 -0.33   -0.09 -0.35 -0.14 
2008 -0.38   -0.07 -0.32 -0.13 
2009 -0.37   -0.07 -0.33 -0.11 
  Leisure 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
Tr
av
el
 ti
m
e 
in
 
m
in
ut
es
 
2003 -1.42 -1.82 -1.71 -0.44 -1.74 -0.80 
2004 -1.44 -1.91 -1.52 -0.42 -1.75 -0.75 
2005 -1.41  -1.53 -0.38 -1.65 -0.66 
2006 -1.44  -1.86 -0.34 -1.81 -0.79 
2007 -1.37   -0.24 -1.65 -1.34 
2008 -1.63   -0.17 -1.44 -1.73 
2009 -1.61   -0.17 -1.70 -1.65 
W
ee
kl
y 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
2003 0.74 0.95 0.89 0.23 0.91 0.42 
2004 0.75 1.00 0.79 0.22 0.91 0.39 
2005 0.72  0.78 0.19 0.84 0.33 
2006 0.72  0.93 0.17 0.91 0.39 
2007 0.69   0.12 0.83 0.68 
2008 0.81   0.09 0.72 0.86 
2009 0.81   0.09 0.86 0.84 
Fa
re
 
2003 -0.61 -1.28 -2.30 -0.94 -0.92 -2.29 
2004 -0.99 -2.18 -3.72 -0.77 -0.92 -1.96 
2005 -0.88  -3.02 -0.66 -1.95 -1.63 
2006 -1.73  -3.64 -0.92 -3.12 -3.05 
2007 -2.52   -0.58 -3.37 -4.18 
2008 -1.09   -0.39 -5.77 -1.26 
2009 -0.89   -0.15 -1.54 -1.89 
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Except for easyJet in the years 2008 and 2009, business travellers are more 
sensitive to total travel time compared with leisure travellers. In general, the 
differences between the direct elasticities of the related parameters for business 
and leisure trip passengers are in line with expectations. Business passengers are 
more affected by lower total travel times and higher weekly frequencies, but are 
less affected by fare. In contrast, for leisure passengers fares seem important, 
whereas frequency and total travel time seem to be of less importance.104 
Furthermore, the sensitivities to total travel time are considerably lower for the 
Eurostar and easyJet alternatives compared with the other alternatives. In 
addition, the sensitivities towards total travel time decline for Eurostar after the 
completion of High Speed 1. For the other alternatives, in particular LHR-BA and 
LTN-U2 (leisure), these sensitivities increase. So, the improvement of HSR would 
result in favourable changes in passenger valuation for the HSR at the cost of 
mainly LHR-BA, in the business market, and LTN-U2, in the leisure market.  
The high elasticities of market share with respect to frequency for in particular the 
London Gatwick-British Airways and London Heathrow-British Midland 
alternatives are remarkable. Pels et al. (2000) indicate that the frequency elasticity 
of market share may not exceed a certain upper limit in order to be able to 
maximise profits. They show that this limit is equal to 1.105 Appendix 6C shows that 
this limit also holds for (mixed) multinomial logit models. Table 6.8 shows that the 
sample-based aggregated elasticity with respect to frequency exceeds 1 for the 
alternatives London Gatwick-British Airways and London Heathrow-British 
Midland in 2004 and 2006 respectively.  
A possible explanation for the these figures is the fact that airport capacity is 
constrained at London airports. Airlines compete based on price and frequency. 
When demand in a specific market is larger than the capacity allocated to this 
market, one may expect that the elasticity of market share with respect to 
frequency will be relatively high, because airlines cannot increase their frequency. 
If all suppliers face this same constraint, the constraint will cause prices to 
increase. However, the HSR does not face the same capacity constraints and 
therefore does not have the same incentive to increase the price.106 The direct 
elasticities of market share with respect to fares are shown in Table 6.8.  
 
                                                          
104 The latter is speculative since the parameter estimate is not significant. 
105  If this condition is not met, an increase in the number of flights results in a more than 
proportional increase in demand, see Pels et al. (2000) for more details. 
106 The HSR may increase its price to capture source rents. The relative elastic demand may limit 
this possibility.  
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Table 6.8 Sample-based aggregated direct elasticities of market share with respect to travel time, frequency, 
and fare per alternative and year for mixed multinomial logit model. 
  Business and Leisure 
  LHR-BA LGW-BA LHR-BD EUR LHR-AF LTN-U2 
Tr
av
el
 ti
m
e 
in
 
m
in
ut
es
 
2003 -1.48 -1.88 -1.90 -0.68 -1.85 -1.18 
2004 -1.51 -1.99 -1.81 -0.64 -1.86 -1.17 
2005 -1.50  -1.85 -0.58 -1.81 -1.19 
2006 -1.54  -2.08 -0.54 -1.94 -1.32 
2007 -1.54   -0.34 -1.75 -1.46 
2008 -1.72   -0.26 -1.63 -1.64 
2009 -1.69   -0.25 -1.80 -1.59  
W
ee
kl
y 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
2003 -0.77 -0.98 -0.98 -0.35 -0.96 -0.62 
2004 -0.78 -1.03 -0.93 -0.33 -0.96 -0.60- 
2005 -0.76  -0.94 -0.29 -0.91 -0.60 
2006 -0.76  -1.03 -0.27 -0.97 -0.65 
2007 -0.77   -0.17 -0.88 -0.74 
2008 -0.85   -0.13 -0.81 -0.81 
2009 -0.85   -0.13 -0.91 -0.81 
Fa
re
 
2003 -0.48 -0.92 -1.56 -0.64 -0.70 -1.50 
2004 -0.71 -1.46 -2.40 -0.52 -0.69 -1.26 
2005 -0.63  -1.98 -0.45 -1.31 -1.06 
2006 -1.13  -2.30 -0.59 -1.99 -1.89 
2007 -1.87   -0.43 -2.47 -2.97 
2008 -0.91   -0.31 -4.37 -0.97 
2009 -0.77   -0.13 -1.26 -1.47 
 
Table 6.8 reveals that these direct elasticities are indeed high for the aviation 
alternatives. Adjusting the prices upwards would therefore result in a high loss of 
market share. Hence, these results suggest that London Gatwick-British Airways 
and London Heathrow-British Midland are not able to optimise their frequency 
and maximising their profits. The constrained optimisation may still yield positive 
profits. In the Los Angeles–San Francisco market capacity restrictions also play a 
role, but not to the extent we see in Europe, where slot allocation to a large extent 
dictates available capacity. Nevertheless, also in the case of the Los Angeles–San 
Francisco market one may expect low market shares and high frequency elasticities 
of market shares to coincide.107  
The elasticity of market share with respect to frequency for the HSR alternative is 
relatively low, so profits can be maximised, and capacity restrictions appear to be 
less important. As the HSR increases its market share over time (see Table 6.1), its 
frequency elasticity of market share decreases, and this effect is even more 
pronounced when other alternatives leave the market. Table 6.8 furthermore 
suggests that London Heathrow-British Airways and London Heathrow-Air France 
most probably face difficulties in optimising profits in this particular market. 
                                                          
107 See, for example, Pels et al. (2003). 
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However, their market presence may be guaranteed by the feeder function this 
route has in their hub-and-spoke network. On the other hand, if HSR can be 
integrated in British Airways’ or Air France’s network, by substituting HSR for a 
London-Paris flight, both airlines could be better off. On the basis of the results, we 
conjecture that the presence of HSR may eventually result in the withdrawal of 
airlines whose network does not rely on the particular point-to-point route. Low-
cost carriers compete heavily with the HSR for leisure passengers. The probability 
that low-cost carriers leave point-to-point markets entered by HSR is higher in less 
dense markets. Mainly because of its high frequency and large capacity, HSR has 
the potential to become the dominant supplier in point-to-point markets. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Intermodal competition and HSR attract attention in the literature because of 
investments such as the High-Speed Rail link between the UK and continental 
Europe. This chapter provides an analysis of the behaviour of travellers in the 
London-Paris passenger market and the conditions under which HSR becomes a 
viable alternative. In particular, this chapter studies the relationship between 
passengers’ preferences and the withdrawal of airlines and completion of the High-
Speed Rail link in November 2007 by estimating mixed logit models using cross-
sectional revealed preference data over the period 2003-2009. 
The results show that frequency, total travel time, and distance to the UK port are 
the main determinants of travellers’ behaviour. Leisure passengers show to be 
more heterogeneous regarding average fares compared with business passengers. 
Furthermore, the results show that accounting for correlation between the 
alternatives in unobserved effects, while making this correlation random amongst 
the travellers, and allowing for a random fare coefficient, improve the discrete 
choice model. Regardless the improvements in the HSR alternative and the 
withdrawal of aviation alternatives, it can be concluded that the consumer 
preferences are fairly constant in the period 2003-2009. For example, direct 
elasticities with respect to total travel time only change slightly after the withdrawal 
of two airlines and the completion of the HSR link. In particular London 
Heathrow-British Airways suffers from the improvement in HSR by having to 
confront higher direct elasticities with respect to total travel time and frequency. 
This suggest that the competitive position of London Heathrow-British Airways has 
become worse.  
This chapter presents higher cross-elasticities of market share compared with those 
reported in the literature, indicating the fierce competition in this market. For the 
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business segment, competition between London Heathrow-British Airways and 
London Heathrow-Air France on the one hand, and Eurostar, on the other, is more 
fierce compared with competition between Eurostar and easyJet, whereas for the 
leisure segment the opposite holds. So, the degree and pattern of intermodal 
competition in this market depends largely on trip purpose. The HSR is clearly a 
viable alternative for both market segments.  
The analysis of the London-Paris market illustrates that a longer average travel 
time for HSR can be offset by frequency and fares to attract passengers in both 
market segments. The findings suggest that in markets with even larger differences 
in average travel times, due to, for example, a lower average speed or a larger 
distance between the city pairs, HSR may also be a viable alternative compared 
with aviation. Applying the results of the London-Paris market, this chapter shows 
this to be the case for the projected HSR in the San Francisco–Los Angeles market. 
The presence of multiple aviation alternatives in this specific market, as is the case 
in the London Paris market, may not be a real entry barrier for HSR.  
Although, the results show that competition in the London-Paris passenger market 
is present and rather strong compared with the findings in empirical studies in 
other markets, the dominant position of Eurostar in this market warrants 
attention. Two aviation alternatives exited the market during the sample period 
leading to a reduction in competition. These airlines were not able to maximise 
profits regarding service frequency and remaining airlines experience the same 
difficulties. Conventional carriers, however, may stay in the market because of the 
presence of this route in their network.  
Transport policy needs to address the development of HSR into dominant firms in 
the markets they serve. The fact that most HSR routes, in contrast to air transport, 
are currently operated by a single consortium implies that competition in medium-
haul transport markets will decline in the future. Recognising this threat, the 
European Commission introduced a policy to open up the international passenger 
services to competition within the European Union from 2010 onwards.108 In the 
case of the San Francisco–Los Angles passenger market, the difference in travel 
times are such that one may expect that HSR can be a viable competitor but will 
not end up having a dominant market position. Even though the current findings 
suggest that HSR in the Los Angeles–San Francisco market may not obtain a 
dominant position, policy makers should consider the competitive effect of HSR. 
                                                          
108 See Directive 2007/58/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure. Accessible from www.eea.europa.eu/policy-
documents/directive-2007-58-ec.  
Intermodal competition in the London-Paris passenger market     135 
 
Appendix 6A: Definition and construction of the variables 
Average on time arrival in % (PPM). The so-called Public Performance Measure 
(PPM) in aviation and rail transport is used to determine the percentage of on-time 
arrival or departure of a certain alternative on a yearly basis. A flight is delayed if it 
arrives or departs 15 minutes later compared with the scheduled arrival or 
departure time. For long-haul trains in the UK, a 10 minutes time interval is used 
to determine the PPM.  
Total travel time in minutes. The total travel time in minutes is defined by the 
summation of three elements. The first element is the average scheduled in-vehicle 
travel time per alternative and period. For the aviation alternatives, monthly 
periods are used. For the rail alternative, the average scheduled in-vehicle travel 
time is seasonally based. The second element is the time in minutes that passengers 
are advised to arrive at the port before departing. British Airways indicates 60, Air 
France, BMI British Midland and Eurostar 30, and easyJet 40 minutes. The third 
element is the expected delay in minutes. The expected delay in minutes is the 
average delay on a yearly basis multiplied by the percentage of delayed arrivals or 
departures. For all aviation alternatives, the average delays are published in the UK 
Punctuality Statistics, whereas Eurostar does not make public the average delays 
in minutes. However, given that for the aviation alternatives the average delay in 
minutes is close to the official 15 minutes interval, we take the official rail boundary 
of 10 minutes as the proxy of the average delay in minutes of the Eurostar.  
Weekly frequency. The weekly frequency is measured as the total number of 
departures from London to Paris per alternative. The frequencies of the aviation 
alternatives are based on monthly figures whereas the number of train departures 
is seasonally based.  
Fare. An average fare per alternative, ticket type and year is calculated. We exclude 
indicated fares lower than 15 or higher than 1 000 British pounds (1995). The 
calculation of the average fare from 2007 onwards involves an extra step. We first 
use cluster analysis to categorise the fares into first- or second-class fare type. 
Then, based on this classification, the average fare per alternative, ticket type, and 
year is calculated.  
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Appendix 6B: Cross-elasticities of market share 
The cross-elasticity of market share measures the effect of a 1 per cent change in 
the attribute of an alternative, i, on the probability of another alternative, not i, and 
is defined as follows: 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?
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To determine the effect of a change in the level of the attributes time and frequency 
of Eurostar on the other aviation alternatives, the cross-elasticities are calculated in 
the same way as for the direct elasticities. Table 6.9 shows these cross-elasticities of 
market share with respect to a 1 per cent increase in total travel time and weekly 
frequency of Eurostar.  
So, for example, a 1 per cent increase in Eurostar’s total travel time in 2009 results 
in a market share increase of 1.32 per cent for London Heathrow-British Midland, 
1.40 per cent for London Heathrow-Air France, and 0.84 per cent for London 
Luton-easyJet in the business market. The relative magnitudes of these cross-
elasticities indicate the level of competition between aviation and HSR in this 
market. For both total travel time and weekly frequency, rather high values for the 
cross-elasticities compared with figures reported in the literature are found. Bhat 
(1997), Koppelman and Wen (2000), and Park and Ha (2006) all report cross-
elasticities of market share. Bhat (1997) reports cross-elasticities regarding daily 
frequency, based on changes in the attribute level of the rail alternative, of around -
0.03 for business travellers. This is considerably lower compared with our results. 
Koppelman and Wen (2000) report cross-elasticities of the same order of 
magnitude as Bhat (1997), while Park and Ha (2006) find a cross-elasticity with 
respect to frequency of about -0.17. In addition, our obtained cross-elasticities with 
respect to travel time are considerably higher compared with the figures reported 
by Bhat (1997). He reports a cross-elasticity of about 0.4 in the business market. 
Hence, intermodal competition in the London-Paris passenger market is present 
and seems to be stronger compared with other markets studied in the literature.  
The cross-elasticities as shown in Table 6.9 also indicate that in the business 
segment competition between London Heathrow-British Airways and London 
Heathrow-Air France, on the one hand, and Eurostar, on the other, is fiercer 
compared with the competition between Eurostar and London Luton-easyJet. For 
the leisure segment the opposite is the case: high cross-elasticities of market share 
for London Heathrow-British Airways and London Heathrow-Air France, and 
lower figures for London Luton-easyJet in the business segment, and the other way 
around in the leisure segment are found.  
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Table 6.9 Cross-elasticities of market share with respect to travel time and frequency per alternative, year, 
and trip purpose for mixed multinomial logit model. 
  Business  Leisure 
  LHR-
BA 
LGW-
BA 
LHR-
BD 
LHR-
AF 
LTN-
U2  
LHR-
BA 
LGW-
BA 
LHR-
BD 
LHR-
AF 
LTN-
U2 
Tr
av
el
 ti
m
e 
in
 
m
in
ut
es
 
2003 0.68 0.78 0.66 0.70 0.64  0.61 1.19 0.62 0.62 0.63 
2004 0.76 0.87 0.75 0.80 0.72  0.66 1.25 0.51 0.67 0.56 
2005 0.89  0.87 0.91 0.86  0.69  0.54 0.68 0.50 
2006 0.96  0.95 0.98 0.94  0.75  0.72 0.75 0.65 
2007 1.27   1.31 0.93  0.89   0.86 1.15 
2008 1.36   1.41 0.84  1.02   1.05 1.57 
2009 1.32   1.40 0.84  1.00   1.02 1.51 
             
W
ee
kl
y 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
2003 -0.35 -0.40 -0.34 -0.36 -0.33  -0.32 -0.62 -0.32 -0.32 -0.33 
2004 -0.39 -0.45 -0.38 -0.41 -0.37  -0.34 -0.65 -0.27 -0.35 -0.29 
2005 -0.44  -0.44 -0.46 -0.43  -0.35  -0.28 -0.35 -0.26 
2006 -0.48  -0.47 -0.48 -0.46  -0.37  -0.36 -0.38 -0.33 
2007 -0.63   -0.65 -0.47  -0.45   -0.43 -0.58 
2008 -0.67   -0.69 -0.41  -0.51   -0.52 -0.78 
2009 -0.66   -0.70 -0.42  -0.50   -0.52 -0.76 
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Appendix 6C: Exit and the elasticity of market share with respect 
to frequency 
Following Pels et al. (2000), but using a (mixed) multinomial logit demand model 
instead, the profit function of an airline can be specified as follows: 
 ? ?? ? ?Ρ ,i i i iπ p c k f  (6C.1) 
Where pi is the generalised price; c is the marginal cost per passenger; k is the 
constant marginal cost of frequency; and ,Ρi t  is the (mixed) multinomial logit 
probability. The existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed if 
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 where pβ  and fβ  are the 
coefficient estimates for fare and frequency. The term outside the brackets is 
necessarily positive, implying that the term inside the brackets needs to be 
negative. Therefore, ? ?1 1? ?Ρ .f iβ  The elasticity of market share with respect to 
frequency is determined as ? ?1?Ρ .f iβ  Hence, if the elasticity of market share with 
respect to frequency exceeds 1 the airline cannot maximise its profits. 
 
7 Conclusions and discussion 
  
  
  
7.1 Results  
This dissertation focused on the interaction between consumer heterogeneity, 
product differentiation, and oligopolistic competition between suppliers of 
scheduled services in transport markets. Throughout this dissertation, the aviation 
industry was used as the main motivation and prime example of such a market.  
The growth of low-cost carriers and major investments in high-speed rail in the last 
decade changed the nature of competition between scheduled service suppliers in 
aviation dramatically. Carriers and policy makers need to consider the challenges 
introduced by these changes in the competitive environment. For example, Chapter 
6 studied consumer behaviour and oligopolistic competition in the London-Paris 
passenger market. In this market, a limited number of firms – low-cost carriers, 
legacy carriers, and high-speed rail – supply vertically differentiated products. Due 
to the improvements in high-speed rail, the high-speed rail operator is now a 
dominant supplier in this market. In order to assess the major public investments 
in high-speed rail, policy makers need to take into account a whole range of 
aspects, such as: the impact on local accessibility (Vickerman (1997) and Levinson 
(2012)); the environmental impact (Westin and Kågeson, 2012); network effects 
(Adler et al., 2010); and substitution and competition effects (Givoni and Banister, 
2006). This dissertation developed an analytical framework to study the latter 
effect – i.e. competition – taking into account both observed and unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity, multiple-product firms, and exogenous and endogenous 
product differentiation.  
Chapter 2 analysed patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multi-product 
monopoly with endogenous quality-then-price setting. Although monopoly pricing 
problems involving a product line have already been studied in the literature, for 
example Mussa and Rosen (1978), the model developed in this chapter extends and 
generalises these models by applying a random utility framework. This framework 
accounts for heterogeneity across consumers in unobserved attributes within the 
demand structure of the model. The few studies applying the random utility model 
to analyse oligopolistic quality-then-price competition – see Anderson and de 
Palma (1992a and 1992b) – report counterintuitive equilibria in which a single firm 
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supplies multiple variants with equal qualities and prices. In contrast, our findings 
show that including both observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity 
supports the existence of both symmetric, asymmetric and fully differentiated 
equilibria. For relative low levels of unobserved heterogeneity, asymmetric and 
fully differentiated equilibria exist, whereas otherwise the equilibrium becomes 
symmetric. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the level of observed and 
unobserved consumer heterogeneity does not affect the relative efficiency of the 
monopolist compared with the social optimum. 
Chapter 3 extended the model as outlined in Chapter 2 to a duopolistic market with 
endogenous quality-then-price setting, and with heterogeneity across consumers in 
both observed and unobserved attributes. This chapter analysed how consumer 
heterogeneity and strategic interaction between multi-product duopolistic firms 
may lead to vertically differentiated equilibrium patterns in terms of number of 
supplied variants, quality, and fare per variant. In a recent article, Cheng et al. 
(2011) prove the existence of a vertically differentiated subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. However, they exclude unobserved consumer heterogeneity and the 
possibility of interlaced equilibria. Chapter 3 accounted for both elements. Looking 
at the observed competition between a legacy carrier and a low-cost carrier, the 
analysis shows that both the high-quality- and the low-quality firm have limited 
incentives to provide an extra product variant at the lower end of the market. In 
fact, if consumer heterogeneity is based on observable attributes and it is costly to 
introduce new variants, an interlaced equilibrium does not exist. One of the major 
implications of including consumer heterogeneity based on unobserved attributes 
is that it restores the existence of interlaced equilibria within the endogenous 
quality-then-price setting model.  
From Chapters 2 and 3 it became apparent that fully differentiated equilibrium 
patterns, accounting for both observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity, 
only exist for relatively low levels of unobserved consumer heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, competition lowers the incentive for differentiation. The incentive for 
duopolistic firms to supply multiple vertically differentiated product variants is 
limited due to the fact that adding an extra variant causes more intensive 
competition over the whole product line. This lowers the mark-up of the high-
quality product variants. Hence, for increasing levels of unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity, symmetric equilibria are observed earlier in a duopoly compared 
with a monopoly.  
Chapter 4 contributed to a better understanding of the impact of frequent flier 
programs (FFPs) on actual consumers’ usage levels. Although loyalty programs are 
key in firms’ customer relationship management strategies in various industries, 
only a few empirical studies analyse the long term effects of such programs. This 
chapter addressed three major concerns mentioned in the literature: endogenous 
Conclusions and discussion     141 
 
participation decisions into FFPs (Leenheer et al., 2007); the two dimensions of 
consumer usage levels ((Liu (2007), Verhoef (2003), and Lewis (2004)); and the 
impact of changes in reward structure (Dorotic et al., 2011). The panel data used in 
this chapter covers a representative sample of active FFP members of a particular 
airline and includes actual usage levels over a three-year period. Halfway this 
three-year period, the airline changed its FFP by including status and non-linear 
token accrual in the program. This exogenous change in the FFP is used to find the 
effect of non-linear token accrual on consumers’ purchase frequency and 
transaction size by formulating a two-stage budgeting model. A panel mixed logit 
model is specified to estimate the impact of this change on transaction size, i.e. fare 
type choice, in the second stage. In the first stage, a Poisson count data model is 
specified to estimate the impact of the change on the purchase frequency, i.e. the 
number of trips. In particular, the non-linear token accrual affects actual consumer 
usage levels positively. The estimates imply that after the change in the FFP, the 
average total individual consumer surplus of FFP members decreased by around 7 
per cent of the average fare paid.   
Chapter 5 studied the impact of product differentiation on capacity-then-price 
competition under demand uncertainty in a duopoly. Prior literature focuses on 
either the impact of demand uncertainty (Reynolds and Wilson, 2000) or 
differentiation (Benassy, 1989). The combination of both is therefore an innovative 
approach and extends the seminal work by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). 
Depending on the realised demand after capacities have been chosen, the market in 
the pricing stage can be described as: contested monopoly, residual monopoly, or 
Bertrand Edgeworth duopoly. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies exists, but only if the market is characterised by a sufficient level of 
vertical product differentiation. In line with Reynolds and Wilson (2000), our 
results show that if the difference in quality between firms exactly offset cost 
differences, asymmetric outcomes in the capacity stage arise. Apart from the 
impact on capacities, demand uncertainty and product differentiation also affect 
efficiency and price dispersion. The highest level of efficiency is reached at the 
degree of vertical product differentiation where it would be social optimal if firms 
had equal capacities. Furthermore, the findings show that vertical product 
differentiation leads to less dispersed prices of the high-quality firm, but to more 
dispersed prices of the low-quality firm. These results therefore provide an 
explanation for the ambiguous results found in empirical research on price 
dispersion in civil aviation by, amongst others, Borenstein and Rose (1994), Hayes 
and Ross (1998), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). 
Chapter 6 studied inter and intramodal competition in the London-Paris passenger 
market over the period 2003–2009. The expansion of high-speed rail around the 
world, predominantly in Asia and Europe, and the planned developments in the 
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US, calls for an analysis of competition in these markets. Nevertheless, just a few 
studies have analysed intermodal competition thoroughly. These studies – 
González-Savignat (2004), Park and Ha (2006), and Ortúzar and Simonetti (2008) 
– are all based on stated preference data. In contrast, the study in this chapter 
employed a cross-sectional data set covering actual travel behaviour of passengers. 
After estimating separate mixed logit models for business -and leisure passengers, 
the estimation results are applied to analyse the reaction of passenger behaviour on 
the withdrawal of aviation alternatives and the completion of the High-Speed Rail 
link. Travel time and frequency are the main determinants of travel behaviour 
given the variation in attribute levels in the actual choice situations. The valuation 
of travel time changes over the years following the opening of the High-Speed Rail 
link. The withdrawal of aviation alternatives and the high frequency of the high-
speed rail, combined with high consumer valuation of frequency, may cause 
competition to decline in the long run. 
 
 
7.2 Implications and directions for further research 
This section discusses the methodological and practical implications – both for 
yield management and governmental policy – that follow from the analyses in this 
dissertation. In addition, possible limitations of the analyses, due to restrictive 
assumptions, and the associated implications for further research are outlined.  
The results of Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that the random utility framework is 
applicable in modelling the mainly non-symmetric patterns of vertical product 
differentiation as observed in various industries. This finding implies that the 
random utility model can be used consistently to describe consumer behaviour in a 
vertically differentiated market where firm behaviour is exogenous, such as the 
empirical studies in Chapters 4 and 6, and to model strategic firm behaviour, like in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
Throughout this dissertation, the importance of consumer heterogeneity is 
apparent. The relative level of unobserved consumer heterogeneity determines 
which type – symmetric or asymmetric – of equilibria can be modelled within the 
random utility framework. Furthermore, the two empirical studies in Chapters 4 
and 6 conclude that unobserved consumer heterogeneity may affect the choice for 
particular sets of alternatives differently than others. Therefore, this dissertation 
reconfirms the importance of capturing both observed and unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity in empirical studies, as well as including heterogeneity in theoretical 
studies. An important direction for further research is to increase our 
understanding of how to model and capture unobserved heterogeneity and the 
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accompanying limitations. For example, in the empirical literature there is a recent 
focus on discrete, latent class, mixture models to capture individual preferences.109 
One may apply these models to the empirical studies in Chapters 4 and 6 and 
compare the results with the ones reported applying continuous mixture models. A 
uniform distribution of the implied willingness to pay for quality is assumed 
throughout Chapters 2 and 3, one may study how different continuous and 
discontinuous distributions may affect the resulting patterns of product 
differentiation.  
The results in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide some insights in yield management 
strategies for multi-product firms. From Chapters 2 and 3, it follows that the scope 
of multi-product strategies, in terms of number of variants and ordering of 
qualities, is limited. In fact, Chapter 3 shows that the marginal revenue of adding 
an extra product variant quickly approaches zero. In contrast to the current 
strategy of one of Europe’s major low-cost carriers, easyJet, the model of vertical 
product differentiation does not support equilibria in which the low-quality firm 
supplies a high-quality variant in addition to the low-quality variant. Here, further 
theoretical research is needed to find the assumption that is responsible for this 
difference between real and predicted market behaviour. A first reason may be that 
instead of pure Nash behaviour, the low-cost carrier may expect that the high-
quality firm only changes behaviour in the high-end of the market and will not 
consider the whole quality spectrum. Second, instead of assuming Cournot 
competition, the quality-then-price competition may be modelled as Stackelberg 
competition with the legacy carrier as the leader and the low-cost carrier as the 
follower. Third, in this dissertation we largely ignored the effect of cost differences 
between firms. Asymmetry in generic costs may obviously change the findings.  
Chapter 4 identifies myopic behaviour of loyal consumers participating in a FFP as 
the main cause of an increase in consumers’ usage levels. In particular, the non-
linear token accrual and accompanying threshold values affects consumers’ usage 
levels positively. Hence, the airline’s FFP with its hierarchical three status levels 
has a mechanism at its disposition that changes the behaviour of FFP members in 
favour of the airline. This suggests that increasing the number of status tier levels, 
and therefore creating more threshold values, would help to exploit this 
mechanism even more. Although the results show that consumers experience a loss 
in surplus, the valuation of status by consumers is not explicitly measured. 
Therefore, one may argue that the reported loss in consumer surplus may already 
have been compensated for via the extra benefits of status. Further research to 
assess the monetary benefits of status in a loyalty program is therefore warranted. 
Furthermore, in order to determine the overall effectiveness of loyalty programs, 
one should also asses the costs of a loyalty program for the sponsoring firm. 
                                                          
109 See, for example, Greene and Hensher (2003), Hess (2007), and Shen (2009). 
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Changing the focus to governmental policy, this dissertation developed a 
framework to study the impact of heterogeneity and (endogenous) product 
differentiation in oligopolistic markets on consumer and firm behaviour. Although 
this framework enables to assess the impact of heterogeneity and differentiation on 
welfare, it has not been the intention to provide a full welfare assessment of current 
aviation policies. A potential important insight for competition policy regarding 
price dispersion is given in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. According to Dana (1999), a 
positive relationship between price dispersion and competition exists. In contrast, 
the results in Chapters 2 and 3 imply that, based on yield management strategies, 
intrafirm price dispersion diminishes with competition and equals zero in the 
extreme case of symmetric equilibria. Chapter 5 shows that intrafirm price 
dispersion, based on uncertainty in demand, may either increase or decrease with 
competition. Hence, a strict relationship between price dispersion and competition 
does not exist. Therefore, it is not straightforward to use price dispersion as a 
measure of collusion as suggested in the literature. Further research is required to 
study the combined effect of yield management and uncertainty in aggregate 
demand on the relation between the level of competition and price dispersion. Only 
if the source of the dispersion is known, one may normatively assess price 
dispersion and relate it to market functioning.    
Finally, understanding how markets with only a few competitors function is crucial 
for yield management and governmental (transport) competition and investment 
policy. This dissertation is a step towards facilitating this understanding and 
extending it by including multi-product firms, product differentiation, and 
consumer heterogeneity.  
 References 
  
  
  
 
Acemoglu, D., Bimpikis, K., Ozdaglar, A. (2009) Price and Capacity Competition, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 66(1), 1-26. 
Adler, N., Pels, E., Nash, C. (2010) High-Speed Rail and Air Transport 
Competition: Game Engineering As Tool for Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 44(7), 812-833. 
AEA, Association of European Airlines (2012) AEA Traffic and Capacity Data. 
Available at http://www.aea.be/research/traffic/index.html. 
Alderighi, M., Cento, A., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P. (2012) Competition in the 
European Aviation Market: the Entry of Low-Cost Airlines, Journal of 
Transport Geography, 24, 223-233. 
Algers, S., Beser, M. (2001) Modelling Choice of Flight and Booking Class - a Study 
Using Stated Preference and Revealed Preference Data, International 
Journal of Services Technology and Management, 2(1/2), 28-45. 
Allison, P.D. (2005) Fixed Effects Regression Methods for Longitudinal Data 
Using SAS. Cary, North Carolina: SAS Institute Inc. 
Allison, P. D., Waterman, R. P. (2002) Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
Models, Sociological Methodology, 32(1), 247-265. 
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A. (1992a) Multiproduct Firms: A Nested Logit 
Approach, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(3), 261-276. 
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A. (1992b) The Logit As a Model of Product 
Differentiation, Oxford Economic Papers, 44(1), 51-67. 
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A. (2001) Product Diversity in Asymmetric Oligopoly: Is 
the Quality of Consumer Goods Too Low?, The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 49(2), 113-135. 
Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., Thisse, J. F. (1989) Demand for Differentiated 
Products, Discrete Choice Models, and the Characteristics Approach, The 
Review of Economic Studies, 56(1), 21-35. 
146     References  
 
Anderson, S.P., De Palma, A., Thisse, J.F. (1992) Discrete Choice Theory of 
Product Differentiation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Ashford, N., Bencheman, M. (1987) Passengers' Choice of Airport: an Application 
of the Multinomial Logit Model, Transportation Research Record, 1147, 
1-5. 
Balcombe, K., Fraser, I., Harris, L. (2009) Consumer Willingness to Pay for in-
Flight Service and Comfort Levels: A Choice Experiment, Journal of Air 
Transport Management, 15(5), 221-226. 
Banerjee, A., Summers, L. (1987) On Frequent-Flyer Programs and Other Loyalty-
Inducing Economics Arrangements. Cambridge: Harvard Institute of 
Economic Research. 
Basar, G., Bhat, C. (2004) A Parameterized Consideration Set Model for Airport 
Choice: An Application to the San Francisco Bay Area, Transportation 
Research Part B: Methodological, 38(10), 889-904. 
Basso, L., Clements, M., Ross, T. (2009) Moral Hazard and Customer Loyalty 
Programs, American Economic Review: Microeconomics, 1(1), 101-123. 
Baumol, W. J. (1967) Calculation of Optimal Product and Retailer Characteristics: 
The Abstract Product Approach, Journal of Political Economy, 75(5), 
674-685. 
Behrens, C., Lijesen, M. (2012) Capacity Choice Under Uncertainty With Product 
Differentiation. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2012-113/VIII. 
Behrens, C., Lijesen, M., Pels, E., Verhoef, E. (2012) Deterministic Versus Random 
Utility: Implied Patterns of Vertical Product Differentiation in a Multi-
Product Monopoly. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2012-023/3. 
Behrens, C., Pels, E. (2009) Intermodal Competition in the London-Paris 
Passenger Market: High-Speed Rail and Air Transport. Tinbergen 
Institute Discussion paper TI 2009-051/3.  
Behrens, C., Pels, E. (2012) Intermodal Competition in the London-Paris Passenger 
Market: High-Speed Rail and Air Transport, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 71(3), 278-288. 
Bell, D. R., Corsten, D., Knox, G. (2011) From Point of Purchase to Path to 
Purchase: How Preshopping Factors Drive Unplanned Buying, Journal of 
Marketing, 75(1), 31-45. 
Ben-Akiva, M., Lerman, S.R. (1985) Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and 
Application. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
References     147 
 
Benassy, J. P. (1989) Market Size and Substitutability in Imperfect Competition: A 
Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Model, The Review of Economic 
Studies, 56(2), 217-234. 
Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., Pakes, A. (1995) Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 
Econometrica, 63(4), 841-890. 
Berry, S. T. (1994) Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation, 
The RAND Journal of Economics, 25(2), 242-262. 
Bhat, C. R. (1997) Covariance Heterogeneity in Nested Logit Models: Econometric 
Structure and Application to Intercity Travel, Transportation Research 
Part B: Methodological, 31(1), 11-21. 
Bierlaire, M. (2003) Biogeme: A Free Package for the Estimation of Discrete 
Choice Models. Paper presented at the 3rd Swiss Transportation Research 
Conference: Ascona, Switzerland. 
Bonnisseau, J.-M., Lahmandi-Ayed, R. (2006) Vertical Differentiation: 
Multiproduct Strategy to Face Entry?, The B.E.Journal of Theoretical 
Economics, 6(1), 1-14. 
Borenstein, S. (2011) Why Can't US Airlines Make Money?, American Economic 
Review, 101(3), 233-237. 
Borenstein, S. (1989) Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the 
U.S. Airline Industry, RAND Journal of Economics, 20(3), 344-365. 
Borenstein, S., Rose, N. L. (1994) Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. 
Airline Industry, Journal of Political Economy, 102(4), 653-683. 
Botimer, T. C., Belobaba, P. P. (1999) Airline Pricing and Fare Product 
Differentiation: A New Theoretical Framework, The Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 50(11), 1085-1097. 
Caplin, A., Nalebuff, B. (1991) Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the 
Existence of Equilibrium, Econometrica, 59(1), 25-59. 
Chamberlin, E. (1933) The Theory of Monpolistic Competition. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Champsaur, P., Rochet, J. C. (1989) Multiproduct Duopolists, Econometrica, 57(3), 
533-557. 
Cheng, Y.-L., Peng, S.-K., Tabuchi, T. (2011) Multiproduct Duopoly With Vertical 
Differentiation, The B.E.Journal of Theoretical Economics, 11(1), 1-27. 
Crawford, G. S. (2012) Endogenous Product Choice: A Progress Report, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(3), 315-320. 
148     References  
 
Dai, M., Liu, Q., & Serfes, K. (2012) Is the Effect of Competition on Price 
Dispersion Non-Monotonic? Evidence From the U.S. Airline Industry. 
Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890104. 
Dana, J. D. (1999) Equilibrium Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty: The 
Roles of Costly Capacity and Market Structure, The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 30(4), 632-660. 
De Frutos, M. A., Fabra, N. (2011) Endogenous Capacities and Price Competition: 
The Role of Demand Uncertainty, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 29(4), 399-411. 
De Jong, G., Daly, A., Pieters, M., van der Hoorn, T. (2007) The Logsum As an 
Evaluation Measure: Review of the Literature and New Results, 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 41(9), 874-889. 
Dixit, A. K., Stiglitz, J. E. (1977) Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product 
Diversity, American Economic Review, 67(3), 297-308. 
Dorotic, M., Bijmolt, T. H. A., Verhoef, P. C. (2011) Loyalty Programmes: Current 
Knowledge and Research Directions, International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 14, 217-237. 
Dowling, G. R., Uncles, M. (1997) Do Customer Loyalty Programs Really Work?, 
Sloan Management Review, 38(4), 71-82. 
European Commission (2012) Mergers: Commission Opens in-Depth 
Investigation into Proposed Acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair. Press 
Release. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/921. 
Eurotunnel Group (2012) Annual Reviews. Available at 
http://www.eurotunnelgroup.com/uk/shareholders-and-
investors/publications/annual-reviews/. 
Gabszewicz, J. J., Shaked, A., Sutton, J., Thisse, J. F. (1986) Segmenting the 
Market: The Monopolist's Optimal Product Mix, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 39(2), 273-289. 
Gabszewicz, J. J., Poddar, S. (1997) Demand Fluctuations and Capacity Utilization 
Under Duopoly, Economic Theory, 10(1), 131-146. 
Gerardi, K., Shapiro, A. H. (2009) Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? 
New Evidence From the Airline Industry, Journal of Political Economy, 
117(1), 1-37. 
References     149 
 
Giaume, S., Guillou, S. (2004) Price Discrimination and Concentration in 
European Airline Markets, Journal of Air Transport Management, 10(5), 
305-310. 
Givoni, M., Banister, D. (2006) Airline and Railway Integration, Transport Policy, 
13(5), 386-397. 
Goetz, A. R., Vowles, T. M. (2009) The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 30 Years of US 
Airline Deregulation, Journal of Transport Geography, 17(4), 251-263. 
González-Savignat, M. (2004) Competition in Air Transport - The Case of the High 
Speed Train, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 38, 77-107. 
Gorman, W. M. (1959) Separable Utility and Aggregation, Econometrica, 27(3), 
469-481. 
Greene, W. H., Hensher, D. A. (2003) A Latent Class Model for Discrete Choice 
Analysis: Contrasts With Mixed Logit, Transportation Research Part B: 
Methodological, 37(8), 681-698. 
Guimarães, P. (2008) The Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Model Revisited, 
Economics Letters, 99(1), 63-66. 
Harvey, G. (1987) Airport Choice In a Multiple Airport Region, Transportation 
Research Part A: General, 21(6), 439-449. 
Hausman, J. A., Hall, B. H., Griliches, Z. (1984) Econometric Models for Count 
Data With an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Technical Working Paper Series, No. 17. 
Hausman, J. A., Leonard, G. K., McFadden, D. (1995) A Utility-Consistent, 
Combined Discrete Choice and Count Data Model Assessing Recreational 
Use Losses Due to Natural Resource Damage, Journal of Public 
Economics, 56(1), 1-30. 
Hayes, K. J., Ross, L. B. (1998) Is Airline Price Dispersion the Result of Careful 
Planning or Competitive Forces?, Review of Industrial Organization, 
13(5), 523-541. 
Hendricks, K., Piccione, M., Tan, G. (1999) Equilibria in Networks, Econometrica, 
67(6), 1407-1434. 
Hensher, D.A., Rose, J.M., Greene, W.H. (2005) Applied Choice Analysis: A 
Primer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hess, S., Polak, J. W. (2005) Mixed Logit Modelling of Airport Choice in Multi-
Airport Regions, Journal of Air Transport Management, 11(2), 59-68. 
150     References  
 
Hess, S. (2007) Posterior Analysis of Random Taste Coefficients in Air Travel 
Behaviour Modelling, Journal of Air Transport Management, 13(4), 203-
212. 
Hess, S., Polak, J. (2006) Airport, Airline and Access Mode Choice in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, Papers in Regional Science, 85(4), 543-567. 
Hotelling, H. (1929) Stability in Competition, Economic Journal, 39, 41-57. 
Hviid, M. (1991) Capacity Constrained Duopolies, Uncertain Demand and Non-
Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria, European Journal of Political 
Economy, 7(2), 183-190. 
IATA, International Air Transport Association. (2003) Air/Rail Intermodality 
Study. Hounslow: Air Transport Consultany Services. 
IATA, International Air Transport Association. (2011) Vision 2050. Availabe at 
http://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/Documents/vision-
2050.pdf. 
Imbens, G. W., Lemieux, T. (2008) Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to 
Practice, Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 615-635. 
Ishii, J., Jun, S., Van Dender, K. (2009) Air Travel Choices in Multi-Airport 
Markets, Journal of Urban Economics, 65(2), 216-227. 
Kaldor, N. (1935) Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity, Economica, 2, 35-50. 
Kivetz, R., Simonson, I. (2003) The Idiosyncratic Fit Heuristic: Effort Advantage 
As a Determinant of Consumer Response to Loyalty Programs, Journal of 
Marketing Research, 40(4), 454-467. 
Kivetz, R., Urminsky, O., Zheng, Y. (2006) The Goal-Gradient Hypothesis 
Resurrected: Purchase Acceleration, Illusionary Goal Progress, and 
Customer Retention, Journal of Marketing Research, 43(1), 39-58. 
Klemperer, P. (1987a) Markets With Consumer Switching Costs, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 102(2), 375-394. 
Klemperer, P. (1987b) The Competitiveness of Markets With Switching Costs, 
RAND Journal of Economics, 18(1), 138-150. 
Koppelman, F. S., Wen, C. H. (2000) The Paired Combinatorial Logit Model: 
Properties, Estimation and Application, Transportation Research Part B: 
Methodological, 34(2), 75-89. 
Kreps, D. M., Scheinkman, J. A. (1983) Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand 
Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, The Bell Journal of Economics, 
14(2), 326-337. 
References     151 
 
Lancaster, K. J. (1966) A New Approach to Consumer Theory, Journal of Political 
Economy, 74(2), 132-157. 
Lancaster, K.J. (1979) Variety, Equity and Efficiency. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Lederman, M. (2007) Do Enhancements to Loyalty Programs Affect Demand? The 
Impact of International Frequent Flyer Partnerships on Domestic Airline 
Demand, RAND Journal of Economics, 38(4), 1134-1158. 
Lederman, M. (2008) Are Frequent-Flyer Programs a Cause of the Hub Premium?, 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17(1), 35-66. 
Leenheer, J., van Heerde, H. J., Bijmolt, T. H. A., Smidts, A. (2007) Do Loyalty 
Programs Really Enhance Behavioral Loyalty? An Empirical Analysis 
Accounting for Self-Selecting Members, International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 24(1), 31-47. 
Levinson, D. M. (2012) Accessibility Impacts of High-Speed Rail, Journal of 
Transport Geography, 22(0), 288-291. 
Lewis, M. (2004) The Influence of Loyalty Programs and Short-Term Promotions 
on Customer Retention, Journal of Marketing Research, 41(3), 281-292. 
Lin, K. Y., Sibdari, S. Y. (2009) Dynamic Price Competition With Discrete 
Customer Choices, European Journal of Operational Research, 197(3), 
969-980. 
Liu, Y. (2007) The Long-Term Impact of Loyalty Programs on Consumer Purchase 
Behavior and Loyalty, Journal of Marketing, 71(4), 19-35. 
Manski, C. F. (1977) The Structure of Random Utility Models, Theory and 
Decision, 8(3), 229-254. 
Mantin, B., Koo, B. (2009) Dynamic Price Dispersion in Airline Markets, 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 
45(6), 1020-1029. 
McCaughey, N.C., Behrens, C. (2011) Paying for Status? The Effect of Frequent 
Flier Program Member Status on Air Fare Choice. Monash University 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper 04/11. 
McFadden, D. (1974) Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. 
New York: Academic Press. 
Morrell, P. (2011) Current Challenges in a 'Distressed' Industry, Journal of Air 
Transport Management, 17(1), 14-18. 
152     References  
 
Morrison, S., Winston, C. (1995) The Evolution of the Airline Industry. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Morrison, S., Winston, C., Bailey, E., Kahn, A. (1989) Enhancing the Performance 
of the Deregulated Air Transportation System, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity.Microeconomics, 1989, 61-123. 
Mussa, M., Rosen, S. (1978) Monopoly and Product Quality, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 18(2), 301-317. 
OAG (2011) OAG Historical Schedules. Dunstable: OAG Aviation. 
Orlov, E. (2011) How Does the Internet Influence Price Dispersion? Evidence From 
the Airline Industry, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 59(1), 21-37. 
Ortúzar, J. D., Simonetti, C. (2008) Modelling the Demand for Medium Distance 
Air Travel With the Mixed Data Estimation Method, Journal of Air 
Transport Management, 14(6), 297-303. 
Park, Y., Ha, H. K. (2006) Analysis of the Impact of High-Speed Railroad Service 
on Air Transport Demand, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics 
and Transportation Review, 42(2), 95-104. 
Pearce, B. (2012) The State of Air Transport Markets and the Airline Industry After 
the Great Recession, Journal of Air Transport Management, 21(0), 3-9. 
Pels, E., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P. (2000) Airport and Airline Competition for 
Passengers Departing From a Large Metropolitan Area, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 48(1), 29-45. 
Pels, E., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P. (2003) Access to and Competition Between 
Airports: A Case Study for the San Francisco Bay Area, Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 37(1), 71-83. 
Pels, E., Verhoef, E. T. (2004) The Economics of Airport Congestion Pricing, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 55(2), 257-277. 
Porter, M. (1979) How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, Harvard Business 
Review, 57(2), 137-145. 
Proussaloglou, K., Koppelman, F. (1999) The Choice of Air Carrier, Flight, and Fare 
Class, Journal of Air Transport Management, 5(4), 193-201. 
Reynolds, S. S., Wilson, B. J. (2000) Bertrand Edgeworth Competition, Demand 
Uncertainty, and Asymmetric Outcomes, Journal of Economic Theory, 
92(1), 122-141. 
References     153 
 
Rouwendal, J., Boter, J. (2009) Assessing the Value of Museums With a Combined 
Discrete Choice/Count Data Model, Applied Economics, 41(11), 1417-
1436. 
Schuman, H.O. (1986) Oligopolistic Nonlinear Pricing - A Study of Trading 
Stamps and Airline Frequent Flyer Programs. Chicago: Northwestern 
University. 
Sharp, B., Sharp, A. (1997) Loyalty Programs and Their Impact on Repeat-Purchase 
Loyalty Patterns, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 14(5), 
473-486. 
Shen, J. (2009) Latent Class Model or Mixed Logit Model? A Comparison by 
Transport Mode Choice Data, Applied Economics, 41(22), 2915-2924. 
Skinner, R. E. (1976) Airport Choice: An Empirical Study, Transportation 
Engineering Journal, 102(4), 871-882. 
Steer Davies Gleave (2006) Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities. 
Strotz, R. H. (1957) The Empirical Implications of a Utility Tree, Econometrica, 
25(2), 269-280. 
Taylor, G. A., Neslin, S. A. (2005) The Current and Future Sales Impact of a Retail 
Frequency Reward Program, Journal of Retailing, 81(4), 293-305. 
Thomas Cook (2011) European Rail Timetable. Peterborough: Thomas Cook 
Publishing. 
Tirole, J. (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Train, K. (2003) Discrete Choice Methods With Simulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
UIC, International Union of Railways. (2011) High Speed Lines in the World. 
Available at http://www.uic.org/spip.php?article573. 
UIC, International Union of Railways. (2012) Railway Statistics: Synopsis. 
Available at http://www.uic.org/spip.php?rubrique1449. 
Van Ommeren, J. N., Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, E. (2011) Are Workers With a Long 
Commute Less Productive? An Empirical Analysis of Absenteeism, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 41(1), 1-8. 
154     References  
 
Verhoef, P. C. (2003) Understanding the Effect of Customer Relationship 
Management Efforts on Customer Retention and Customer Share 
Development, Journal of Marketing, 67(4), 30-45. 
Vickerman, R. (1997) High-Speed Rail in Europe: Experience and Issues for Future 
Development, The Annals of Regional Science, 31(1), 21-38. 
Vives, X. (1999) Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Westin, J., Kågeson, P. (2012) Can High Speed Rail Offset Its Embedded 
Emissions?, Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment, 17(1), 1-7. 
WTO, World Trade Organization. (2007) Air Transport and the GATS: 2000-2005 
in Review. Lausanne: WTO Publications. 
Young, D. T. (2010) Endogenous Investment and Pricing Under Uncertainty, The 
B.E.Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10(1), 1-27. 
Zhang, A. (1996) An Analysis of Fortress Hubs in Airline Networks, Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy, 30(3), 293-307. 
 Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
  
  
  
Het effect van heterogeniteit in vraag en aanbod op marktwerking 
in de luchtvaartsector 
In 1838 legt Antoine Augustin Cournot de basis voor het bestuderen van 
strategische interactie tussen aanbieders en de totstandkoming van prijzen in 
markten waar slechts enkele bedrijven actief zijn. Bijna een halve eeuw later, in 
1883, beschrijft Joseph Louis François Bertrand de naar hem vernoemde paradox: 
aanbieders met marktmacht kunnen deze niet uitoefenen omdat prijsconcurrentie 
leidt tot prijzen gelijk aan de marginale productiekosten. Weer bijna een halve 
eeuw later, in 1929, beschrijft Harold Hotelling een oplossing voor deze paradox: 
het aanbieden van niet-homogene producten in combinatie met consumenten die 
verschillen in hun preferenties, resulteert in prijzen die hoger liggen dan de 
marginale productiekosten. Veel economen houden zich sindsdien bezig met de 
vraag hoe productdifferentiatie de strategische interactie tussen aanbieders in een 
onvolkomen markt beïnvloedt.  
Deze dissertatie behandelt aan de hand van vijf verschillende deelstudies het effect 
van heterogene consumentenvoorkeuren endogene productdifferentiatie op de 
strategische interactie tussen aanbieders in onvolkomen markten. De concurrentie 
tussen luchtvaartmaatschappijen in de luchtvaartsector vormt in deze dissertatie 
het voorbeeld van zo’n onvolkomen markt waarop het te ontwikkelen theoretisch 
en empirisch kader kan worden toegepast. Recente ontwikkelingen in deze sector – 
bijvoorbeeld de opkomst van hogesnelheidstreinen en prijsvechters zoals Ryanair 
en easyJet – maken een analyse van juist deze markt relevant vanuit 
wetenschappelijk- en beleidsoogpunt.  
Voor traditionele luchtvaartmaatschappijen en beleidsmakers is het belangrijk om 
te begrijpen wat de kansen en mogelijkheden zijn van de toetreding van imperfecte 
substituten in deze vervoersmarkten. In Nederland speelt bijvoorbeeld de vraag 
hoe de strategie van het hub-and-spoke netwerk van Air France-KLM wordt 
beïnvloed door concurrentie van easyJet vanaf Schiphol, van Ryanair vanaf 
Eindhoven, en treinverbindingen tussen Amsterdam en andere Europese 
hoofdsteden. Hoofdstuk 6 geeft een ander voorbeeld. Dit hoofdstuk bestudeert de 
concurrentie tussen prijsvechters, traditionele luchtvaartmaatschappijen, en de 
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hogesnelheidstrein Eurostar in de vervoersmarkt tussen Londen en Parijs. De 
gerealiseerde tijdwinst van de hogesnelheidstrein in de jaren 2003 tot en met 2009 
heeft bijgedragen aan een markt waarin de Eurostar een dominante marktpositie 
heeft. Om bijvoorbeeld de grootschalige investeringen in hogesnelheidslijnen te 
kunnen beoordelen, moeten verschillende aspecten – waaronder 
bereikbaarheidseffecten, milieueffecten, netwerkeffecten, en substitutie- en 
concurrentie-effecten – worden bestudeerd. Deze dissertatie ontwikkelt een 
analytisch kader om dit laatste effect, de concurrentie, te analyseren. In deze 
analyse wordt rekening gehouden met zowel geobserveerde en niet-geobserveerde 
verschillen tussen consumentenvoorkeuren, endogene en exogene 
productdifferentiatie, en de mogelijkheid voor bedrijven om meerdere 
productvarianten aan te bieden.  
In Hoofdstuk 2 staat de vraag centraal hoe een monopolist de prijs en kwaliteit van 
verschillende productvarianten bepaalt, gegeven dat de consumenten verschillen in 
hun preferentie voor kwaliteit. Deze verschillen worden uitgedrukt in de 
zogenoemde betalingsbereidheid voor kwaliteit. Eerdere theoretische bijdragen in 
de literatuur, met name Mussa en Rosen (1978), analyseren deze vraag onder de 
veronderstelling dat de monopolist alle verschillende consumentenvoorkeuren 
volledig kan waarnemen. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat deze veronderstelling niet 
noodzakelijk is en dat het gedrag van de monopolist geanalyseerd kan worden met 
vraagfuncties die consistent zijn met het random utility model. In dit model wordt 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen systematisch en stochastisch nut (random utility), 
waarbij het stochastisch nut enkel waarneembaar is door het individu zelf. Random 
utility modellen worden veelvuldig gebruikt om in empirische analyses het discrete 
keuzegedrag van individuen te analyseren. In tegenstelling tot Anderson en de 
Palma (1992a en 1992b), toont dit hoofdstuk aan dat het gebruik van random 
utility modellen niet per definitie leidt tot het paradoxale en onrealistische 
evenwicht waarin de monopolist verschillende varianten met exact dezelfde prijs en 
kwaliteitskenmerken aanbiedt. Voor relatief lage waarden van niet-geobserveerde 
heterogeniteit bestaat er een evenwicht waarbij alle varianten verschillen in de prijs 
en kwaliteitskenmerken. Naarmate de monopolist de heterogeniteit tussen 
consumenten minder goed kan waarnemen, wordt het voor de monopolist minder 
aantrekkelijk om de producten te differentiëren. Dit leidt uiteindelijk tot de 
genoemde onrealistische evenwichtspatronen.  
Met het oog op concurrentie tussen luchtvaartmaatschappijen is de analyse van een 
monopolie minder goed toepasbaar. Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeert daarom dezelfde 
vraagstelling als in Hoofdstuk 2, maar dan voor een markt met twee aanbieders: 
een duopolie. Hoewel op het eerste gezicht deze uitbreiding eenvoudig lijkt, blijkt 
dat met het toevoegen van strategische interactie tussen aanbieders de kwalitatieve 
inzichten veranderen. De markt tussen Amsterdam en Manchester dient als 
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voorbeeld van zo’n duopolistische markt. In deze markt bieden zowel Air France-
KLM, een traditionele carrier, als easyJet, een prijsvechter, hun diensten aan. 
Opvallend aan het patroon van verticale differentie in deze markt is dat de 
traditionele carrier meerdere varianten aanbiedt, oplopend in prijs en kwaliteit, 
maar dat de prijsvechter slecht één variant, het goedkoopste ticket in de markt, 
aanbiedt. Cheng et al. (2011) bewijzen het bestaan van het evenwicht onder de 
veronderstelling dat alle heterogeniteit van de consumenten waarneembaar is en 
dat elk bedrijf of alle lage óf alle hoge kwaliteitsvarianten aanbiedt. Uit Hoofdstuk 3 
blijkt dat beide veronderstellingen niet noodzakelijk zijn. De analyse toont aan dat 
zowel de traditionele carrier (hoge kwaliteit aanbieder) als de prijsvechter (lage 
kwaliteit aanbieder) slechts een beperkte prikkel heeft om een extra productvariant 
aan te bieden aan de onderkant van de markt. Als de heterogeniteit van 
consumenten compleet waarneembaar is, bestaat deze prikkel helemaal niet. In dat 
geval bestaat er enkel het evenwicht zoals genoemd door Cheng et al. (2011). Is er 
echter ook sprake van niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit, dan bestaan er ook 
evenwichten waarbij niet alle varianten noodzakelijkerwijs per kwaliteit en bedrijf 
geordend zijn.  
Vervolgens analyseert Hoofdstuk 4 het effect van loyaliteitsprogramma’s in de 
luchtvaart, de zogenoemde frequent flier programs (FFP), op het bestedingsniveau 
van consumenten bij een bepaalde carrier. Loyaliteitsprogramma’s worden in de 
praktijk veelvuldig gebruikt om klantenbinding te verhogen. Opmerkelijk genoeg 
zijn er slechts enkele wetenschappelijke studies die het effect van zulke 
programma’s op het bestedingsniveau analyseren. Dit hoofdstuk gaat in op drie 
belangrijke onderwerpen en tekortkomingen van de bestaande studies: de dubbele 
causaliteit tussen het bestedingsniveau en FFP participatie (Leenheer et al., 2007); 
de eenzijdige focus op aankoopfrequentie óf de hoogte van het aankoopbedrag 
(Verhoef, 2003; Lewis, 2004; and Liu, 2007); en het meten van het effect van een 
verandering in de FFP beloningsstructuur (Dorotic, et al., 2011). De gebruikte 
dataset omvat een representatieve steekproef van het klantenbestand van een FFP 
van een bepaalde carrier waarin alle transacties van 2006 tot en met 2008 van deze 
consumenten zijn opgenomen.110 Het betreffende FFP is in August 2007 compleet 
vernieuwd. Vanaf het moment van deze verandering omvat het FFP status levels en 
een niet-lineair spaarpunten systeem voor alle deelnemers. Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikt 
deze verandering om het effect van FFP op consumentengedrag aan te tonen 
gebaseerd op een two-stage budgetting model. Om de keuze tussen verschillende 
vliegtickets – de hoogte van het transactiebedrag – te analyseren wordt in de eerste 
stap van dit model een panel mixed logit model geschat. Met een Poisson count 
data model wordt het effect van de verandering in het FFP op het aantal vluchten 
                                                          
110  De data is aangeleverd onder de voorwaarde dat het desbetreffende FFP en/of de 
luchtvaartmaatschappij niet bij naam wordt genoemd. 
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dat de FFP leden met deze carrier maken – de aankoopfrequentie – geanalyseerd. 
Via het two-stage budgetting model is het mogelijk om het effect van de 
verandering in het FFP voor de consumenten uit te drukken in 
consumentensurplus. Deze berekening, gebaseerd op zowel het effect op 
aankoopfrequentie en hoogte van aankoopbedrag, laat zien dat het gemiddelde 
individuele consumentensurplus is gedaald met ongeveer 47 dollar (in 2008 US$). 
Dit komt neer op 8 dollar per vlucht of 7 procent van de gemiddelde prijs van een 
vliegticket. 
In de luchtvaart is naast prijs en kwaliteit ook capaciteit een belangrijke variabele 
die aanbieders inzetten in de concurrentie voor passagiers. Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert 
het strategisch gedrag van aanbieders in een duopolie waar prijs en kwaliteit 
worden bepaald en de producten imperfecte substituten zijn. De aanbieders 
bepalen tegelijkertijd hun capaciteit zonder het exacte niveau van de geaggregeerde 
vraag te weten. Nadat capaciteiten bepaald zijn, wordt het exacte niveau van de 
vraag bekend en bepalen beide aanbieders tegelijkertijd hun prijs. In de 
luchtvaartsector worden capaciteiten bepaald zonder dat het exacte niveau van de 
vraag voor vluchten bekend is. Concurrentie op basis van prijs, kwaliteit, en 
capaciteit is relevant voor alle markten waar capaciteit kostbaar is en het product 
niet kan worden opgeslagen, zoals hotels en elektriciteitsopwekking. Voorgaande 
studies bestuderen alleen het effect van onzekerheid over de geaggregeerde vraag 
(Reynolds en Wilson, 2000) óf differentiatie (Benassy, 1989) op het gedrag van 
aanbieders. Hoofdstuk 5 combineert beide elementen op een innovatieve manier in 
een theoretisch model en analyseert de effecten in het evenwicht op capaciteiten, 
welvaart, en prijsvariatie. Een subgame perfect Nash evenwicht in pure strategieën 
blijkt te bestaan onder de voorwaarde dat de producten voldoende verticaal 
gedifferentieerd zijn. Zelfs als de capaciteitskosten en het verticale verschil in 
kwaliteit tussen de producten elkaar opheffen is het evenwicht toch asymmetrisch 
in capaciteiten. Dit resultaat wordt ook door Reynolds en Wilson (2000) 
beschreven. De resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 5 tonen aan dat verticale 
productdifferentiatie leidt tot minder prijsvariatie voor het product met hoge 
kwaliteit. Voor het product met lage kwaliteit leidt productdifferentiatie juist tot 
meer prijsvariatie. Het differentiëren van prijsvariatie naar soort bedrijf is een 
mogelijke verklaring voor de tegenstrijdige empirische resultaten betreffende 
prijsvariatie binnen één bedrijf (zie, bijvoorbeeld, Borenstein en Rose (1994), 
Hayes en Ross (1998) en Gerardi en Shapiro (2009)). 
Zoals hierboven genoemd, geeft Hoofdstuk 6 een empirische analyse van inter and 
intramodale concurrentie in de Londen-Parijs passagiersmarkt over de jaren 2003 
tot en met 2009. Ondanks de recente ontwikkelingen en uitbreidingen van 
hogesnelheidslijnen wereldwijd zijn er maar enkele studies die intermodale 
concurrentie onderzoeken: González-Savignat (2004), Park en Ha (2006), en 
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Ortúzar en Simonetti (2008). Een belangrijk kenmerk van al deze studies is dat zij 
zijn uitgevoerd voordat de hogesnelheidstrein daadwerkelijk in gebruik was 
genomen. Een logisch gevolg is dat deze studies gebruik maken van zogenoemde 
stated preference onderzoekstechnieken. De studie in Hoofdstuk 6 echter 
analyseert daadwerkelijk reisgedrag van individuen in de Londen-Parijs markt. 
Verschillende discrete keuzemodellen, onder andere mixed logit modellen, zijn 
geschat voor zaken en niet-zaken reizigers. De resultaten worden gebruikt om het 
effect van het verdwijnen van twee carriers in deze markt en het verbeteren van de 
service van de Eurostar door snellere reistijd en hogere frequentie op het 
keuzegedrag van individuen te bepalen. De resultaten tonen aan dat gegeven de 
variatie in de attribuutwaarden over de verschillende alternatieven met name de 
reistijd en de aangeboden frequentie belangrijke determinanten van het 
keuzegedrag zijn. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat door de zeer hoge frequentie en 
bijhorende capaciteit en de relatief gunstige reistijd van de Eurostar de 
luchtvaartmaatschappijen in de toekomst meer moeite zullen hebben te 
concurreren met de Eurostar. De marktmacht van de hogesnelheidstrein operator 
zal bij ongewijzigd verder toenemen.  
 
 
Implicaties en suggesties voor verder onderzoek 
Deze dissertatie heeft een analytisch kader ontwikkeld én beschreven om het effect 
van heterogeniteit in vraag en aanbod op het gedrag van aanbieders en 
consumenten in oligopolistische markten te bestuderen. Het beschreven kader kan 
in zowel descriptief als normatief vervolgonderzoek worden gebruikt om 
welvaarttheoretische vraagstukken te analyseren.  
Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 laten zien dat het in empirisch onderzoek zeer populaire 
random utility model tevens een geschikt kader is om evenwichtspatronen van 
verticale productdifferentiatie in onvolkomen markten theoretisch te analyseren: 
dit model biedt de flexibiliteit om zowel de in de literatuur vaak beschreven 
symmetrische als de in praktijk vaak voorkomende asymmetrische 
evenwichtspatronen te repliceren. Uit deze dissertatie blijkt dat heterogeniteit in de 
consumentenvoorkeuren cruciaal is voor het strategisch gedrag van aanbieders. 
Met name de relatieve verhouding tussen geobserveerde en niet-geobserveerde 
heterogeniteit bepaalt in de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 of er een asymmetrisch evenwicht 
bestaat. Vervolgonderzoek moet zich richten op de empirische validatie van deze 
conclusie: hoe groot is de niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit in markten met enkele 
aanbieders waar prijs en kwaliteit worden bepaald? De luchtvaartsector kan hier 
weer als voorbeeld dienen, maar laat ook meteen de uitdaging van zulk onderzoek 
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zien: het vinden van benaderingen voor kwaliteitsverschil. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt 
kwaliteitsverschil enkel gemeten aan de hand van alternatief specifieke constanten 
(alternative specific constants). Echter, de betalingsbereidheid voor betere 
benaderingen van kwaliteit zoals het aantal restricties op het ticket of het verschil 
in kwaliteit op de vlucht (maaltijd, stoelgrootte) moeten empirisch worden getest.  
De resultaten uit Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 zijn toepasbaar om yield management 
strategieën van aanbieders verder te analyseren. Uit de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 blijkt 
dat er slecht een beperkte prikkel is om meerdere varianten van een product aan te 
bieden. Sterker nog, als er concurrentie is tussen twee aanbieders is de marginale 
opbrengst van het aanbieden van een extra variant minimaal: dit suggereert dat er 
een natuurlijke limiet is aan het aanbieden van varianten. Dit beeld vindt 
bevestiging in de praktijk: luchtvaartmaatschappijen bieden hoogstens vijf 
varianten binnen hun productlijn aan. In tegenstelling tot de huidige strategie van 
easyJet voorspelt het model van verticale productdifferentiatie zoals besproken in 
de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 dat een strategie met het aanbieden van een lage en een 
hoge kwaliteit variant niet tot een evenwicht leidt. Verder onderzoek is nodig om 
dit verschil tussen het theoretische inzicht en de praktijk te verklaren. Een 
mogelijkheid is dat in werkelijkheid de prijsvechter, easyJet, verwacht dat de 
traditionele carrier, Air France-KLM, zijn kwaliteit van de tickets niet aanpast 
en/of enkel aanpast voor de tickettypen die het meest lijken op de hoge kwaliteit 
variant van easyJet. Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 zijn gemodelleerd op basis van puur Nash 
gedrag. De twee bovenstaande mogelijke verwachtingen en reacties wijken hiervan 
af. Deze hypothese heeft verdere onderbouwing en onderzoek nodig. Een andere 
mogelijke oorzaak is het feit dat in deze dissertatie wordt verondersteld dat alle 
aanbieders dezelfde kostenfunctie hebben en dat de kosten dus slechts afhangen 
van de te kiezen kwaliteit. Asymmetrie in kosten, bijvoorbeeld een kostenvoordeel 
voor de prijsvechter, kan leiden tot andere evenwichtspatronen dan nu 
gerapporteerd in de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3.  
De resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 4 suggereren dat met het FFP de 
luchtvaartmaatschappij een mechanisme tot haar beschikking heeft dat het 
bestedingsniveau van deelnemende consumenten verhoogt: het in de buurt komen 
van het volgende puntenniveau waarbij de consument een beloning krijgt, 
bijvoorbeeld extra status, verhoogt de bestedingen van diezelfde consument. Dit 
houdt in dat als de luchtvaartmaatschappij dit mechanisme weet uit te bouwen – 
door bijvoorbeeld extra drempelwaarden en dus status levels in te voeren – dit het 
bestedingsniveau van consumenten verder versterkt. Het onderzoek en de 
gerapporteerde resultaten in Hoofdstuk 4 bieden ook mogelijkheden voor 
vervolgonderzoek. Het meten van de waardering van een bepaald status niveau is 
hierbij de belangrijkste uitbreiding. Hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat het 
consumentensurplus per vlucht is gedaald, maar meet niet expliciet de voordelen 
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van status. Het is dus mogelijk dat er een afruil plaatsvindt tussen de daling van het 
consumentensurplus per vlucht en de extra voordelen die een bepaalde status 
oplevert.    
De relatie tussen prijsvariatie en concurrentie zoals behandeld in de Hoofdstukken 
2, 3 en 5 is van belang voor mededingingsbeleid. Volgens Dana (1999) is de 
prijsvariatie van een product binnen één bedrijf hoger naarmate concurrentie 
tussen bedrijven toeneemt. Dana schrijft dit toe aan onzekerheid over het niveau 
van de geaggregeerde vraag. Hoofdstuk 5 echter toont aan dat concurrentie – 
rekening houdend met onzekerheid in de geaggregeerde vraag en 
productdifferentiatie – zowel kan leiden tot meer of minder prijsvariatie 
afhankelijk van de aangeboden kwaliteit. Uit Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 volgt dat door 
yield management prijsvariatie juist daalt naarmate concurrentie tussen de twee 
aanbieders toeneemt. Met andere woorden, een eenduidige relatie tussen 
prijsvariatie en concurrentie bestaat niet. De suggestie die in de literatuur gedaan 
wordt om prijsvariatie als indicator voor kartelvorming te gebruiken is niet uit te 
voeren zolang deze relatie niet eenduidig is. Vervolgonderzoek dat rekening houdt 
met zowel onzekerheid evenals yield management van aanbieders is noodzakelijk 
om de relatie tussen competitie en prijsvariatie beter te kunnen duiden. Enkel als 
de oorzaak van prijsvariatie vast staat, kan men prijsvariatie gebruiken om 
normatieve uitspraken te doen over het functioneren van markten.    
Kortom, het is cruciaal om te begrijpen hoe markten functioneren als er slechts 
enkele aanbieders zijn en er dus sprake is van onvolkomen concurrentie. Dit geldt 
met name voor vraagstukken die betrekking hebben op yield management en op 
het terrein van (transport)mededingings- en investeringsbeleid. Dit proefschrift 
beoogt de kennis over het functioneren van deze markten te vergroten en uit te 
breiden door rekening te houden met productdifferentiatie, meerdere 
productvarianten per aanbieder, en heterogeniteit in consumentenvoorkeuren. 
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